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Mathematical models are powerful tools for simulating plausible epidemic spread scenarios
and for evaluating the impact of control policies. They represent the scientific basis on
which public health policy makers should take their decisions on the intervention strate-
gies that should be performed at local, national and international scale. In this context,
Individual-Based simulation Models (IBM) have become one of the much relevant ap-
proaches.
The crucial point of this thesis project is to override some of the limit of the current
generation of IBM. Specifically, highly detailed models of the sociodemography and mobility
of the Italian and European population have been developed; a model of individuals and
households demographics, which leads the network of contacts among individual to evolve
over time, has been introduced; an analysis of the role of different assumptions on the
“random”contacts among the individuals of a population on the spread of epidemics has
been performed.
Results such as the development, for the first time in literature, of an IBM working
on a continental scale and of an IBM suitable for the investigation of endemic diseases
represent a crucial improvement for the community of epidemic modelers. Moreover, the
achieved results in terms of evaluation of the effectiveness of (individually-targeted) public
health control measures have had a practical application. In fact, they have been used by the
Italian Ministry of Health for assessing the efficacy of the Italian pandemic preparedness
plan and for planning the mitigation strategies for the 2009 A(H1N1) influenza pandemic.
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At the time of writing (August 6, 2009), a new subtype of influenza A(H1N1) virus is
rapidly spreading worldwide, with over 171,000 cases and over 1,500 deaths [39]. Devel-
oping measures for controlling the ongoing (and future) influenza pandemics represents
a crucial challenge for public health agencies worldwide. In fact, during the last century
there were three influenza pandemics, the most devastating in 1918–19 which killed 20 to
50 million people worldwide [80]. Considering that since 1918 the world’s population has
more than tripled and that global traveling and urbanization have increased dramatically,
it is easy to understand the pessimistic scenarios predicted in many recent studies in case
of a future pandemic, with huge human and economic losses [109]. This has motivated
intensive pandemic planning in many countries, with several intervention strategies being
suggested by the World Health Organization (WHO), involving both medical and pub-
lic health countermeasures. Measures such as travel restrictions, schools and workplaces
closure, antiviral treatment and prophylaxis, vaccination, case isolation, quarantine may
all be useful, but the need clearly arises to carefully and timely study their effectiveness
and feasibility. Non–pharmaceutical interventions involving social distancing may have
negative consequences (e.g., in terms of acceptability by the population) and, in general,
can be helpful for slowing down the course of an epidemic rather than to minimize its
impact. Antiviral availability will be limited for most of the world’s population and the
antiviral stockpile is below the level recommended by WHO also for many occidental
countries [121]. Vaccine needs time for the production: its availability is estimated to be
of about 4 months at best [111] (other estimates are 6 months at best [128, 112]).
In this context, mathematical models are powerful tools for simulating realistic pan-
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2 Chapter 1. Introduction
demic spread scenarios and for evaluation of the potential impact of control policies. They
may be useful to identify optimal strategies, to set priorities and to establish criteria for
deployment and use of antivirals and vaccine and, more in general, for testing the effec-
tiveness of containing/mitigating strategies included in national pandemic preparedness
plans [114, 124]. Recent work has illustrated the ability of mathematical models to pre-
dict the course of actual epidemics, and to help policy makers in the design of control
measures, e.g., in the 2001 foot–and–mouth disease epidemic in UK cattle [48] and in the
2002–2003 global outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) [116].
Specifically, in the case of person–to–person transmitted diseases, households, schools
and workplaces often represents the main places where transmission occurs because in-
dividuals have a lot of contacts [105] and spend a lot of time [133] in such contexts.
Therefore, from a public health point of view, control measures aimed to reduce the
number of contacts in these locations (e.g., schools closure or case isolation) or the ad-
ministration of drugs to household or school/workplace contacts of a clinical case (e.g.,
antiviral prophylaxis) can play a key role in the control of an epidemic.
In IBM, individuals and the main places where virus transmission can occur are ex-
plicitly represented. Therefore, since they allow the explicit representation of the actual
locations where intervention measures will be implemented to reduce transmission, they
are currently considered the best tools for testing the effectiveness of control strategies.
In this context, the main effort has been done for the evaluation of strategies for contain-
ing/mitigating a new influenza pandemic [46, 47, 85, 87, 54, 132, 29, 35, 64, 96], and for
testing control measures in response to a bioterroristic smallpox attacks [42, 86, 65, 115].
1.2 The Problem
In this PhD thesis we have faced the following problems. The first is the evaluation of
highly realistic individually targeted public health interventions for mitigating an influenza
pandemic (as the ongoing A(H1N1) epidemic) in Italy by developing an individual based
model. The main aim of this part of the project is giving precise indication on the course
of a pandemic influenza to the public health policy makers, in order to minimize the
impact of the epidemic in terms of number of cases, severity of the infections, number of
individuals simultaneously ill and the economic burden.
The second point is to extend, for the first time, individual based models to a con-
tinental scale. Nowadays, IBM has been used for describing epidemic outbreak on a
community scale (e.g., see [85]), on a city level (e.g., see [42]) or on a country level (e.g.,
see [47, 54, 29]). However these models have not been developed at continental scale and
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thus it is still how epidemics could spread at this scale and what extent the heterogeneity
of mobility patterns and population heterogeneity affect its spread. The main issues we
have had to face for working on a continental scale concerns (i) the collection of a huge
amount of sociodemographic data on each country of the considered geographic area; (ii)
the development of new more efficient algorithm and data structure for dealing with hun-
dreds of millions of individuals; (iii) the development of a model of the highly variable
sociodemographic structure of the populations of a continent and (iv) the development of
a model of their mobility.
As highlighted by Riley [114], the need arises “to develop a simple model of house-
hold demographics, so that these large–scale models can be extended to the investigation
of long–time scale human pathogens”. In fact, endemic diseases such as tuberculosis,
measles, malaria, hepatitis and HIV represent important public health issues worldwide
[106]. One of the aim of this project is to extend IBM in order to allow them describing
also endemic diseases. To such aim it is required to integrate birth and death processes
togather with a model of household demography. Again, the use of IBM allows the
evaluation of both mass and individually targeted public health interventions aimed at
controlling/limiting the impact and severity of endemic diseases.
Finally, since for the transmission of a human–to–human infectious diseases places
where individuals have contacts with other individuals could be the source of infections,
they can potentially play a relevant role in the spread of an epidemic. Unfortunately, even
if information about the number and the duration of such kind of contacts are currently
becoming available [105, 133], their explicit representation in the models are still debated
[114]. Therefore, we investigate the impact of different assumptions on these kind of
“unstructured” contacts on the course of simulated epidemics.
1.3 The Solution
In order to reach the first objective briefly described in Section 1.2, the main ingredient
has been the development of a highly detailed model of the Italian sociodemography.
This was possible thanks to the collection of detailed sociodemographic data (e.g., on the
age-structure, on households composition, on schools and workplaces sizes, on national
and international travels). This allows us to test public health interventions and giving
precise indications to the policy makers.
For quantifying the impact of the “arbitrary” assumptions on modeling the unstruc-
tured contacts we re-implement the main approaches used in literature and we made a
systematic comparison of the simulated epidemics.
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For extending IBM to a continental scale we collected a huge amount of data, similar
to that used for the Italian model, for each considered country. After the data collection,
the one of the problems we faced has been the computational cost of the previously
developed algorithms and the large RAM memory required by the simulations. Therefore,
we have developed new data structure and more efficients algorithms for overcome the
computational difficulties. Moreover, from a modeling point of view, we spent a big effort
on developing a reliable model of human mobility, which keep into account both daily
short-distance travels (e.g., movements between the places of residence and work) and
occasionally long-distance travels.
For describing the dynamics of long–time scale human pathogens we have developed
a model of households demographics and the network of contacts among individual has
become dynamic. This allow us to investigate endemic diseases through IBM simulations.
1.4 Innovative Aspects
This project contributes to the advancement of the knowledge in modeling infectious dis-
eases dynamics. In particular, it contributes to a better understanding the consequences
of the hypotheses usually made on modeling the random contacts component among the
individuals of a human population.
Our evaluation of the mitigation strategies in response to a diffusion of a new influenza
pandemic are currently contributing for controlling the A(H1N1) pandemic in Italy. Our
evaluation of an age–prioritized use of antiviral drugs certainly represents an original
contribution to the fight to influenza pandemics.
From a completely different point of view, thanks to the great improvements in terms
of algorithms and data structure, for the first time in literature we have been able to
propose a continental scale IBM. The European model, developed within this project,
probably represents the more detailed model for describing an epidemic spread on a large-
scale. This model allowed us to study the effects of population heterogeneity and human
mobility on the spread of an epidemic.
Finally, the development of a dynamic network of contacts and a model of households
demography allowed us to extend IBM to the analysis of endemic diseases. This can
be consider a crucial step to the identification of more suitable strategies for controlling
endemic diseases (e.g., tuberculosis, HIV, hepatitis), which represent important public
health issues worldwide [106].
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is structured as follows. In the next chapter, a brief review on mathematical
models of human infectious diseases transmission is carried out. This is mainly focused
on individual based models and it highlights the main assumptions and features of the
current “state-of-the-art” IBM. In chapter 3, the problems we have faced during the thesis
project are described.
In chapter 4, the approaches used for dealing with the problems are described in
details. Specifically, three main types of models are introduced. First, in Sec. 4.1, the
model used for testing the effectiveness of different intervention options for mitigating an
influenza pandemic in Italy is described. Second, in Sec. 4.2, the continental-scale IBM
is introduced. Third, in Sec. 4.3, it is shown how our IBM have been extended in order
to investigate endemic diseases.
Chapter 5, the main results of this project are presented. In particular, in Sec. 5.1, it
is shown to what extent is the impact of different modeling assumptions on the general
(“random”) contacts among the population on the spread of an influenza pandemic. In
Sec. 5.2 and 5.3, detailed individually targeted strategies (considered by health policy
makers) for mitigating an influenza pandemic in Italy are evaluated. In Sec. 5.4, the role
of sociodemographic structure and mobility of the European population on the spread of
an influenza pandemic at continental scale. Finally, In Sec. 5.5, the effects of different
options for controlling hepatitis A (which ranges from mass vaccination to individually
targeted interventions) are shown.
In chapter 6, a comparison with current “state-of-the-art” IBM developed by other
authors is performed. Finally, chapter 7 is dedicated to summarize the work made during
this thesis project and to highlight possible future directions of IBM for infectious diseases
transmission.
6 Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2
State of the Art
Depending on the diseases and on the intervention options considered, different models
can result a valuable choice to describe the spatiotemporal evolution of an epidemic and to
assess the impact of containment/mitigation strategies. Classical deterministic compart-
mental models based on Kermack and McKendrick’s work [82] have the main advantage of
transparency and simplicity. They are easy to develop and fast to solve, allowing for rig-
orous sensitivity analysis to explore the dependence of model output on uncertainty of the
parameters. They can be used, either in simple and in structured form (considering age
structure [37] and/or geographic component [126]), for describing the temporal dynamics
of an epidemic and for the assessment of some containment or mitigation strategies, such
as mass vaccination [37] or border restrictions [31]. On the other hand, the evaluation
of realistic, individually targeted, public health intervention strategies, such as antiviral
prophylaxis of household or school/workplace contacts of index cases, in turn requires
highly detailed models. Spatially explicit models provide a plausible system in which the
precise spatial location of individuals and movement patterns can be employed to evaluate
intervention options [114]. Spatial models can be broadly divided into three major cate-
gories: patch models, distance–based models, network models. In patch models, the force
of infection (FOI) received by an individual living in a patch (e.g., a town) depends on the
distance between the patch of residence and the patches of the infectious individuals: all
the members of a patch receive the same FOI. In distance–based models individuals are
assigned a precise location and the FOI is a decreasing function of the distance between
susceptible and infectious individuals. In network models individuals are connected to
other individuals by co–locating them into groups (e.g., households, schools and work-
places, etc.). Additionally, the members of a group can be not equally well connected. For
instance, in large schools or workplaces subgroups of individuals, representing classmates
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or close colleagues, can be more strongly connected. The FOI received by a susceptible
individual is non zero when he/she shares an arc with a infectious individual.
To simulate either of the previous models (patch, distance–based, and network) Indi-
vidual Based Models, also called Agent Based Models, can be used. An IBM is a model
for simulating the interaction of individuals (or agents) and it is the common way to
simulate a network model (in this proposal, the term IBM refers to network models for
infectious diseases where individuals are explicitly represented). In fact, incorporating
local contact network structure in classical models is difficult: for instance, households
(or schools/workplaces) cannot easily be represented as structures distinct from patches,
despite household transmission occurring at a much higher rate than community transmis-
sion (which can be considered an unstructured contacts component). Moreover structures
as households and schools/workplaces play an important role in the assessment of control
measures because they are often considered targets for interventions. The inclusion of
this type of population structure together with age structure (coming from realistic de-
mography) and the possibility to model the course of the illness in each individual, makes
IBM more suitable.
Making a step back to the main question of responding to the emerging of a new
influenza pandemic, network models (and thus IBM) allow the evaluation of intervention
measures targeted at individual level, in locations such as households, schools, workplaces,
transportations and hospitals which are among the most important routes of influenza
transmission. Since households are considered the main route of influenza transmission,
as shown in [132], it is not possible to neglect this structure to test efficient mitigation
strategies. Many efforts were done in this context. In particular Ferguson et al. propose
large–scale (national level) IBM for assessing containment strategies in South–East Asia
[46] and mitigation strategies in US and UK [47]. These models are network models (ex-
plicitly modeling households, schools and workplaces) where also the distance between
individuals is considered (to describe the random component of the transmission). For
the first time in [46] was proposed an IBM at national level (accounting for millions of
individuals); super–computing techniques were adopted to overcome the computational
problems of these models, in terms of RAM memory consumption and computational cost
of the algorithm. In [85] a network model is employed for assessing the effectiveness of
containment strategies based on antiviral prophylaxis in a typical American community.
In this paper a higher level of details on the sociodemographic structure of the population
is reached (e.g. local neighborhood and playgroups). This work was extended later to the
entire US population [54], so the authors were able to consider also the connections among
communities and a realistic national level epidemic was simulated. Another milestone is
9the model proposed by Longini et al. in [87], where a network model is employed for
assessing the chance of containing at the source an influenza pandemic mostly with an-
tiviral agents. Some of the above mentioned approaches, and other modeling choices, were
compared in [2] to understand to what extent different modeling choices for unstructured
contacts can affect pandemics prediction and control options.
IBM are commonly employed to describe spatiotemporal evolution of smallpox out-
breaks (mainly related to bioterrorism attacks) and to evaluate the impact of containment
strategies [65, 115]. From the point of view of public health, it would be useful to evaluate
with these models control options for other diseases such as SARS, Marburg, Ebola and
Chikungunya.
Going more into detail of the current generation of IBM, networks among individuals
are implemented on the basis of data on the sociodemographic structure of the popula-
tion considered. There exists the need to collect detailed data on the spatial and age
distribution of the population, households types and their composition, travel data (both
for incorporating commuting destinations and occasional trips), international travels data
(for determining incoming cases from abroad), etc. In principle, in IBM it would be pos-
sible to characterize the specific contact network, by employing data on every type of
contact (e.g. contacts on neglected but important activities, such as leisure time, sport
mall, restaurants, etc.) and time–use data (e.g. time spent in school/workplaces, at home,
at the canteen, etc.). Therefore IBM represent the most obvious way to relax assumptions
that were considered mandatory in traditional mathematical models of diseases, such as
the assumption of homogeneous mixing, which most mathematical models are based on.
As a first step in the construction of an IBM, contacts are progressively “structured” by
co–locating individuals into the diverse environments where they are expected to have
contacts, namely households, school, workplaces, commuting and public transportations
and so on. However, one readily realizes that most epidemics initiating from a single
focus would die out or would not travel, unless a degree of (pseudo)–randomness in con-
tacts, perhaps small, is allowed. Though largely unknown, the impact of the unstructured
component on the epidemics dynamics is not necessarily small: in fact it often prevents
epidemics to die out and allows more structured contacts to amplify the epidemics them-
selves, thus leading to potentially devastating outbreaks.
Current generation of IBM have some disadvantages: they are computationally in-
tensive; they do not allow continental/world scale simulations; they are not suitable for
describing endemic diseases; they are much harder to parameterize and validate than
classical models (e.g. the sociodemographic structure of the population is thorough, but
hard to implement and update during a simulation). Some of these limitations have been
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overtaken during this thesis project.
Chapter 3
The Problem
3.1 The evaluation of individually-targeted public
health intervention for facing an influenza pan-
demic in Italy
As it is proved by the ongoing A(H1N1) pandemic, facing an influenza pandemic is a
real threat. Therefore, obtaining reliable evaluation of the effectiveness of individually
targeted public health interventions for controlling an influenza pandemic is crucial for
public health policy makers worldwide. Recently, the best solution for this problem has
been represented by IBM [114], which have been largely used for predicting the spatio–
temporal spread of pandemic influenza and for assessing the efficacy of strategies for
containing or mitigation [95, 2, 87, 46, 85, 54, 47, 132, 55, 29, 35, 64, 96] the epidemic.
Therefore, one of the problem we faced during this thesis project was to develop an IBM
at national (Italian) scale. The main aim of this model is to give precise indication on
the dynamics of a pandemic influenza to the policy makers, in order to limit the impact
of the epidemic in terms of number of cases and death, severity of the infections, number
of individuals simultaneously ill and the economic burden.
Basically, the strategies which would be tested include vaccination, antivirals treat-
ment and/or prophylaxis, social distancing measures and travel restriction. As regards
the vaccination, it is relevant to understand which is the optimal target population; e.g.,
it can be provided to specific age classes, to at risk individuals, to essential workers or
it can be a massive. However, it is crucial also to evaluate the effects of the timing of
the vaccination: e.g., a late vaccination would results in a very low effect on limiting the
epidemic, at the cost of a relevant the economic burden. Antivirals, used for both treat-
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ment of cases and/or prophylaxis, can be used for mitigating the spread of an influenza
pandemic as long as a pandemic vaccine is not available. However, in some countries
the antiviral stockpile exceeds the number actually required for the treatment of all cases
[121]. Therefore, the problem of prioritizing the use of antivirals would be a crucial issue.
Non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as travel restrictions and social distancing mea-
sures, can delay the epidemic arrival and peak, but without reducing the overall impact of
the epidemic. However, understanding which non-pharmaceutical intervention it is better
to perform and when their impact is much relevant is another point that the model should
be able to address.
For developing a model able to reach such targets, we need to collect highly detailed
data on sociodemographic structure (e.g., age–structure, households size and composi-
tion, school size) and mobility (e.g., number of international airplane passengers, distance
between place of residence and work) of the Italian population. Another issue we have
had to address was the computational burden required (both in terms of RAM memory
and number of CPU cycles) for simulating epidemics. In this thesis it will be highlighted
how such problem were faced and overtaken.
3.2 Understanding the impact of different modeling
assumptions
IBM represent a plausible way to relax assumptions that were considered mandatory
in traditional mathematical models of diseases, such as the assumption of homogeneous
mixing, which most of mathematical models are based on.
The sources of infections for human–to–human infectious diseases are the places where
individuals have contacts with other individuals. Therefore, households, schools, work-
places, but also cinemas, malls, prisons, public transport systems, gyms, etc. play a crucial
role in the spread of an epidemic. Reliable data on households, schools and workplaces
(e.g., on the size or on the composition) are available. For this reason, in some sense,
we can consider this contact component as “known” or “structured”. On the contrary,
for all the other kind of contacts among persons, we have limited information (even if
estimations about the number and the duration of such kind of contacts are currently
becoming available [105, 133]).
However, one readily realizes that most epidemics initiating from a single focus would
die out or would not travel, unless a degree of (pseudo)-randomness in contacts, perhaps
small, is allowed. Though largely unknown, the impact of the unstructured component
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on the epidemics dynamics is not necessarily small: for instance, many current flu models
are based on the explicit assumption that unstructured contacts account for about 1/3 of
the total risk of infection per unit time [46]. Moreover, unstructured contacts prevent epi-
demics to die out and allow more structured contacts to amplify the epidemics themselves,
thus leading to potentially devastating outbreaks. The currently available generation of
infectious diseases IBM have achieved a sophisticated descriptions of the structured com-
ponent of contacts, but the unstructured component continues to be loose because of
scarce information on unstructured ones which are however the sustaining factor. What
concretely happens is that unstructured contacts are modeled in a residual way, mainly
reflecting the researcher feeling, and at best are left as free simulation parameters.
The purpose of this part of the thesis project is to evaluate to what extent different
modeling strategies for unstructured contacts can affect pandemics prediction and con-
trol. Motivated by the issue of modeling interventions aimed at containing a national
flu pandemic, we provide a comparison of various alternatives to model the unstructured
component. These alternatives include the main approaches proposed in the literature
and comprehend some new techniques. In particular, we keep the structured component
fixed, and we vary the unstructured one, looking at the implications in terms of the major
epidemic outputs, as fade-out and extinction probabilities, spatial traveling, attack rates,
and proportion of infected individuals by age.
3.3 Working on a continental scale
Another point is to extend, for the first time, individual based models to a continental
scale. Nowadays, IBM has been used for describing epidemic outbreak on a community
scale (e.g., see [85]), on a city level (e.g., see [42]) or on a country level (e.g., see [47, 54,
29]). The main issues we have had to face for working on a continental scale concerns
(i) the collection of a huge amount of sociodemographic data on each country of the
considered geographic area and (ii) the development of new more efficient algorithm and
data structure for dealing with hundreds of millions of individuals.
Specifically, the spread of an infectious disease epidemic is driven by the interplay
of two factors: the transmissibility of the virus responsible for the infection and the
characteristics of the host population. When the role of host is played by a human
population, predicting the spread of an epidemic is a tough problem due the complexity of
modern human societies. It is well established that the spatial structure of the population
has an impact on the diffusion of an epidemic: measles waves in England and Wales,
spreading from large cities to small towns, are determined by the spatial hierarchy of the
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host population structure [61], and the spatial distribution of farms influences the regional
variability of foot-and-mouth outbreaks in United Kingdom [81]. The heterogeneity of
the population itself can play an important role in the spread of an epidemic [38]. It is
also well known that human mobility patterns affect the spatiotemporal dynamics of an
epidemic: the role played by the airline transportation network has been analyzed in [30],
and it has been shown that the high degree of predictability of the worldwide spread of
infectious diseases is caused by the strong heterogeneity of the transport network [68].
However, Europe has never been analyzed as a whole and thus it is still uncertain how a
new pandemic influenza could spread in Europe. Europe comprises countries characterized
by completely different social and economical backgrounds that result in different levels
of population heterogeneity, in terms of both sociodemograpic structure and mobility.
In particular, it is still unclear how differences in the sociodemographic structure, which
result in different levels of population heterogeneity, and different patterns of human
mobility can affect the spatiotemporal spread of an epidemic.
3.4 Dealing with endemic diseases
As highlighted by Riley [114], the need arises “to develop a simple model of household
demographics, so that these large–scale models can be extended to the investigation
of long–time scale human pathogens”. In fact, endemic diseases such as tuberculosis,
measles, malaria, hepatitis and HIV represent important public health issues worldwide
[106]. One of the aim of this project is to extend IBM in order to allow them describing
also endemic diseases. In fact, “traditional” IBM have been used only for the investiga-
tion of epidemic outbreaks (which duration can be consider one year at most). Therefore,
the network of contact among individuals can reasonably be considered static. On the
contrary, when we deal with endemic diseases, the investigated temporal scale is of several
years. This implies that the network of contacts among individual has to be dynamic.
Therefore, for extending IBM to the investigation of endemic diseases we have to develop
a model for the dynamics of contacts among individuals.
Again, by using such kind of model allows the evaluation of both mass and individually
targeted public health interventions aimed to controlling/limiting the impact and severity
of endemic diseases.
Among endemic diseases, tn this part of the thesis project, we decide to focus our
attention on the dynamics of viral hepatitis A in Southern Italy. Hepatitis A virus (HAV)
is the cause of viral hepatitis A infection, which results in an acute form of hepatitis.
Patients recover completely and develop full immunity against future HAV infections
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[122]. Nevertheless, viral hepatitis A represents an important public health issue, imposing
a remarkable economic burden worldwide [15, 34] and in Italy as well [90]. HAV is
transmitted via the fecal–oral route by person–to–person contact (direct transmission) or
by ingestion of contaminated food or water (indirect transmission). Indirect transmission
represents the most important source of infection in countries with high living standards
[49, 89]. Specifically, raw mussels and shellfish consumption represents the main source
of infection in Italy [94], especially in the most affected regions: Puglia and Campania
[24, 25, 118]. Another significant source of infection is represented by travels to high
endemicity areas [94], where both direct and indirect transmission can occur. Nowadays,
even in the absence of vaccination, hepatitis A is in a decaying phase, mainly determined
by improved hygienic conditions derived from economic development and higher standards
of living [77, 78]. Although this is true also for Italy as a whole, as documented by both
notification [94, 72] and serological data [33], Southern Italy shows a different pattern.
HAV infections are still common in Puglia and Campania, two regions in Southern Italy,
where a very large outbreak was observed in 1996–1997 [90], despite the improvement of
socio–economic conditions.
Thanks to a new generation of mathematical modeling tools, the effectiveness of both
pharmaceutical (e.g., treatment or prophylaxis on a contact tracing basis) and non–
pharmaceutical (e.g., social distancing) individually targeted intervention measures can
be thoroughly investigated. Since hepatitis A is a vaccine–preventable disease, by using
our model, we want to evaluate the effectiveness of different vaccination programmes.
Moreover, we want to analyzed the effects of improvements in standards of living and
hygiene and of social distancing measures, such as isolation of symptomatic cases and
closure of day care centers and kindergartens.
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Chapter 4
The proposed approach
4.1 The Italian model
We have developed an individual based models for the transmission of an influenza like
illness. Basically, the model simulates a synthetic population of agents representing every
Italian individual. Among this population the infections can be transmitted from agent-
to-agent by a stochastic simulated transmission process. Therefore, the model has two
main ingredients: a sociodemographic model and a transmission model.
4.1.1 Simulated sociodemographic structure
Households In the national model, individuals were randomly grouped in households to
match the 2001 census data (Italian Institute of Statistics: XIV Censimento generale della
popolazione e delle abitazioni, 2001. Available at url http://dawinci.istat.it/MD/) on
age structure and data from a specific 2003 survey (Italian Institute of Statistics: Strutture
familiari e opinioni su famiglia e figli, 2003. Available at url http://www.istat.it/
dati/catalogo/20060621_03/) on household size and composition. Nine different types
of households were considered (e.g., singles or couples, with or without children, with or
without additional members, adults living together) and individuals were co-located in
households according to specific data on the percentage of the different household types,
their size, the age of the household head. Frequency distribution of household sizes for the
different household types are shown in Fig. 4.1a, together with the frequency distribution
of the household types. The availability of these data allowed us to develop a very realistic
model of the mixing of the age classes within households. The resulting age structure of
the population is shown Fig. 4.1 and it agrees well with the 2001 census data.
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Schools and workplaces The Italian population at 2001 is structured as follows:
20, 559, 595 workers, 11, 360, 556 students and 25, 084, 274 unemployed or retired. Chil-
dren and young adults were assigned to one of six levels of school (i.e., from day care
to university) on the basis of age and specific data on school attendance by age (Ital-
ian Ministry of University and Research: La scuola in cifre, 2005. Available at url
http://www.miur.it/ustat/documenti/pub2005/. Italian Ministry of University and
Research: L’universita` in cifre, 2005. Available at url http://www.miur.it/ustat/
documenti/pub2005/). Attendance to school varies widely with age: it ranges from
14% in day care centers, to 90% in kindergartens, approximately 100% in primary and
middle schools, 82% in high schools, 31% in university. We used specific data on em-
ployment rate by age in Italy to assign an employment to individuals aged more than
15 years. Workers were randomly assigned to one of seven employment categories, de-
fined by the number of employees in the workplace (see Fig. 4.1c) (Italian Institute of
Statistics: VIII Censimento generale dell’industria e dei servizi, 2001. Available at url
http://dwcis.istat.it/cis/index.htm). Teachers and school employees were also con-
sidered in the model.
Commuting We modeled travel destinations by using specific Italian data on travels
between place of residence and place of work or study. Specifically, we used a gravity
model [126], in which the probability of commuting from municipality i to municipality j







where pi and pj represent the number of individuals living in municipality i and j re-
spectively and dij is the distance between the two municipalities. θ is a proportionality
constant, τd = 0.28 and τr = 0.66 tune the dependence of dispersal on donor and recip-
ient sizes and ρ = 2.95 tunes the dependence on the distance. Model parameters were
optimized as in [29] in order to take into account that the fraction of commuters (indi-
viduals traveling outside the municipality of residence for work or study) in Italy varies
significantly from South to North of Italy, ranging from 15% in Southern Italy to 60%
in Northern Italy. Fig. 4.1d shows the resulting probability density function of travel
distances, compared with that obtained by using a model depending only on the distance,
namely Eq. (4.3), used for modeling the transmission in the general population.
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Figure 4.1: a Frequency distributions of household size for the different household types
(in blue) and frequency distribution of the different household types (in red) considered in
the model. b Age distribution from census data (blue) and simulated (red). c Proportion
of workers for class of workplace from industry census data (blue) and simulated (red).
d Probability density function of travel distances as obtained by using the gravity model
(4.1) (in blue) compared with that obtained by using the the distance kernel (4.3) (in
red).
4.1.2 Transmission models
As in [47, 54], the seeding of the infection is based on the arrival of infected individuals
from abroad. Therefore, the model accounts for two of transmission processes: among
the simulated individuals and by the importation of cases from abroad.
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Worldwide transmission model
The worldwide spread of influenza pandemic and the consequent importation of cases in
Italy were modeled using a deterministic homogeneous-mixing SEIR model. This model
was used for determining the number of imported cases in Italy from abroad over time.
Specifically, we coupled the results of the worldwide model with 2003 data on arrivals
and departures in Italy’s 38 international airports. More in detail, the number of imported
cases over time was estimated by sampling a Poisson distribution of parameter pE(t)
N
∆t,
where p is the total number of passengers arriving daily in Italy (≈ 70, 000 on average),
E(t) is the number of exposed individuals at time t predicted by the global homogeneous-
mixing model, N is the world population and ∆t is the time step of the simulation.
National transmission model
The national impact of the epidemic in Italy was predicted using a stochastic, spatially-
explicit individual-based model [47, 29]. For each individual i we define:
• Hi as the set of the ni individuals belonging to the same household of individual i;
• Lji as the set of the mji individuals attending the same school (index j = 1, . . . , 6
identifies school types, from day care centers to university) or sharing the same
workplace (index j = 7, . . . , 13 identifies workplaces of increasing size, see Fig. 4.1c)
of individual i;
Any susceptible individual i, at any time t of the simulation has a probability pi =
1− e−λi∆t of becoming infected, where ∆t = 0.25 days is the time-step of the simulation
and λi is the instantaneous risk of infection. The latter is the sum of the risks coming
from the three modeled source of infections, namely contacts with infectious members
of the household, contacts with infectious individuals working in the same workplace or























Ikβrκ(t− τk)f(dik) [1 + Ck(ω − 1)]∑N
k=1 f(dik)
(4.2)
The terms in Eq. (4.2) are defined as follows:
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• N is the total population, i.e. ≈ 57, 000, 000 of individuals;
• Ik = 1 if individual k is infected, 0 otherwise;
• βh is the within-household transmission coefficient, βjp are the within-school/workplace
transmission coefficients and βr is the transmission coefficient for random contacts.
The different transmission scenarios were drawn by varying the transmission param-
eters.
• τi is the time in which individual i became infectious and κ(T ) is a lognormal
function describing infectiousness over time. Estimates of incubation period (1.48±
0.47 days) and infectiousness period (
∫∞
0 Tκ(T )dT ) lead to a generation time Tg =
2.6 days (as in [46]);
• Ck = 1 for symptomatic cases (we assume 50% of cases to be symptomatic), 0
otherwise. Since ω = 2, the infectiousness of symptomatic cases doubles the one of
asymptomatic cases (as in [46]);
• α = 0.8 scales the household transmission rates with household size (as in [46]);
• ψjp(T ) is a function accounting for induced absenteeism and it is defined as follows:
if T > 0.25 (the minimum time for recognizing the infection) ψjp(T ) is set to: 0.1
for j = 1, 2; 0.2 for j = 3, 4; 0.25 for j = 5; 0.5 for j = 6, . . . , 13; 1 otherwise;
• as in [47, 46, 29], we assume that random contacts in the population depend explic-
itly on the distance dik between infectious individual k and susceptible individual






with a = 3.8km and ρ = 2.32 [29].
We assume that 33% of transmission occurs in households, 33% in schools or workplaces
and 33% in the general community [46, 29].
4.1.3 Epidemiological parameters
In the worldwide model, we assumed that infectious individuals were all symptomatic and
no longer traveling and that exposed individuals were asymptomatic and possibly traveling
before the infectious phase. In the national model, infectious individuals were divided
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into symptomatic and asymptomatic classes. Once an individual become infectious, the
probability of developing symptoms was set to 0.5. In both models, we assumed that the
latency period for influenza was the same as the incubation period: duration of 1.5 (±
0.5 standard deviation) days. In the national model, we assumed that the duration of
infectiousness varied over time, as a lognormal function [47, 46, 29]. Infectiousness peaked
at 1.75 days, and its duration was truncated at 10 days. This corresponded to an average
generation time of 2.6 days. In the worldwide model, the infectious period was assumed
to be constant over time and was set at 1.5 days, to give essentially the same growth rate
as the national model [47, 29].
4.1.4 Excess mortality
Though it is not possible to predict death rates in future pandemics (reliable estimates
are not available yet for the ongoing A(H1N1) influenza outbreak), it is important to
assess the effects of antiviral treatment and prophylaxis under different assumptions on
age-specific case fatality rates. We used results presented in [7] on the lethal 1918-19
influenza pandemic in Copenhagen (scenario EM1918), where deaths occurred primarily
among young persons, and in [117] on the mild 1969-70 influenza pandemic in Italy (sce-
nario EM1969), where deaths occurred primarily among elderly (as during inter-pandemic
seasons), to estimate age-specific case fatality rates. Basically, we assumed that the esti-
mated age-specific excess mortality rates as reported in [7] were associated to an epidemic
with R0 = 2 (authors report estimates of R0 in 2.2-2.4 for the Summer wave and R0 ≈ 1.2
for the Fall wave, due to preexisting immunity in the population) and we estimated age-
specific case fatality rates (for symptomatic individuals) in such a way that the age-specific
excess mortality rates as obtained by running simulations with R0 = 2 comply with the
values reported in [7]. The resulting age-specific case fatality rates were used to estimate
age-specific excess mortality in all the considered transmission scenarios. Similarly for the
data on the 1969-70 influenza pandemic in Italy, where we assumed R0 = 1.4 (estimated
value in the range 1.3-1.6 [63]).
4.2. The European model 23
4.2 The European model
We developed an individual-based epidemic simulation model [95] that accounts, at coun-
try level, for explicit transmission in households, schools, workplaces (where homogeneous
mixing is assumed) and in the general population (where the force of infection is assumed
to depend explicitly on the distance). The epidemic can spread from one country to an-
other through cross-borders diffusion and because of long distance travels. The infection
is continuously sustained in the study area by importation of cases from countries out-
side Europe. Sociodemographic data were used to generate a highly detailed synthetic
population of individuals, explicitly grouped in households, schools and workplaces, for
simulating the populations in the different countries of the study area. Data on air and
railway transportation data were used to simulate long-distance travels across the coun-
tries of the study area and to simulate importation of cases.
4.2.1 Sociodemographic structure of the European population
Population density
The Gridded Population of the World version 3 (GPW v3) [14] produced by the Center
for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) of the Earth Institute at
Columbia University was used as the source of population density for the study area.
The study area covers most part of Europe and includes all the member states of the
European Union, for a total of 37 countries. The total population of the study area is
about 515 million individuals. The most and the less populous countries are Germany
(≈ 81 millions) and the Principality of Monaco (≈ 14 thousand), respectively.
The study area covers a surface of about 5 million square kilometers and it is divided
into 63,794 cells, whose average surface is about 77 square kilometers. The number of
individuals per cell varies from 1 (in many parts of Scandinavia and Scotland) to 1,355,987
(a cell of Paris), with an average of 8,066 individuals. Such thorough grid allows a precise
spatial location of households, schools and workplaces, crucial for modeling the spatial
spread of the epidemic.
Households
The importance of considering realistic household groups in spatial studies of human dis-
eases, such as influenza, is well known [114]. The explicit representation of the household
groups in the model allows testing the effectiveness of intervention options such as antivi-
ral prophylaxis, which is considered one of the key measures for containing/mitigating a
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new influenza pandemic [129]. Moreover, since households are characterized by a static
geographic location, it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of spatial interventions
(i.e., the administration of antivirals to the individuals living within a certain distance
from a symptomatic case), which can be crucial for containing an influenza pandemic
at the source [87, 46]. Therefore, it arises the need of developing a realistic model of
household groups in the different countries of the study area. We used an heuristic model
which matches marginal distributions of household size and population age structure,
and maintains realistic generational age gaps within households (by avoiding randomly
assigned ages to the households members), respecting as best as possible the actual mix
of students, workers and inactive individuals. A sketch of the heuristic model employed
is shown below:
1. determine the household type by sampling from the distribution of the frequencies
of household type (see Fig. 1b in the main text);
2. assign an age to the household head, ah, by sampling from the distribution of the
age classes (see Fig. 1e in the main text) and by taking into account the following
constraints:
(a) ah ≥ 18,
(b) ah ≤ 65 if there are children among the household members;
3. determine the number of additional members of the households by sampling from
the proper, type dependent, distribution of the frequencies of household size;
4. assign an age to the additional members by sampling from the distribution of the
age classes and by taking into account the following constraints:
(a) the age of (eventual) wife/husband, aw, satisfies ah−15 ≤ aw ≤ ah and aw ≥ 18;
(b) the age of (eventual) children, ac, satisfies: aM − 40 ≤ ac ≤ am − 15, where
aM = max {ah, aw} and am = min {ah, aw}, if there are two adults living in the
household; ah − 40 ≤ ac ≤ ah − 15, otherwise.
Schools and workplaces
As regards the schools size, not all the countries in the study area are covered by the
PIRLS 2001 and PISA 2000 and 2003 international surveys. In the countries not covered
by the surveys we used average values. The values reported in the surveys on the size of
the Italian schools were validated by comparing them with detailed data on the location
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of all Italian schools. Specifically, we used average values of the schools size, as resulting
from the surveys, for generating a synthetic set of primary and secondary Italian schools.
We found that the resulting number of secondary schools complies with the actual number
of Italian secondary schools. On the contrary, the resulting number of primary schools is
largely lower than the the actual number of Italian primary schools. Very likely, this is due
to different definitions of school. The Italian data refer to scholastic buildings while the
survey data refer to administrative units, which can comprise several scholastic buildings.
Consequently, the actual size of the scholastic buildings (the structures relevant to the
epidemic transmission) can be largely lower than that reported in the surveys, especially
in rural areas. This considered, we allowed the minimal size of the schools simulated
in the model to be much lower than the minimal size resulting from the analysis of the
survey data.
Schools and workplaces were spatially-distributed proportionally to the population.
This assumption was supported by the analysis of the spatial location of the Italian
schools.
Data on the workplaces size for all the countries in the study area were not available.
We analyzed the distribution of the workplaces size in Italy and the United Kingdom and
we did not find significant differences. We used these data to generate a distribution of
workplaces size that we used for assigning the size to the workplaces in all the countries
of the study area.
4.2.2 Mobility of the European population
Long–distance travels within Europe
The data on the mobility of the EU27 population reveals a relevant flux of individuals
traveling among the EU27 countries (more than 360 million travelers per year). Such
volume of human movement has to be considered in the epidemic transmission model.
Therefore, since the available data refer only to EU27 members, the need arises to develop
a model of “long–distance” travels among all the considered countries.
We used three different methods to fit the origin-destination matrix, i.e. to estimate
the flows from country i to country j. Specifically, we generated a synthetic population
of travelers taking travels according to a gravity model whose masses are given by the
normalized GDPs (model A, full description of the model can be found in Sec. 5.4.2),







, where pi is the population
of country i) and, finally, taking travels by choosing random destinations (model C). We
performed a statistical analysis which revealed that the best model for reconstructing the
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data is model A.
Internal commuting
As detailed in the main text, students and workers were randomly assigned to a school
or workplace, in such a way that probability density function of travel distances complies
with a truncated power-law distribution, as proposed in [58] for the radius of gyration of
mobile phone users, namely









where r0g = 5.8km, βr = 1.65 and κ = 350km.
Here we compare the probability density functions of travel distances as obtained
by employing Eq. (4.4) and by employing a gravity model previously developed by the
authors for Italy [29] and detailed below.
Commuting destination are assigned in order to fit available commuting data [110].
In particular, the proportion of individuals with age ≥ 15 working or attending school in
the same municipality of residence is available for each municipality, together with the
number of individuals traveling either to a municipality of the same province they live in,
or outside the province but within the same region, or outside the region.
As a starting point, for determining the probability of commuting from municipality









where ni and nj are the number of individuals living in municipality i and j respectively
and dij is the distance between the two municipalities. θ is a proportionality constant,
τf and τt tune the dependence of dispersal on donor and recipient sizes and ρ tunes the
dependence on the distance.
The proportion of commuters (individuals traveling outside the municipality of resi-
dence for work or school) in Italy, however, varies significantly by province. In particular,
the proportion of commuters drastically increases from South to North of Italy. The pro-
portion of commuters varies from 15% to 60% and this variability does not depend on the
size of the municipalities or on the distance among municipalities. Indeed, it depends on
social factors and thus can not be explained by model (4.5).
Thus, we considered model (4.5) with an additional constraint forcing the model to
produce in each province the proportion of commuters as resulting from the available
data.
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The set of model parameters was optimized by searching for the set giving rise to
a simulated population of commuters matching the available data on the number of in-
dividuals commuting within the province, the region or outside the region of residence.
We obtained the following estimates: τf = 0.28, τt = 0.66 and ρ = 2.95 which are very
close to those obtained in [126] for modeling travel destinations in the United States at
short distances (less than 119 km). We found that the probability density function of






with a = 3.8km and b = 2.32.
We used the same law (Eq. 4.4) for modeling the internal commuting in all the
countries of the study area. This is a strong assumption. However, it was originally
proposed in [58] as an universal law of human mobility (at least in developed countries,
as the European countries). Moreover, our assumption is strongly supported by the
good agreement between the results obtained by employing this law and a gravity model
developed on specific Italian data of internal commuting.
Travels from/to outside Europe
The number of intercontinental passengers traveling from and/or to EU27 in 2007 were
more than 135 millions. Since it is not realistic to assume that a new influenza pandemic
will spread only within Europe, the need arises of modeling the worldwide spread of the
epidemic. A model based on the number of individual traveling from/to each pair of
international airports of the world as in [31] represents the optimal solution. Once the
location of the first world case is correctly identified, it is possible to make predictions
on timing, volume and location of the cases over time. However, since the aim of this
study is to predict the spatiotemporal spread of an epidemic in Europe, it is sufficient
to estimate the number of imported cases over time and to identify the more likely final
destinations of infected individuals. For accomplishing this task, a much simpler “global”
model based on an homogeneous mixing assumption in the world population is sufficient.
Therefore, we used a discrete-time stochastic SEIR epidemic model for describing the
dynamics of the worldwide epidemic. In order to estimate the number of imported cases
by international flights at each time step ∆t of the simulation in any European country
c, we sampled from a Poisson distribution of parameter
ac∆t[E(t) + (1− Ps)I(t)]/N˜ (4.7)
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where E(t) is the number of exposed individuals (predicted by the homogeneous mixing
SEIR model at time t); I(t) is the number of infectious individuals (predicted by the
homogeneous mixing SEIR model at time t); Ps is the probability of developing symptoms,
N˜ is the world population, ac is the total number of passengers arriving daily in the country
c. Finally, imported cases were randomly assigned to a cell of the country (by replacing
susceptible individuals) with probability proportional to the population. Let us note that,
by employing Eq. (4.7), we are assuming that only exposed and asymptomatic individuals
have a chance of arriving in Europe. In fact, we are assuming that symptomatic individuals
can not travel because of the influenza symptoms or that they can be recognized as ill
and consequently isolated.
The “global” model is parametrized in the same way as the European individual-
based model. The probability of developing symptoms is kept fixed to 0.5. Latent and
infectiousness periods have the same duration as in the European model. The transmission
rate is chosen to give the same reproductive number as for the European model.
4.2.3 Epidemic transmission details
Natural history of influenza
The epidemiological flow of influenza can be schematized as follow. A newly infected
person passes through latent and infectious phases (the latter can be characterized by
presence or absence of clinical symptoms). After the infectious phase, either individuals
recover and acquire (partial or complete) immunity, or die.
As in [87, 46], we assume a fully susceptible population, even if residual immunity
derived from other influenza strains was suspected for last pandemics [107]. Moreover,
induced mortality is not considered [87, 29, 47, 54]. We consider a scenario accounting for
the transmission of a single new influenza strain: the presence of multiple strains [27] or
the contemporary presence of other diseases potentially affecting the influenza dynamics
[97] are not considered. Spontaneous changes in the population behavior in response to a
pandemic and potentially affecting its course [45, 113] are not considered.
The mechanism responsible for the seasonality of influenza epidemics are becoming
clearer [84]. In particular a study has highlighted how the vapor pressure is probably the
driving factor for this process [119]. However, we do not consider seasonality effects since
the whole study area is located in the northern hemisphere. Moreover, it is not clear
yet how to model the dependence of the transmission rates on seasonal factors (e.g., the
above mentioned vapor pressure). Therefore, in each simulated epidemic the transmission
rates are kept constant, though it is possible that the school closure in the Summer period
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would delay the spread of the epidemic in Europe, independently on seasonal factors.
According to [46, 47, 29], the probability of developing symptoms is assumed to be
0.5. Different scenarios were drawn by assuming that the probability of developing clinical
symptoms ranges from 0.35 to 0.8. Symptomatic individuals are assumed to transmit
the infection more than asymptomatic individuals (by a factor 2) [29, 47, 85]. As in
[29, 47], we assume that the duration of latent and infectious periods is the same in
both symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals. The latent period is assumed to be
exponentially distributed with mean 1.5 days. We assume an exponential distribution
also for the infectious period (mean 2 days). However, we also performed a sensibility
analysis on the duration of the infectious period. Specifically, different scenarios were
drawn by assuming that the infectious period ranges from 1.5 to 3 days.
Transmission model
The influenza transmission was simulated by a stochastic spatially structured individual–
based model. We considered an epidemic occurring within the European population,
accounting for ≈ 515 million individuals, kept constant during a simulation (i.e., without
considering neither born/dead nor immigration/emigration processes). Individuals are
explicitly represented in the model and are characterized by citizenship, household mem-
bership and school/workplace membership (if any). Households, schools and workplaces
are located in an explicit geographic location.
Once the population is initialized, at any time t of the simulation (time step ∆t =
0.5days), any susceptible individual i has a probability pi = 1 − e−∆t·λi(t) of becoming
infected. The probability of becoming infected depends on the instantaneous risk of
infection λi(t), computed at any time of the simulation. The risk of infection for each
individual is defined as the sum of the risk factors coming from the different sources of
infections considered, namely:
1. contacts with infectious members of the household (first term in Eq. 4.8),
2. contacts with infectious individuals working in the same workplace or attending the
same school (second term in Eq. 4.8),
3. random contacts in the population and cross-border diffusion (third term in Eq.
4.8),
4. long distance travels (fourth term in Eq. 4.8).


























The terms in Eq. (4.8) are defined as follows:
• Si is the index of the country where individual i lives in.
• Hi is the index of the household where individual i lives in.
• P ji is the index of the place where individual i works/studies (if i is employed) and
j identifies the place type (e.g., school, workplace).
• N is the European population.
• NSk is the population of country Sk.
• S?i is the set indices of the countries bordering country Si, country Si included.
This set of countries (S?i ) allows taking into account random contacts in the general
community in country Si and cross-borders diffusion due to random contacts among
individuals living in bordering countries (S?i \ Si).
• Ik = 1 if individual k is infected, 0 otherwise.
• ck = 2 for symptomatic cases (we assume the 50% of cases to be symptomatic), 1
otherwise. As discussed before, this choice is consistent with the one adopted in
[46, 29, 47].
• ajk accounts for sickness-induced absenteeism and it is defined as follows: 0.2 if
individual k is a symptomatic student, 0.5 if individual k is a symptomatic worker,
1 otherwise. This is a simplified version of the parameters used in [46, 47, 29] for
modeling induced absenteeism. According to the results of a survey presented in
[108], for every 100 children followed up during an influenza season, which included
37 school days, an excess 28 illness episodes and 63 missed school days occurred
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(average number of schooldays missed: 2.25). According to the results of a survey
presented in [4], the average number of workdays missed due to ILI is 1.30 days.
These results support the choice of the parameters values.
• f(dik) is the function in Eq. (4.4). It makes the transmission of the epidemic in the
general community (and the cross-border diffusion) explicitly dependent on patterns
of human mobility (as described in [58]).
• P (Si, Sk) is the probability of traveling from country Si to country Sk. It is estimated
by using the gravity model A.
• βh (expressed in day−1) is the within–household transmission rate.
• βjp (in day−1) is the within–school/workplace transmission rate, which depends on
the type j of the place. Specifically, as in [29, 47], we assume that βjp is the same for
all the school types and that it is three-times the transmission rate in the workplaces.
Sensitivity analysis is shown in Sec. 4.2.2.
• βu (in day−1) is the transmission rate in the general community.
• βt (in day−1) is the transmission rate for long-distance travels.
At any time t of the simulation, infected (exposed) individuals enter the infectious phase
with probability ∆t/Tl, where Tl is the latent period. When exposed individuals become
infectious they develop symptoms with probability 0.5. Finally, infectious individual
recover from the infection with probability ∆t/Ti , where Ti is the infectious period.
4.2.4 Model parametrization
The basic reproductive number R0 is the fundamental parameter in epidemic models. It
is defined, essentially, as the average number of secondary infections caused by a typical
primary infection in an infinite and completely susceptible population [6]. It depends not
only on the transmissibility characteristic of the virus, but also it greatly depends on the
structure of the host population. Therefore, it is not possible to set an unique R0 for the
whole study area without changing the values of the transmission rates in the different
countries. Since there are neither evidence nor reliable reasons for assuming differences
among the European countries in the probability of transmitting the infection in the
different social contexts, we fixed the transmission rates to obtain a certain R0 in the
United Kingdom and then we employed the same transmission rates in all the countries
of the study area.
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As regards the value for the reproductive number, according to recent estimations
based on past influenza pandemics [46, 27, 99], we investigated three plausible transmis-
sibility scenarios: namely R0 = 1.6, 2 and 2.4.
We assumed the same proportion of transmission in the different social contexts as in
[47]. As stated in the main text, the model was parametrized in such a way that in the
United Kingdom 30% of transmission occurs in households, 37% in schools and workplaces
and 33% in the general community. This choice, coupled with the choice of fixing the basic
reproductive number in the United Kingdom, allowed us to compare the results of this
study with those obtained in [47], which is focused on United Kingdom and United States.
Reliable data on the proportion of transmission in social contexts, crucial to the disease
transmission, as prisons, leisure places, public transportation systems, hospitals are not
available, though some research works are contributing to fill the gap [105, 133]. Our
assumption is supported by the findings presented in [105], where the authors analyzed
social contacts and mixing patterns in eight European countries. Specifically, they found
that living in a larger household size was associated with higher number of reported
contacts. Moreover, they found that the dominant feature of the contact matrix data is
the strong diagonal element: individuals in all age groups tend to mix assortatively (i.e.,
preferentially with others of similar age) and this pattern is most pronounced in those aged
5-24 years, i.e. the scholar age. They also found that 58% of all reported contacts occur
at home, at work, or at school. This results supports our assumption on the proportion
of transmission in the different social contexts (in the model, 67% of transmission occurs
in households, schools and workplaces, at least in the United Kingdom).
Finally, we chose parameter βt on the basis of the following criteria: since the num-
ber of passengers traveling among European countries is about 2.7 times the number
of passengers from outside Europe, we assumed the number of cases generated during
long-distance travels in Europe to be about 2.7 times the number of imported cases from
outside Europe.
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4.3 Modeling endemic diseases
We have developed an individual–based model with dynamic network of contacts, pa-
rameterized by employing sociodemographic and epidemiological data and accounting for
millions of individuals. The main ingredients of the model are: (i) the sociodemographic
model, simulating the temporal evolution of the population; (ii) the transmission model,
simulating the temporal evolution of the epidemic.
4.3.1 Sociodemographic model
Initialization of the network of contacts The contact network among individuals
is adapted from the one introduced in [2]. Basically, each individual is explicitly repre-
sented in the model and the network of contacts is generated by co–locating individuals
in households, schools and workplaces.
The populations of Campania (5,701,931 inhabitants) and Puglia (4,020,707 inhabi-
tants) are modeled. Individuals are hierarchically grouped within the region of residence
by municipalities and provinces, according to the administrative borders of the study area
and to the number of individuals by municipality.
Census data on population, household type and size [110] and data on age structure
[75] are jointly used with survey data [74] to randomly assign age and co–locate individuals
in households. Data on the age structure are specific for the two regions, while survey
data refer to an analysis conducted at national level. Nine different household types
are considered in the model. Comparison between real and simulated age structure and
between real and simulated household size frequencies are reported in Fig. 4.2.
Demographic, school [101, 102] and industry census data [73] are used for generating
schools and workplaces, and for randomly assigning an employment category (student,
worker, unemployed) to each individual on the basis of age and employment rates by
age (which also include rates of school attendance). Six school types, from day care to
university, are considered in the model. School employees (e.g. teachers) are located in
schools and not in generic workplaces.
Commuting destinations for both workers and students are randomly assigned by
employing a gravity model [126], integrated with specific data [110].
All the details on the initialization of the sociodemographic model can be found in [3].
Dynamic network of contacts The vital dynamics of the population has to be con-
sidered for modeling endemic diseases. This implies that the network of contacts among
individuals has to be kept updated. In particular, in the proposed model, individuals































































Figure 4.2: a Age structure (year 2007) of Campania region (black line) and age structure
simulated by the sociodemographic model (gray line). c Italian household size (black bars)
and household size simulated by the model in Campania (gray bars). Note that data on
household size are not directly employed in the algorithm. b and d as a and c, but for
Puglia.
come to life, grow, can generate new households, can procreate and die; moreover, they
can attend school (following the educational career), have an employment and retire.
The population is assumed to be closed, i.e. without immigration and emigration,
and with a constant number of individuals, i.e. the number of deaths corresponds to the
number of newborns. Despite Italy has one of the lowest fertility rates worldwide, it has
experienced a large immigration since the 1990s [69], which has contributed to slightly
increase the Italian population. Campania and Puglia followed the completely opposite
pattern. The demographic balance is positive, with an excess of births over death, but
the two regions have experienced a large emigration. As a consequence, in the last 5
years Campania and Puglia populations have been constant in size: the variations (both
positive and negative) have been less than 0.7% per year. Therefore, assuming a constant
number of individuals can be considered as a reliable modeling choice.
Births replace dead individuals, which are randomly selected on the basis of the mor-
tality rates by age, specific for the two considered regions [71]. Each newborn is located
in an existing household, chosen among those of suitable size and members age. Finally,

















































































unemployed student worker teacher
Figure 4.3: a Age structure of Campania (black line) and age structures simulated by the
sociodemographic model: projections to the years 2012, 2017 and 2022 (from dark gray
to light gray). c As a but for frequencies of household size. e As a but for frequencies of
employment categories. b, d, f as a, c, e but for Puglia region.
it is determined whether the newborn is enrolled in a day care center or not.
Individuals who have not already generated their own family and are at least 18 years
old can generate a new household group, possibly a single member household, on the basis
of the probability of getting married by age [76].
Every time the population is updated the age of each individuals is increased and
an employment category (possibly, “unemployed”) is associated to each individual on
the basis of the employment rates by age. If this category is the same that she/he
had before the update she/he keeps her/his place, otherwise a new school/workplace is
randomly chosen among the existing ones. In the latter case, the commuting destination
is determined by employing the same gravity model employed for the initialization of
the network of contacts. As regards the students, the school type (day care center,
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kindergarten, primary, middle, high school, university) is deterministically assigned on
the basis of the age of the individual. Since the age of the individuals is kept updated,
the previously described procedure allows students to follow the educational career.
Fig. 4.3 shows the sociodemographic projections for the years 2012, 2017 and 2020 in
terms of age structure, frequencies of households size and employment category. These
projections show a progressive population aging (Fig. 4.3a and 4.3b) and the consequent
decrease in the number of students and workers and the increase in the number of retired
individuals (Fig. 4.3e and 4.3f). These demographic projections comply with the Italian
situation. In fact, nowadays, Italian population is undergoing a phase of progressive
aging. For validating these demographic projections, we initialized the population of
both Campania and Puglia with their age–structure in the 2002 and compared them with
the age–structure simulated by the model using these data as input. Then we ran the
simulations and compared the age–structure in the 2007 with the one predicted by the
model. The predicted age–structures for both Puglia and Campania are in good agreement
with the real data.
4.3.2 Epidemic transmission model
The epidemic transmission model is adapted from the one proposed in [1], which is specific
for describing the hepatitis A transmission in Italy. The model accounts for the three
main sources of HAV infection in the region: person–to–person transmission, ingestion of
infected food and travels to high endemicity areas.
For each susceptible individual i, the probability of being infected at time τ is given
by
pi(τ) = 1− e−λi(τ)∆t ,
where λi(τ) is the force of infection for the susceptible individual i at time τ , and ∆t
is the time step of the simulation (1 week). λi(τ) is the sum of the risk factors due to
the three considered sources of infection: λi(τ) = λ
D
i (τ) + λ
S
i (τ) + λ
T
i (τ) , where λ
D
i (τ)
represents the direct transmission component, λSi (τ) represents the indirect transmission
component and λTi (τ) the component associated to travels to high endemicity areas.
Direct transmission Direct transmission accounts for person–to–person contacts. Since
individual–based models allow the explicit representation of the places where transmis-
sion can occur, this transmission component is divided into contacts within households,
schools and workplaces.
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pi − 1 , (4.9)
where
• Ij(τ) is equal to 1 if individual j is infectious at time τ , 0 otherwise.
• Hi is the set of the indices of the hi individuals living in the same household of i
(note that if hi = 1 the first term in Equation 4.9 is 0 by definition).
• βh is the transmission rate within households.
• Pi is the set of the indices of the pi individuals working or studying in the same
place of i (if pi = 0 or pi = 1 the second term in Equation 4.9 is 0 by definition).
• ϑ(i) is the employment category of individual i (i.e., one of the seven types described
in the sociodemographic model).
• βϑ(i)p is the transmission rate within the place of type ϑ(i).
Indirect transmission Indirect transmission accounts for the infections by ingestion
of contaminated seafood. The risk of infection due to this component at time τ is given
by:
λSi (τ) = βs(ai)U(τ) ,
where
• βs(ai) is the transmission rate associated to the ingestion of infected seafood. Since
consumption of raw mussels and shellfish varies by age, βs is a function of the age
of the individual i.
• U(τ) is the quantity of HAV in seafood at time τ , as a consequence of the excretions
of infected individuals.
The variable U(τ) depends on the number of individuals that were infective prior to time
τ , basically because they excrete HAV in the environment during their entire period of
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where δ is the decay rate of HAV in the environment and
∑N
j=1 Ij(τ) is the number of
infectious individuals in the population, which comprises N individuals, at time τ . A
discussion on this model of indirect transmission can be found in [1].
Travels to high endemicity areas Travels to high endemicity areas account for all
the infections occurring outside the considered region. This component of the force of
infection is modeled as
λTi (τ) = βt(ai) ,
which is constant over time and varies by age.
Chapter 5
Experimental results
5.1 Understanding the impact of different modeling
assumptions
The modeling framework adopted for the comparison, particularly for the structured
component, is represented by the recently developed IBM used for pandemic prediction
and control in Italy (and described in Sec. 4.1). Three main approaches are considered to
model the unstructured component: a spatially explicit model depending on a parametric
kernel function of the distance, with asymptotic power-law form [46, 47, 29, 96]; a model
where random contacts are chosen in the local communities [85]; a model where random
contacts are defined on the basis of commuting data [98]. For ease we term the three
models as models S, L and M respectively. Moreover, we also included occasional long-
distance trips T (as in [54]) in models L and M, called now L+T and M+T respectively.
5.1.1 Definition of the models of the unstructured contacts
Here we define unstructured any contact which is not a household or workplace contact and
we consider the following five different models of transmission by unstructured contacts.
• Model S: unstructured contacts through the whole space by a distance-based model.
Each individual is in contacts with every other individual in the population, with
probability (decreasing with the distance) given by a specific kernel function.
• Model L: unstructured contacts within the municipality the individual lives in.
• Model M: unstructured contacts within the ”commuting community’” the individual
belongs to. In particular, for individuals who study or work in the same municipality
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they live in, the social network consists of other inhabitants of the same municipality
and those who commute to this municipality. For individuals traveling outside
the municipality of residence, the social network consists of the inhabitants and
commuters of both depart and arrival municipality.
Moreover, we consider two additional models including occasional long-distance trips [54]
in models L and M, called L+T and M+T respectively. In particular, all individuals are
assumed to spend in average 10 days (randomly chosen) per year in a community other
than that of residence and school/work. In these periods, within household, school and
workplace transmission is not allowed.
5.1.2 How to compare different models
In order to perform the comparison, we define the first generation index G0, as the average
number of secondary infections generated by the first infected individual, during his entire
infectious period, in a completely susceptible population.
In traditional models the simplest choice would be to fix the basic reproduction number
R0 (see [6, 37]), which can be estimated by approximating the slope of the cumulative
number of cases during the exponential growth phase of the epidemic. The difference
between first generation index and basic reproduction number lies on the fact that the
former is determined only by the first generation of infection while the latter emerges
after the underlying next generation operator is applied for a sufficiently large number
of generations. Our choice is motivated by the simplicity of the G0 computation, in
opposition to the difficulty in appropriately calculating R0 for individual based models
(see [54, 17]). Moreover, by adopting the first generation index as comparison indicator,
all the models are initialized in the same way.
Three different scenarios have been investigated, corresponding to G0=1.1;1.4;1.7. All
the simulations are initialized with only one infected individual, yielding a completely
susceptible population. Estimate of the transmission rates in the different transmission
places (household, school/workplace and community) leading to the chosen G0 value is
done by keeping trace of number and place of the secondary infections. A reference model
(the M model for instance) is chosen and transmission coefficients are determined by an
additional constraint on the proportions of cases generated by the different sources of
infection considered in the model. In particular, the contribution of each of the three
sources of infection is set to 1/3. For S and L models, the transmission rates within
households and schools/workplaces are kept fixed, while a specific rate is selected for the
transmission in the communities, satisfying the above constraint on the proportions of
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cases generated by the different sources. Models including long-distance trips M+T and
L+T) inherit transmission coefficients from the corresponding basic models.
This choice leads to within households and schools/workplaces transmission slightly
smaller than in the respective basic models, because transmission during trips occurs only
by random contacts in the population. For our choices of the transmission rates, the final
proportion of cases generated by the three sources differs no more than 0.018 from 1/3.
For each model and choice of the first generation index, an average of at least 20,000 runs
were considered, to guarantee a sufficiently accurate estimate of the relative transmission
parameters.















































































































































































Figure 5.1: Spreading time from the seeding municipality as a function of the distance
for different values of G0 and different seeding municipalities: Rome (first row), Cagliari
(second row), a small isolated village (third row). Model M in orange, M+T in red, L in
cyan, L+T in blue, and S in green.
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5.1.3 Results
More than 1,000,000 experiments were run to evaluate how the different approaches to
modeling unstructured contacts can affect the spatiotemporal epidemic dynamics. For
each considered model, different model instances were realized by varying the first gen-
eration index G0 defined as the average number of secondary infections generated by the
first infectious individual during the entire infectious period in a completely susceptible
population (more details are given in Methods): G0 values of 1.1, 1.4 and 1.7 were consid-
ered to simulate low to high transmission scenarios. We compared a variety of summary
measures such as the probability of having a large outbreak, the epidemic evolution (at-
tack rate, basic reproductive number, peak day, proportion of infected by age) and the
spatial diffusion, i.e., the average distance from the seed area for individuals infected since
the start of the epidemic as a function of time. For comparison’s sake, all the simulations
were seeded with only one infected individual, even though a pandemic influenza in a Eu-
ropean country will be very likely sustained by mechanisms of case importation, e.g., by
international travels [31, 32, 127, 41]. Different seeding municipalities were chosen to take
into account the role played by the demographic size, density and geographic location of
the seeding zone; we considered large cities, small/medium size towns, isolated villages,
and, as an extreme case of isolated seeding region, islands.
The final attack rate of the considered models is significantly different (see Tab. 5.1)
and it ranges from 19.1% to 25.7% for G0=1.1, from 47.8% to 50.7% for G0=1.4 and from
62.4% to 67.8% for G0=1.7. No substantial differences are observed by varying the seeding
municipality. The introduction of occasional long-distance trips substantially decreases
the final attack rate of both the M and the L models. In fact, in our implementation,
transmission is not allowed within household and within school/workplace during long-
distance trips.
The basic reproductive numberR0 of the simulated epidemics is calculated as in [54, 28]
Table 5.1: Final attack rate. Final attack rates (with standard deviation) of the different
models considered for different G0 values.
Model/G0 1.1 1.4 1.7
M 25.7 (0.029) 50.7 (0.014) 64.6 (0.011)
M+T 21.4 (0.040) 47.7 (0.016) 62.4 (0.011)
L 26.9 (0.031) 50.7 (0.016) 67.6 (0.011)
L+T 22.9 (0.035) 47.8 (0.018) 65.7 (0.011)
S 19.6 (0.077) 48.6 (0.039) 64.8 (0.017)
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Table 5.2: Basic reproductive number. Basic reproductive numbers R0 (with standard
deviation) of the different models considered for different G0 values.
Model/G0 1.1 1.4 1.7
M 1.34 (0.018) 1.78 (0.010) 2.18 (0.011)
M+T 1.29 (0.022) 1.71 (0.010) 2.11 (0.013)
L 1.34 (0.022) 1.73 (0.011) 2.16 (0.016)
L+T 1.29 (0.025) 1.67 (0.011) 2.10 (0.011)
S 1.27 (0.029) 1.72 (0.013) 2.14 (0.008)
(see Methods). The observed R0 values, among all the considered models, do not vary
more than 0.07, 0.11 and 0.08 for G0=1.1, 1.4 and 1.7 respectively (see Tab. 5.2). Note
that R0 is systematically larger than the average number of secondary cases generated by
the primary infection in a wholly susceptible population, as observed in [54].
Significant differences can be detected in the spatial diffusion of the epidemic (see
Fig. 5.1). For G0=1.1, L models are spread systematically more slowly than the respec-
tive M models (with difference of about 100 days to cover 200 km). In fact, the set of
unstructured contacts as considered in M models includes individuals living in or traveling
to the same municipality where the individuals travel to, thus inducing a higher probabil-
ity of exporting the epidemic. Due to the specific choice of kernel function and parameters,
S models are spread systematically more quickly (with difference of about 100 days to
cover 200 km with respect to M models). However, alternative choices of kernel function
and parameters can lead to different model outputs. The behavior of L and M models
tends to be similar when increasing the first generation index, while the S models are
systematically the fastest. Not surprisingly, models including long-distance trips M+T
and L+T spread quite faster than the respective M and L models (even though their
attack rate is systematically lower), independently from the first generation index and
the seeding municipality. Furthermore, the observed pattern of spatial spread strongly
depends on the seeding region. For instance, when the epidemic is seeded in a small, iso-
lated village, no clear pattern of diffusion is observable (especially for S models) since the
epidemic is more likely to spread towards far, large cities than towards close, small size
municipalities (see Fig. 5.1, third row). At a given distance, the variability observed in the
time of epidemic arrival is basically determined by the variability in the population size
of the arrival municipalities. Trivially, on average, the epidemic is very likely to spread
first towards large population municipalities than towards small, isolated municipalities.
When infection is seeded in very isolated regions, as Sardinia island, the models behave
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Figure 5.2: Spatiotemporal dynamics at 40 (left), 50 (center) and 60 (right) days. Infection
is seeded in Cagliari (Sardinia island) and G0=1.7. Colored areas (model M in orange,
M+T in red, L in cyan, L+T in blue, and S in green) indicate presence of at least one
infected, infectious or removed individual.
quite differently (see Fig. 5.1, second row). Basically, in M and L models the epidemic is
spread on the entire island before being spread out to the rest of Italy. A similar behavior
is observed in M+T and L+T models, even though it is not so pronounced, while in S
model the epidemic is spread out in the first phase. In fact, only a very small fraction of
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Table 5.3: Peak day. Peak day (with standard deviation) of the different models consid-
ered for different G0 values.
Model/G0 1.1 1.4 1.7
M 287.1 (22.0) 143.7 (11.3) 104.5 (6.7)
M+T 294.9 (29.0) 137.9 (10.2) 98.9 (7.2)
L 439.3 (127.4) 153.6 (11.5) 107.3 (7.1)
L+T 407.6 (163.7) 142.9 (10.7) 99.3 (7.7)
S 302.0 (33.8) 127.4 (10.6) 90.3 (7.7)
Table 5.4: Peak day for different seeding municipality. Peak day (with standard deviation)
for different seeding municipality and different values of the first generation index G0.
G0 Municipality M M+T L L+T S
1.1 Rome 287.2 (20.6) 289.3 (25.8) 429.5 (129.7) 396.3 (153.6) 299.0 (33.6)
Cagliari 288.4 (27.3) 286.2 (26.2) 448.2 (126.5) 448.2 (174.1) 300.9 (33.7)
Luserna 286.4 (13.8) 294.6 (26.4) 421.5 (143.7) 380.8 (144.9) 298.3 (38.0)
Turin 286.2 (20.5) 288.9 (25.4) 427.9 (130.3) 388.3 (148.2) 298.8 (31.3)
Vieste 287.1 (22.1) 294.9 (29.0) 439.4 (127.5) 407.7 (163.8) 302.1 (33.8)
1.4 Rome 144.9 (12.4) 136.7 (10.2) 154.4 (10.5) 142.1 (10.7) 127.9 (11.8)
Cagliari 142.5 (9.6) 136.0 (10.2) 153.5 (9.4) 142.0 (11.0) 126.1 (12.3)
Luserna 145.9 (12.7) 134.2 (8.4) 158.0 (10.3) 141.1 (9.9) 129.2 (11.5)
Turin 143.6 (11.9) 136.6 (10.2) 155.0 (12.0) 142.8 (11.5) 127.6 (11.3)
Vieste 143.8 (11.4) 138.0 (10.3) 153.6 (11.6) 143.0 (10.8) 127.4 (10.6)
1.7 Rome 106.1 (6.6) 97.8 (6.2) 108.7 (6.5) 98.5 (7.5) 89.7 (6.4)
Cagliari 105.5 (5.6) 98.0 (6.2) 109.7 (6.3) 99.7 (7.5) 87.9 (6.1)
Luserna 106.0 (6.3) 97.3 (5.9) 109.5 (6.0) 98.3 (7.3) 88.6 (6.8)
Turin 104.9 (6.9) 98.0 (6.8) 107.9 (7.3) 98.9 (7.7) 89.6 (6.2)
Vieste 104.5 (6.7) 99.0 (7.3) 107.4 (7.1) 99.4 (7.8) 90.4 (7.7)
Roma is the largest city of Italy (2,546,804 inhabitants), located in the central Italy.
Cagliari is a city (164,249 inhabitants) in the Sardinia island.
Luserna is a small isolated village (297 inhabitants) in the northern of Italy.
Turin is a big city (865,263 inhabitants), located in the northern Italy.
Vieste is a small town (13,430 inhabitants) in the southern Italy.
workers and students commutes to or from the island, greatly reducing the set of contacts
outside the island in M and L models, while this is not the case for S models. However,
note that the kernel parameters of the spatially explicit model were chosen on the basis of
commuting data. While this is a reasonable choice for assigning commuting destination,
it is unclear whether this is the best choice for modeling the spatial spread of an epi-
demic through unstructured contacts. Completely different behaviors are to be expected
when adopting different kernel shapes. Although the spatially explicit model is flexible,
it requires detailed data, both demographic and epidemiological, for choosing the optimal
kernel and kernel parameters.
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Table 5.5: Probability of a large outbreak. Probability (with standard deviation) of a large
outbreak for the different models considered and for different G0 values.
Model/G0 1.1 1.4 1.7
M 0.184 (0.050 0.449 (0.027) 0.572 (0.060)
M+T 0.184 (0.096) 0.446 (0.072) 0.598 (0.055)
L 0.192 (0.047) 0.460 (0.079) 0.628 (0.023)
L+T 0.154 (0.040) 0.464 (0.086) 0.661 (0.013)
S 0.201 (0.047) 0.474 (0.007) 0.662 (0.021)
Significant differences are observed in the peak day (see Tab. 5.3). In particular, for
large values of G0 (G0≥1.4) the epidemic peak of S models occurs systematically earlier
than M and L models (with differences of about 15 to 20 days for different values of the
first generation index). Since in S models the epidemic is spread much more quickly,
new infection foci occur simultaneously in many different regions, thus inducing a spatial
synchronization of the epidemic. No substantial differences are observed by varying the
seeding region (see Tab. 5.4). For G0=1.1, no significant differences are observed between
M and S models, while, on average, the peak day of L models occurs later than M and S
models. This is due to the several simulations behaving very differently from all the others
(and independently from the seeding region), characterized by a very long initial phase
and giving rise to a high standard deviation. In fact, for low values of the first generation
index, L models are less likely to spread out the epidemic because of the reduced set
of unstructured contacts. Not surprisingly, the introduction of occasional long-distance
trips significantly anticipates the epidemic peak in both the M and L models (5 to 10
days earlier than the respective M and L models). See also Fig. 5.3 where the number of
cases in time of the different models are reported for different seeding municipalities and
different first generation indices.
Differences are also observed in the proportion of infected by age (see Fig. 5.4). In order
to compare the different models, the curves are normalized, and we consider the indicator
, where ai is the proportion of infected of age i. Independently from the first generation
index, the proportion of infected generated by M models in individuals older than 65 years
is lower than for other models, while the opposite behavior is observed for individuals
younger than 65 years. In terms of unnormalized proportion of infected, differences of
5% to 10% are observed in the older individuals for G0=1.7. In fact, in M models the set
of unstructured contacts of infectious individuals proportionally includes a larger number
of traveling individuals (i.e., with age between 3 and 65 years). Consequently, this latter
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Figure 5.3: Number of daily cases for different values of the first generation index and
different seeding municipalities: Rome (first row), Cagliari (second row), a small isolated
village in the north of Italy (third row). Simulation are initialized with 30 infected indi-
viduals, to reduce the stochastic variability observed in first days of the epidemic. Models
are: M in orange, M+T in red, L in cyan, L+T in blue, and S in green.
class of individuals is proportionally more exposed to contacts with infectious ones. This
is not the case for age independent unstructured contacts models, as S and L models.
In [46, 47, 54], the authors introduce additional parameters to make the unstructured
contacts dependent on age, while for M models this is obtained in a natural way. The
slightly larger proportion of infected observed in individuals aged 35-45 is due to the
structured component of the contacts: in fact, they have a higher probability of living
with individuals aged 3-18, the most infected class.
Finally, no substantial differences are detected in the probability of observing a large

































































Figure 5.4: Proportion of the infected population by age for G0=1.4 (top) and G0=1.7
(bottom). Models M in orange, L in cyan and S in green.
outbreak for G0=1.1 and G0=1.4 (see Tab. 5.5). For G0=1.7, the probability of a large
outbreak in S models is larger than that observed for the other models.
A sensitivity analysis on the effect of varying the number of travel days in models
M+T and L+T and on the effect of varying the spatial kernel in models S is carried on
as already been performed.
5.1.4 Conclusions
In principle, it would be possible to improve the characterization of structured contacts,
for instance by employing data on contacts on neglected but important activities, such as
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leisure time, sport mall, restaurants, etc. and time-use data to provide useful information
for parameterizing IBM. Such information starts being available (see the EU project
Polymod) and it will be mandatory to integrate it in the next generation of IBM. However,
it is not possible to take into account all the possible sources of infections. In fact,
this would mean tracing all the possible contacts (which in turn requires to model all
the places where these contacts occur, how much time is spent in each place, etc.), to
establish the ”type” of contacts (e.g., skin to skin or indirect) of each individual, which is
unfeasible. It is thus required to consider in the models a source of infection accounting
for pseudorandom contacts.
The scenarios emerging from the conducted experiments in terms of final attack rate,
spatial spread, epidemic peak day and proportion of infected by age are quite heteroge-
neous. In particular, epidemics generated by the spatially explicit model spread much
more quickly than those simulated by all the other models, regardless of first generation
index and seeding region. Also, the epidemic peak occurs systematically earlier, probably
because of spatial synchronization effects. Defining unstructured contacts on the basis
of commuting data rather than randomly choosing them in the local communities results
in a faster epidemic, especially for lower values of the first generation index, in terms of
both spatial diffusion and peak day. The effects of occasional long-distance trips are the
speeding up of the spatial diffusion and the decreasing of the cumulative attack rate. The
proportion of infected by age is also significantly different. Specifically, the proportion
of infected in the younger and adult age groups is larger in the models where random
contacts are defined on the basis of commuting data while the proportion of infected in
the older age groups is lower. No significant differences are observed in the probability of
having a large outbreak, especially for small first generation indices.
Wide differences in the models’ outputs can result in different evaluations of the ef-
fectiveness of the containment/mitigation strategies and they would seriously undermine
the usefulness of our models, thus urgently calling for field work aimed at filling this
data-gap. In fact, even though the containment strategies are in general based on the
structured part of the contacts (social distancing measures, e.g. school and workplaces
closure, antiviral prophylaxis on a contact tracing basis), the way we choose to model the
unstructured part of the contacts can lead to very different scenarios.
A detailed analysis of the implications in terms of containment strategies evaluation is
beyond the aim of this work. A few considerations can be drawn, anyway. Trivially, the
cumulative attack rates are quite different, even though the models are initialized in the
same way, thus leading to different evaluations of the effectiveness of the same containment
measure. More specifically, the difference observed in the peak day can result in different
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evaluations on the effectiveness of vaccination campaigns. For instance, in a mass vacci-
nation campaign against a pandemic with G0=1.4, by fixing target population at 60%,
vaccine efficacy at 70% and vaccine availability at 4 months after the first national case,
the number of avoided cases is, on average, 24.4 millions for the M model, 20.2 millions
for the M+T model, 26.8 millions for the L model, 22.7 millions for the L model and 13.4
millions for the S model. Moreover, ignoring the variations in the proportion of infected
by age can result in wrong decisions when optimizing the choice of the target population
for a vaccination campaign. Furthermore, the variability of the spatial spread can influ-
ence the evaluation of strategies based on geographical targeting. We can mention the
choice of the dimension of quarantine areas, the effectiveness of antiviral prophylaxis on a
geographical basis and the timing for closing schools and workplaces: for instance, close
them all simultaneously or wait for a few cases to arise? While the observed differences
could not drastically undermine the results in terms of feasibility of the considered inter-
ventions (the principal objective of many independent studies), nevertheless they could
be relevant in terms of optimality.
Wide differences in the models’ outputs can result in different evaluations of the effec-
tiveness of the containment/mitigation strategies. Consequently, all the possible effects
of different assumptions should be considered for taking public health decisions: not only
sensitivity analysis to various model parameters should be performed, but intervention
options should be based on the analysis and comparison of different modeling choices, as
it happens in different fields, e.g. global climate change, where uncertainty in the models
themselves and in input parameters is a critical factor.
We conclude remarking that unlike what shown in most of the literature [46, 47,
54, 114], no supercomputing techniques have to be employed to perform this kind of
simulations on a national scale (57,000,000 of individuals), making them feasible for a
standard workstation; our implementation of the five model takes less than 3Gb RAM
and a single simulation takes just a few minutes.
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5.2 Mitigating an influenza pandemic in Italy
For these reasons, countries have been urged to strengthen their preparedness plans [70],
and several countries have considered stockpiling both antiviral drugs and monovalent
influenza vaccines containing potentially pandemic strains, such as A/H5N1 (i.e., a pre-
pandemic vaccine), for population priming.
However, some control measures can be costly (e.g., stockpiling antiviral drugs, vac-
cines, and a pre-pandemic vaccine), and others could have limited social acceptance (e.g.,
closure of schools/workplaces and travel restrictions). For these reasons, several countries
have used mathematical models to predict the spread of infection at the national level,
which is an important aspect of preparedness, and to evaluate the feasibility of containing
the pandemic using different strategies [46, 47, 54, 85, 87, 31, 32, 35].
Individual-based models can provide the most reliable estimates of the spread of in-
fluenza [46, 47, 87, 54, 29]. In the present study, we evaluated the diffusion of pandemic
influenza in Italy and the impact of various control measures, coupling a global SEIR
model with an individual based model. We used actual demographic data, obtained from
the 2001 census, which allowed us to simulate the spread of an influenza pandemic and
the impact of control measures. In particular, we examined the impact of antiviral pro-
phylaxis of close contacts, social distancing measures, international air travel restrictions,
and vaccination (both pandemic and pre-pandemic vaccine), under different R0 values.
Since it has been shown that seasonal influenza vaccine effectiveness is higher in adults
than in elderly persons and children [36, 79, 59], we also assumed that both pandemic
and pre-pandemic vaccine effectiveness would vary by age.
5.2.1 Control measures
We considered the following control measures:
• vaccination,
• antiviral treatment and/or prophylaxis (AVP),
• social distancing,
• air travel restrictions.
Vaccination. The target population was divided into 4 categories: i) personnel provid-
ing essential services (15% of the 25-60-year-old working population); ii) elderly persons
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(?65 years of age); iii) children and adolescents from 2 to 18 years of age; and iv) adults
from 40 to 64 years of age. Vaccination was modeled by reducing the proportion of sus-
ceptible individuals in the target population. This proportion depends on vaccination
coverage (VC) and vaccine effectiveness (VE). We assumed that vaccination consists of
two vaccine doses administered one month apart and that VC was 60% of the target
population. This VC was chosen on the basis of the 2005-2006 seasonal influenza cover-
age, which was 68% in elderly persons (¿ 64 years) [100]. We assumed that one week is
necessary for administering each vaccine dose to all target categories. Vaccination was
considered to be effective beginning 15 days after the administration of the second dose.
Three different assumptions on VE were considered: i) VE of 70%, for all age-groups; ii)
VE of 50%, for all age-groups; and iii) VE of 59 for individuals aged 2-18 years [79], 70%
for individuals aged 40-64 years [36], and 40% for individuals aged ?65 years [59]. We as-
sumed that individuals are vaccinated irrespective of whether or not they were infectious
or ill.
When considering the impact of single interventions, we assumed that vaccination
begins 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 months after the first world case, targeting three of the target
categories (i.e., personnel providing essential services, elderly persons, and 2-18 year-
olds), and assuming a VE of 70% for all three categories. When considering multiple
interventions, we assumed that vaccination begins at 2, 3 or 4 months after the first world
case, and we considered the different assumptions for VE reported above (70% for all,
50% for all, or varying by age).
Given that an estimated 3-6 months would be required to produce pandemic influenza
vaccines, the administration of a first dose within 3 months of the first world case would
be possible only if this dose contained a precursor of the pandemic strain [104], followed
by a dose of pandemic vaccine. The actual VE of this regimen was assumed to be equal
to that of two doses of the pandemic vaccine.
Antivirals. We took into consideration the administration of one course of antiviral
drugs, providing therapy for the index case and prophylaxis for close contacts. Both
therapy and prophylaxis were assumed to start one day after clinical onset in the index
case. The treatment of the index case was assumed to reduce infectiousness by 70%
[46, 47, 54, 87, 29], whereas AVP was assumed to reduce susceptibility to infection by
30%, infectiousness by 70%, and the occurrence of symptomatic disease by 60% [29, 87].
We assumed that AVP be provided to 90% of the close contacts of clinical cases (50% of
all infected individuals), with a treatment course of 10 days [85]. Two different definitions
of close contacts were used: i) household contacts only; and ii) household contacts plus
































Figure 5.5: Baseline simulations under different R0 scenarios (blue line: R0=2; red line:
R0=1.7; green line: R0=1.4). Bullet points represent the first Italian case and the time
elapsed from the first world case.
close contacts in the school or workplace. We considered administering AVP for the entire
epidemic period; however, since the feasibility of actually doing this would be limited, we
also considered administrating AVP as a policy to be used only for the first 8 weeks after
the occurrence of the first Italian case.
Social distancing. We considered the nationwide closing of all schools and some public
offices not providing essential services, corresponding to 20% of all employees in these
types of offices (from 8o Censimento dell’Industria e dell’Artigianato, ISTAT, 2004). We
assumed that school and office closings begin 4 weeks after the onset of the first 20
symptomatic cases in Italy and that this measure be maintained for 4 weeks.
We also assumed that symptomatic individuals spontaneously limit their school/work
attendance. The proportion of symptomatic individuals staying at home from school/workplace
would vary by age, from 90% among children ¡ 6 years of age to 50% among the working
population.
Air travel restrictions. We considered travel restrictions that would reduce incoming
international flights by 90% or 99%, starting from day 30 of the first world case [47] and
lasting for the entire duration of the epidemic, or until two months after the introduction
of the first case in Italy. The reduction of domestic air travel and the control of land and
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Figure 5.6: Spatial spread of pandemic influenza in Italy, R0=1.7. Red areas represent
municipalities where at least one case is present.
sea borders were not considered in the model.
5.2.2 Results
Baseline dynamics
For different R0 scenarios, the results of the global SEIR model showed that the number
of imported symptomatic cases would be 53,000, 72,000, and 83,000, with the first Italian
case appearing, respectively, after 77, 48 and 37 days; the epidemic curves for these
scenarios are shown in Fig. 5.5.
For R0=1.7, the spatial spread of the epidemic showed that for the first 10 days the new
cases would be confined to the municipalities where cases were first imported (Fig. 5.6).
At 11-20 days, new cases would begin to occur far from these municipalities, mainly in
municipalities with a large population. At 21-40 days (the exponential growth phase),
infection would spread simultaneously to nearly the entire country, with no clear spatial
pattern.
The epidemic peak is reached after 202, 125 and 91 days, respectively, for the three
different scenarios (Fig. 5.5). The pandemic season at the national level would last for
a period of 3 to 6 months, with an average of 67,000-243,000 clinical cases per day.
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Table 5.6: Mild scenario: Clinical attack rates and peak day, by control measure.
Control measure AR (95% CI) Peak day (95% CI) Peak daily (95% CI) Courses
[%] [days] AR [%] [millions]
None 21.2 (21.1-21.3) 202 (200-204) 0.42 (0.41-0.43) -
Air travel restriction
90% 21.2 (21.1-21.2) 225 (223-228) 0.42 (0.42-0.43) -
99% 21.1 (21.1-21.2) 241 (233-245) 0.40 (0.38-0.41) -
Social distancing








1 month 7.4 (7.4-7.5) 238 (235-239) 0.07 (0.07-0.07) 14.4
2 months 7.5 (7.4-7.6) 237 (234-241) 0.07 (0.07-0.07) 14.4
3 months 7.5 (7.4-7.6) 235 (233-238) 0.07 (0.07-0.07) 14.4
4 months 7.7 (7.6-7.7) 218 (211-222) 0.08 (0.08-0.08) 14.4
5 months 10.5 (9.9-11.2) 182 (178-186) 0.24 (0.20-0.28) 14.4
6 months 17.5 (16.9-18.3) 202 (200-203) 0.43 (0.43-0.44) 14.4
Vaccine efficacy (VE) = 70%.
Vaccination target categories: personnel providing essential services, elderly persons, individuals 2–18 years of age.
The cumulative infected AR would be 42.4%, 61.6% and 77.4%, for the three scenarios,
corresponding to a clinical AR of 21.2%, 30.8%, and 38.7%. The clinical daily-peak AR
would be 0.4%, 1.0% and 1.9%, respectively. Only the clinical AR is considered below.
Impact of control measures
Single measures. The results of the single control measures for different scenarios are
reported in Tab. 5.6,5.7,5.8. International air travel restriction would not affect the AR
but could delay the importation of cases, increasing the time elapsed from the first world
case to importation from a minimum of 7 days to a maximum of 37 days, depending on
the R0 and the level of restriction. The pandemic peak would also be delayed by 6-39 days
(Tab. 5.6,5.7,5.8; Fig. 5.7). Nationwide closure of schools and workplaces not providing
essential services would delay the time of occurrence of the peak by 5–8 days, depending
from the scenario considered.
AVP appears to be the most effective single intervention, resulting in a 36%-76%
reduction in cumulative ARs. It also contributes to delay the peak day (from 13 to 53
days) and to decrease the peak daily attack rate.
Vaccination impact strongly depends from its timing. In the mild scenario, it would
reduce the cumulative AR by approximately 65%, if it is begun within 4 months of the
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Table 5.7: Moderate scenario: Clinical attack rates and peak day, by control measure.
Control measure AR (95% CI) Peak day (95% CI) Peak daily (95% CI) Courses
[%] [days] AR [%] [millions]
None 30.8 (30.7-30.9) 125 (123-126) 1.03 (1.02-1.05) -
Air travel restriction
90% 30.8 (30.7-30.9) 135 (133-138) 1.01 (0.99-1.03) -
99% 30.8 (30.8-30.9) 150 (146-152) 1.03 (0.97-1.10) -
Social distancing








1 month 17.8 (17.7-17.9) 144 (141-146) 0.36 (0.36-0.37) 14.4
2 months 18.1 (18.0-18.1) 133 (132-134) 0.36 (0.36-0.37) 14.4
3 months 25.5 (24.8-25.9) 125 (122-126) 1.0 (0.98-1.01) 14.4
4 months 30.6 (30.5-30.7) 125 (124-127) 1.0 (0.98-1.01) 14.4
5 months 30.8 (30.7-30.9) 125 (124-127) 1.0 (0.98-1.01) 14.4
6 months 30.8 (30.7-30.9) 125 (124-127) 1.0 (0.98-1.01) 14.4
Vaccine efficacy (VE) = 70%.
Vaccination target categories: personnel providing essential services, elderly persons, individuals 2–18 years of age.
Table 5.8: Severe scenario: Clinical attack rates and peak day, by control measure.
Control measure AR (95% CI) Peak day (95% CI) Peak daily (95% CI) Courses
[%] [days] AR [%] [millions]
None 38.7 (38.6-38.8) 91 (89-92) 1.93 (1.87-1.97) -
Air travel restriction
90% 38.7 (38.6-38.8) 97 (95-100) 1.90 (1.86-1.93) -
99% 38.7 (38.6-38.8) 108 (106-109) 1.91 (1.84-1.94) -
Social distancing








1 month 27.1 (27.1-27.2) 99 (97-100) 0.94 (0.94-0.96) 14.4
2 months 36.3 (36.1-36.5) 92 (89-93) 1.91 (1.90-1.94) 14.4
3 months 38.7 (38.6-38.8) 92 (89-93) 1.91 (1.90-1.94) 14.4
4 months 38.7 (38.6-38.8) 91 (89-92) 1.93 (1.87-1.97) -
5 months 38.7 (38.6-38.8) 91 (89-92) 1.93 (1.87-1.97) -
6 months 38.7 (38.6-38.8) 91 (89-92) 1.93 (1.87-1.97) -
Vaccine efficacy (VE) = 70%.
Vaccination target categories: personnel providing essential services, elderly persons, individuals 2–18 years of age.
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first world case (Tab. 5.6,5.7,5.8). In the moderate and severe scenarios, ARs would be
reduced by 42% and 31% respectively, if vaccination starts within 2 months and one
month from the pandemic start (Tab. 5.6,5.7,5.8).
Combined measures. Tab. 5.9 shows the impact of combining vaccination with inter-
national air travel restrictions. In the mild scenario, there is no clear added value of air
travel restriction. In the moderate and severe scenarios, the implementation of 99% of
air travel restriction would allow to have one additional month to implement vaccination,
since administering first dose within three months instead of two, for the moderate sce-
nario, and within two months instead of one, for the severe scenario, would not modify
cumulative AR.
When combing all of the measures, in the mild scenario, the epidemic could be mit-
igated with moderate efforts. Specifically, performing vaccination for three target cat-
egories (i.e., personnel providing essential services, elderly persons, and 2-18 year-olds)
and providing AVP to 90% of household contacts for the entire epidemic period would
reduce the cumulative AR by 98% (from 21% to 0.3%), independently of the timing of
vaccination (2, 3 or 4 months) and the implementation of air-travel restrictions. Limiting
AVP to 8 weeks would produce a cumulative AR of 7.7%, which is similar to that observed
with vaccination alone.
For the moderate scenario (Tab. 5.9, Fig. 5.7), vaccinating the three above-mentioned
target categories and providing AVP to 90% of household contacts for the entire epidemic
period, with 90% air travel restriction would reduce the cumulative AR by 77%-87% (from
31% to 4-7%, depending on the timing of the first vaccine dose). The cumulative AR is
reduced by 87%, if 99% air-travel restrictions were implemented, and vaccination were
begun within 4 months of pandemic start.
If air-travel restrictions were not implemented or were limited to the first two-months
after the first national case, the AR decrease would be similar (81-87%), providing that
vaccination were started within 3 months of the first world case. The cumulative AR
would be even lower (2%, for first dose at 3 months) if AVP were provided to both
household contacts and close contacts in schools and workplaces. This would require the
administration of 11 millions of AV courses.
For the severe scenario (Tab. 5.10, Fig. 5.7), the cumulative AR would decrease by
64% (from 39% to 14%) if the first vaccine dose were administered within 2 months of the
first world case, AVP were provided to household contacts for the entire epidemic period,
and 90% air-travel restriction were implemented, independently from its duration. The
cumulative AR would further decrease (to 9%) if also vaccinating 40-64-year-old individ-
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Table 5.9: Moderate scenario: Clinical Attack rates, peak day, peak daily attack rate and















































































90% air travel restriction
AVPu; fist vaccine dose at 2 months 4.5 (4.4-4.5) 213 (209-215) 0.04 (0.04-0.04) 6.8 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months 4.6 (4.6-4.7) 186 (177-197) 0.04 (0.04-0.04) 7.1 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months 6.7 (6.2-7.2) 154 (150-156) 0.15 (0.12-0.18) 10.0 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months? 5.7 (5.6-5.7) 214 (206-219) 0.05 (0.05-0.06) 8.7 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months? 5.8 (5.7-5.9) 194 (189-197) 0.06 (0.06-0.06) 8.9 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months? 7.4 (7.2-7.8) 155 (151-156) 0.14 (0.12-0.16) 11.3 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months† 7.1 (7.0-7.1) 211 (207-217) 0.07 (0.07-0.07) 10.8 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months† 7.2 (7.1-7.3) 187 (179-194) 0.08 (0.08-0.08) 11.0 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months† 8.6 (8.2-9.0) 155 (151-156) 0.15 (0.12-0.18) 13.1 14.4
AVP for 8 weeks; first vaccine dose 18.2 (18.1-18.3) 171 (167-176) 0.38 (0.34-0.4) 0.1 14.4
at 3 months
AVPu plus school/workplace close 2.1 (2.0-2.2) 141 (127-166) 0.02 (0.02-0.03) 10.7 14.4
contacts; first vaccine dose at 3 months
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months, 5.3 (5.2-5.4) 192 (188-194) 0.05 (0.05-0.05) 8.0 8.5
not vaccinating the elderly
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months, 2.3 (2.2-2.3) 186 (184-188) 0.02 (0.02-0.02) 3.6 24.6
vaccinating also adults
AVPu, first vaccine dose at 3 months, 5.1 (5.0-5.1) 165 (161-170) 0.05 (0.05-0.06) 7.8 14.4
time-limited border restrictions??
99% air travel restriction
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months 4.4 (4.4-4.5) 274 (253-280) 0.04 (0.04-0.04) 6.7 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months 4.4 (4.3-4.5) 251 (246-257) 0.04 (0.04-0.04) 6.7 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months 4.6 (4.5-4.6) 222 (210-230) 0.04 (0.04-0.04) 7.0 14.4
No air travel restriction
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months 4.6 (4.6-4.8) 163 (162-165) 0.04 (0.04-0.04) 7.2 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months 6.2 (6.1-6.3) 126 (123,129) 0.12 (0.12-0.13) 9.5 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months 11.0 (10.8-11.1) 152 (151-156) 0.28 (0.27-0.28) 10.2 14.4
VE vaccine efficacy, 70% (unless otherwise specified).
Vaccination target categories: Personnel providing essential services, elderly persons, individuals 2-18 years
of age (unless otherwise specified).
AVP Antiviral prophylaxis.
? Different vaccine effectiveness for different categories: 59% in individuals 2-18 years of age [79], 70% in
individuals 40-64 years of age [36], and 40% in ≥ 65 year-olds [59].
u Unlimited, household contacts.
† Vaccine effectiveness = 50%.
?? Air travel restrictions for 2 months after the first national case.
uals, which would reduce the number of household contacts receiving AVP by 33%. If
not vaccinating 40-64-year-olds and providing AVP to both household contacts and close
contacts in schools and workplaces, the cumulative AR would decrease to 8%, though
this would require an extremely high number of AVP doses (approximately 32 millions).
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Finally, with the implementation of 99% air-travel restriction, starting vaccination within
three months of pandemic emergence would have the same impact than starting vaccina-
tion within two months, with no air-travel restrictions in place (cumulative AR=16%).
None of the other combinations of control measures would reduce the cumulative clinical
AR to less than 16%.
Assuming a VE of 50% for all age-groups or a different VE by age group (i.e., 59% in
individuals aged 2-18 years, 70% in individuals aged 40-64 years, and 40% in individuals
?65 years) would not substantially affect the cumulative AR; in fact, the cumulative AR
would be 2 or 3 percentage points higher, respectively, than observed assuming a 70% VE
for all age groups (Tab. 5.9 and Tab. 5.10).
Figure 4 shows the cumulative AR by age and vaccination strategy. If no control
measures were performed (baseline), the cumulative AR would be highest for individuals
?18 years of age and would decrease with increasing age. None of the considered scenar-
ios included vaccinating 18-25-year-old individuals, who consequently appear to be the
age-group with the highest incidence after vaccination. However, if vaccinating personnel
providing essential services (15% of the 25-60-year-old working population), elderly per-
sons (≥65-year-olds), and 2-18 year-olds, the AR would also decrease among individuals
19-64 years of age, who are not targeted by vaccination. In particular, the AR would
decrease by approximately 75% in unvaccinated 30-50-year-old individuals. Excluding
the elderly from vaccination would not affect the cumulative AR in the other age groups.
5.2.3 Conclusions
Recent modeling studies have estimated that the first cases of influenza in a future pan-
demic would be imported to Europe within 50-90 days of its emergence elsewhere in the
world [50, 47]. Our results indicate that the first cases would be imported to Italy within
37-77 days, depending on the R0, and that the incidence would peak 54-125 days after
importation. When considering separately the three scenarios in our study, the timing of
the peak for the severe scenario (i.e., 54 days) was similar to that for the severe scenario
in the UK (i.e., 50 days), whereas it differed for the moderate scenario (i.e., 77 days for
Italy compared to 65 days for the UK) [47]. The reason for this divergence is likely due to
the different R0 values considered in the global SEIR model, which were scaled in order
to be proportional to those considered in the national IBM simulations (i.e., 1.4, 1.7, and
2). Varying the global R0, can in fact substantially modify the timing of national first
case introduction, and the consequent epidemic peak. The lower number of air travelers
coming into Italy per year compared to US and UK (25 millions, versus 73 and 92 millions,
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Table 5.10: Severe scenario: Clinical Attack rates, peak day, peak daily attack rate and















































































90% air travel restriction
AVPu; fist vaccine dose at 2 months 14.4 (14.4-14.5) 132 (130-134) 0.28 (0.28-0.29) 21.3 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months 20.5 (20.1-20.8) 124 (122-125) 0.79 (0.77-0.80) 29.1 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months 24.6 (24.5-24.7) 124 (122-125) 0.79 (0.77-0.80) 34.9 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months? 16.2 (16.1-16.3) 130 (129-131) 0.34 (0.33-0.34) 23.7 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months? 21.1 (21.0-21.3) 124 (123-127) 0.78 (0.77-0.80) 30.0 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months? 24.7 (24.6-24.7) 124 (122-126) 0.78 (0.77-0.80) 35.0 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months† 17.6 (17.4-17.7) 130 (127-132) 0.40 (0.39-0.40) 25.8 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months† 21.6 (21.3-22.0) 124 (122-125) 0.79 (0.77-0.80) 30.8 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months† 24.7 (24.6-24.8) 124 (122-125) 0.79 (0.77-0.80) 35.0 14.4
AVP for 8 weeks; first vaccine dose 27.4 (27.3-27.4) 126(123-130) 0.98 (0.97-0.99) 1.5 14.4
at 2 months
AVPu plus school/workplace close 7.9 (7.7-8.1) 117 (101-127) 0.14 (0.13-0.15) 31.8 14.4
contacts; first vaccine dose at 2 months
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months, 16.0 (16.0-16.1) 131 (129-134) 0.32 (0.31-0.33) 23.2 8.5
not vaccinating the elderly
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months, 9.0 (8.8-9.3) 126 (119-132) 0.16 (0.15-0.17) 13.6 24.6
vaccinating also adults
AVPu, first vaccine dose at 2 months, 14.7 (14.6,14.8) 125 (121-128) 0.29 (0.28-0.3) 21.8 14.4
time-limited border restrictions??
99% air travel restriction
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months 14.2 (14.1-14.3) 156 (152-158) 0.27 (0.26-0.28) 21.0 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months 15.8 (15.5-16.3) 129 (127,131) 0.39 (0.35-0.47) 22.9 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months 23.3 (23.0-23.6) 139 (137-141) 0.77 (0.75-0.79) 33.0 14.4
No air travel restriction
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 2 months 16.5 (16.1-16.7) 99 (97-101) 0.49 (0.43-0.52) 24.0 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 3 months 23.7 (23.4-23.8) 109 (107-111) 0.75 (0.75-0.76) 33.6 14.4
AVPu; first vaccine dose at 4 months 24.8 (24.7-24.9) 109 (107-111) 0.75 (0.75-0.76) 35.3 14.4
VE vaccine efficacy, 70% (unless otherwise specified).
Vaccination target categories: Personnel providing essential services, elderly persons, individuals 2-18 years
of age (unless otherwise specified).
AVP Antiviral prophylaxis.
? Different vaccine effectiveness for different categories: 59% in individuals 2-18 years of age [79], 70% in
individuals 40-64 years of age [36], and 40% in ≥ 65 year-olds [59].
u Unlimited, household contacts.
† Vaccine effectiveness = 50%.
?? Air travel restrictions for 2 months after the first national case.
respectively) [47], could also play a role in explaining this difference.
It is widely accepted that a combination of measures would be necessary to suffi-
ciently control the spread of an influenza pandemic, specifically, vaccination, AVP, social
distancing, and air travel restrictions [47, 54]. In our simulations, AVP is confirmed to be
































































Figure 5.7: Clinical AR, by control measure and scenario (Panel A: R0=1.7; Panel B:
R0=2): black = baseline results; light blue = 90% air travel restriction; violet = AVP to
household contacts; blue = vaccination, administering first dose within 3 months of the
first world case for R0=1.7, or within 2 months for R0=2; grey = 90% air travel restriction
+ vaccination, as reported for the blue line; green = all control measures combined; red
= all control measures combined, extending AVP to school/work close contacts.
the most effective single intervention [54]; however this would require to stockpile a high
number of antivirals, to be capable to rapidly identify index cases, to treat a high number
of contacts, and to maintain their compliance to a treatment lasting 10 days.
Recent modeling studies have predicted that the use of a pre-pandemic vaccine with a
low VE after the first dose (i.e., 30%) would be crucial for pandemic mitigation if the R0
were 1.7 yet not higher [87]. In our model, we introduced pre-pandemic vaccine for pop-
ulation priming and considered the vaccine to be effective only after the administration
of a successive dose of pandemic vaccine, assuming different hypotheses for VE. In par-
ticular, we were interested in determining whether variations in VE by age could provide
further insight into the impact of control measures. Systematic reviews have shown that
the clinical effectiveness of seasonal influenza vaccine varies with age, with a higher VE
in adults than in children and the elderly (70% vs. 59% and 40%, respectively) [36, 59].
Our results show that these differences would not substantially affect the cumulative
AR. Moreover, vaccinating 2-18 year-olds would reduce by approximately 75% the AR in
unvaccinated 30-50-year-old adults, showing a clear herd immunity effect. These results
thus support the idea that, during a pandemic, vaccinating children should be a higher












































Figure 5.8: Cumulative clinical AR, by age and scenario (Panel A: R0=1.7; Panel B:
R0=2). Black line represents baseline results; red line represents the standard vaccination
strategy (i.e., personnel providing essential services; elderly persons; and 2-18 year-olds);
green line represents the effect of limiting vaccination to essential workers and children.
priority than vaccinating elderly persons [54, 57].
With specific regard to air-travel restrictions, the effectiveness of this measure remains
controversial [47, 31, 32, 19, 127, 41, 60, 20]. Our results confirm that international air-
travel restrictions can buy about 1 to 3 weeks in delaying the epidemic [47, 32, 20, 41].
In the moderate and severe scenarios, the implementation of 99% air-travel restriction,
would allow to gather one-two months of time for administering the vaccine to target
population. In detail, if R0 were 2, starting vaccination within three months of pandemic
emergence would have the same impact than starting vaccination within two months of
the first world case, with no air-travel restrictions in place.
However, the administration of the first vaccine dose within three months of the first
world case would be possible only if vaccines against ”high pandemic risk” avian influenza
strains (such as A/H5N1) were stockpiled before the pandemic. In any case, because of
the antigenic drift of the virus, it is not possible to precisely predict the effectiveness of
pre-pandemic vaccines. In this scenario, it is reassuring that a decrease in VE from 70 to
50% would not significantly modify the impact of vaccination.
When using a pre-pandemic vaccine, the maximum reduction in the AR would be
achieved by either providing AVP to both household contacts and close contacts in the
school/workplace, as shown in a previous work [54] (i.e., 32 million antiviral courses,
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covering approximately 56% of the national population), or by vaccinating adults (i.e.,
25 million vaccine courses), in addition to the other target categories. In the occurrence
of an actual pandemic, the choice of the strategy will be based on several factors which
at present are unknown, such as the capacity to produce vaccines, the effectiveness of
vaccination and AVP, and logistic constraints in the distribution of vaccines and AVP.
In interpreting the results of this model, some limitations need to be mentioned. The
model requires detailed information on the population’s characteristics, including age and
geographic distribution, the size of households, schools and workplaces, and commuting
data. In our study, the source of these data were routinely collected national statistics.
The number of students per school and workers per workplace vary in proportion to
the resident population in the different geographic areas. However, we assumed that
the employment rate was the same throughout Italy, though it is known to vary greatly
when comparing northern, central, and southern Italy (4%, 6% and 12%, respectively).
Moreover, in modelling the social distancing measures, we only considered the closing of
those public workplaces not providing essential services, which could have resulted in an
underestimate of the effect of such measures. Furthermore, these workplaces are probably
not uniformly distributed throughout Italy.
In the global SEIR model we considered all infected persons to be symptomatic and
not traveling; thus we may have overestimated the effect of travel restrictions. By con-
trast, national data on in-coming flow by land and sea were not easily available, and we
therefore did not take into account land and sea importation and control. This could also
have overestimated the effect of travel restrictions, since importation via all routes should
be considered and eventually reduced. Furthermore, a number of factors, which we did not
consider in our analysis, could modify the effects of the delay caused by air-travel restric-
tions, in particular, seasonality [41], environmental effects, and viral evolution, whereas we
assumed that contact, transmission and disease parameters remained constant throughout
the pandemic period in Italy. Also, we did not include disease-related mortality, consid-
ering that deaths would probably occur at the latter stages of the infectious period and
thus would not affect the diffusion of disease.
Despite these limitations, and considering that we cannot predict all aspects of an
actual pandemic, this IBM, which is based on country-specific demographic data, could
be suitable for the real-time evaluation of measures to be undertaken in the event of the
emergence of a new pandemic influenza virus.
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5.3 Optimized antivirals administration during a pan-
demic outbreak
In general, non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as travel restrictions and social dis-
tancing measures, might delay the epidemic arrival and peak, while pharmaceutical inter-
ventions, such as the use of vaccines and antivirals, might reduce the overall impact of the
epidemic. Specifically, antiviral treatment of influenza cases reduces transmissibility and,
according to recent results [93, 66], case fatality rates, while post-exposure prophylaxis
reduces susceptibility to infection and prevents cases [87].
The World Health Organization suggested that governments stockpile, as part of
preparations for the next influenza pandemic, sufficient influenza antiviral drugs to treat
approximately 25% of their populations. This recommendation was made with the under-
standing that the stockpiled drugs would, in the whole, be used for treatment as opposed
to significant prophylaxis. Remarkably, however, in many countries the antiviral stockpile
is well below the suggested minimum level. For instance, the antivirals stockpiled in Italy
are sufficient to treat only 7 million individuals [121], corresponding to the 12% of the
population.
Therefore, in this study we face the problem of prioritizing the use of antivirals for
treatment of cases as a preventive measure for mitigating the spread of an influenza
pandemic as long as a pandemic vaccine is not available. On the other hand, in some
countries the antiviral stockpile exceeds the number actually required for the treatment
of all cases [121]. Thus, we also search for optimal strategies for prioritizing the use
of antivirals for post-exposure prophylactic treatment of close contacts of cases. In this
case, however, it should be taken into account, that, once the pandemic is well established,
antiviral drugs for prophylaxis should also be provided to high-risk health-care workers
and emergency services personnel for the duration of community pandemic outbreaks.
Prioritizing antiviral treatment and prophylaxis
Both treatment and prophylaxis were assumed to start 24 or 48 hours after the clinical
onset of symptoms in the index case. Treatment of the index case was assumed to reduce
infectiousness by 70% [46, 87, 47, 54, 29], whereas antiviral prophylaxis was assumed to
reduce susceptibility to infection by 30%, infectiousness by 70%, and the occurrence of
symptomatic disease by 60% [87]. Since it is not realistic that governments will implement
prophylaxis without treating index cases first, we consider prophylaxis assuming that
antiviral treatment is provided to the index cases. We assumed that 90% of the clinical
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cases (corresponding to 45% of infected individuals) are identified and treated and that
antiviral prophylaxis is provided to the close contacts, namely household contacts, with a
treatment course of 10 days [85]. We assumed that treatment with antivirals is associated
with a significant reduction in mortality (70%) [93, 66].
We considered administering antiviral treatment and prophylaxis for the entire epi-
demic period. Population was divided into three classes, namely children and young adults
(2-25 years old, individuals younger than 2 years old are excluded since antivirals can not
be administered to them [125]), adults (26-64 years old) and elderly (≥65 years old), on
the basis of the clinical attack rates by age as resulting from the baseline simulations
(Fig. 5.9c), which are consistent with data on attack rates by age classes as reported in
[56] for the 1918-19 influenza pandemic. We conducted a systematic simulation study for
assessing the effects of targeting the different classes in reducing the number of cases and
the excess mortality by minimizing the number of antiviral courses required. To such aim,
we consider the number of avoided clinical cases (with respect to the baseline simulations)
for each antiviral course as an indicator of efficacy of the different intervention options.
Baseline scenarios
On average, the first Italian case arises 76, 48, 36 and 21 days after the first world
case for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7, R0 = 2 and R0 = 3, respectively. Fig. 5.9a shows the
stochastic variability in timing of initial case in the baseline scenarios. After the initial
highly stochastic phase, the stochasticity decreases over time because of the high number
of imported cases over time that, together with long distance travels, contributes to
synchronize the local epidemics. Therefore, the simulated epidemics are very stable in
terms of parameters as clinical attack rate, peak day and peak daily case incidence. On
average, the clinical attack rate is 21.7%, 29.7%, 35.9% and 43.8% for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7,
R0 = 2 and R0 = 3 respectively (see first row of Fig. 5.10). The peak day is at 193, 123, 94
and 58 days respectively (see second row of Fig. 5.10) and the peak daily case incidence is
0.44%, 0.96%, 1.59% and 2.85% respectively (see third row of Fig. 5.10). Fig. 5.9b shows
the expected pattern of spread for the different transmission scenarios considered.
The time needed from the moment that the vaccine seed virus is available until the first
vaccine dose can be used is currently 4 months at best [111]. Other estimates are 6 months
at best [128, 112]. Remarkably, according to these estimates the pandemic vaccine will be
available in time only in case of a mild epidemic (see Fig. 5.9b). Moreover, the continuous
importation of cases make unsuitable all containing strategies based on the isolation and
treatment of the first clusters of cases. These findings support the hypothesis that, in

































































































































Figure 5.9: Timing for initial case for R0 = 1.4 (green), R0 = 1.7 (blue), R0 = 2 (red) and
R0 = 3 (violet) in the baseline scenarios. Histograms are based on 100 simulations each.
b Expected case incidence over time (solid lines) and 95% confidence intervals (shaded
regions) based on 100 simulations for each scenario. Colors as in a. The black time window
indicate a reasonable time interval for the availability of a pandemic vaccine. c Cumulative
clinical attack rate by age (colors as in a), compared with data on the 1918-19 pandemic
[56] (black line). The vertical dashed lines identify the age classes, namely young, adults
and elderly, defined for age-prioritization of the use of antivirals. d Expected excess
mortality by age classes (colors as in a) as obtained by assuming two different age-specific
case fatality rates, similar to those estimated for the 1918-19 pandemic in Copenhagen
(solid lines) and for the 1969-70 pandemic in Italy (dashed lines). Note that in the latter
case, the expected excess mortality in the younger age classes (0-64 years old) is very close
to 0 for all the R0 values considered.
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large countries, social distancing measures (e.g. school and non essential workplaces
closure, case isolation), travel restrictions and pharmaceutical measures based on antiviral
treatment of index cases and prophylaxis to close contacts will be key in mitigating and
delaying the epidemic as long as the pandemic vaccine is not available. Fig. 5.9d shows the
expected age-specific excess mortality in the four considered transmission scenarios and
by assuming two different patterns of mortality, namely scenarios EM1918 and EM1969.
In the EM1918 scenario, the excess mortality is estimated to be 14.4/10, 000, 19.5/10, 000,
23.3/10, 000 and 27.8/10, 000 for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7, R0 = 2 and R0 = 3 respectively
(see first row of Fig. 5.11). In the EM1969 scenario, it is estimated to be 2.6/10, 000,
3.8/10, 000, 5.1/10, 000 and 7.2/10, 000 respectively (see second row of Fig. 5.11).
Age-prioritized use of antivirals: early detection of index cases
We first assume that index cases and close contacts are treated 24 hours after the onset
of symptoms in the index cases. If antivirals are used for treatment only, for all age
classes, attack rates will decrease to 10.5%, 20.1%, 27.9% and 39.1% (see first row of
Fig. 5.10), requiring an antiviral stockpile for treating 5, 10, 14 and 20 million individuals
(corresponding to the 9.4%, 17.8%, 24.7% and 34.6% of the population, see first row of
Fig. 5.12), for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7, R0 = 2 and R0 = 3 respectively. Moreover, the
epidemic peak is slightly delayed (of about 37, 15, 8 and 3 days respectively, see second
row of Fig. 5.10) and the peak daily case incidence is greatly reduced (by about 72%, 51%,
39% and 24% respectively, see third row of Fig. 5.10. The number of avoided cases for
each antiviral course is 1.2, 0.54, 0.32 and 0.14 respectively (see second row of Fig. 5.12).
The excess mortality is greatly reduced by assuming age-specific case fatality rates as
those estimated for both the 1918-19 and 1969-70 pandemics. In the EM1918 scenario,
the excess mortality is reduced by 69%, 56%, 50% and 42% for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7,
R0 = 2 and R0 = 3 respectively (see first row of Fig. 5.11). In the EM1969 scenario, the
excess mortality is reduced by 75%, 65%, 58% and 50% respectively (see second row of
Fig. 5.11).
Treatment of elderly does not lead to any significant reduction of the cumulative
number of cases, while the effects of treating younger population and adults are similar to
those observed when treatment is considered for all age classes. This means that treatment
of elderly has a poor effect in reducing the cumulative attack rate. In fact, when treating
only the elderly, the number of avoided cases for each antiviral course decreases by 68%,
56%, 47% and 36% for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7, R0 = 2 and R0 = 3 respectively. The number
of avoided cases for each antiviral course is similar when treatment is considered only for
68 Chapter 5. Experimental results






































































































































































































































































Figure 5.10: Clinical attack rates, peak day and peak daily clinical attack rate for baseline
simulations (green), for antiviral treatment provided to index cases of all age classes (blue)
or provided only to specific age classes (cyan, Y=young, A=adults, E=elderly), and for
post-exposure prophylactic treatment provided to all age classes (red) or only to specific
age classes (orange, Y=young, A=adults, E=elderly). When post-exposure prophylactic
treatment is considered, we assume that antiviral treatment is also provided to index
cases.
young or adult individuals (see last row of Fig. 55.12.
Results can be different when considering the effects on excess mortality (see Fig. 5.11).
By assuming age-specific case fatality rates similar to those estimated for the 1918-19 in-
fluenza pandemic in Copenhagen, treatment of adults is the much more effective (the
excess mortality decreases by 41.2%-28% for R0 in 1.4-3) than treatment of elderly pop-
ulation (the excess mortality decreases only by 2.8%-0.8% for R0 in 1.4-3). The opposite
5.3. Optimized antivirals administration during a pandemic outbreak 69










































































































































































































































Figure 5.11: Expected excess mortality as obtained by assuming two different age-specific
case fatality rates, similar to those estimated for the 1918-19 influenza pandemic in Copen-
hagen and for the 1969-70 influenza pandemic in Italy respectively, for baseline simulations
(green), for antiviral treatment provided to index cases of all age classes (blue) or provided
only to specific age classes (cyan, Y=young, A=adults, E=elderly), and for post-exposure
prophylactic treatment provided to all age classes (red) or only to specific age classes
(orange, Y=young, A=adults, E=elderly).
pattern is observed by assuming age-specific case fatality rates similar to those estimated
for the 1969-70 influenza pandemic in Italy: treatment of adults is the much less effective
(the excess mortality decreases by 33.8%-12% for R0 in 1.4-3) than treatment of elderly
(the excess mortality decreases by 37.9%-36.9% for R0 in 1.4-3).
When prophylaxis is provided to close contacts of index cases, the clinical attack
rates decrease to 4.9%, 13.7%, 20.6% and 30.8% (see first row of Fig. 5.10), but a larger
antiviral stockpile is required (sufficient to treat 8, 21, 31 and 42 million individuals,
corresponding to the 13.8%, 37.2%, 53.8% and 73.8% of the population, see first row of
Fig. 5.12), for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7, R0 = 2 and R0 = 3 respectively. Moreover, the
epidemic peak is significantly delayed (of about 60, 26, 14 and 6 days respectively, see
second row of Fig. 5.10) and the peak daily case incidence decreases (approximately by
93%, 76%, 66% and 52% respectively, see third row of Fig. 5.10), with respect to the




























































































































































































































































Figure 5.12: Antiviral stockpile required and number of avoided cases divided by the
number of persons treated for antiviral treatment provided to index cases of all age classes
(blue) or provided only to specific age classes (cyan, Y=young, A=adults, E=elderly),
and for post-exposure prophylactic treatment provided to all age classes (red) or only
to specific age classes (orange, Y=young, A=adults, E=elderly). When post-exposure
prophylactic treatment is considered, we assume that antiviral treatment is also provided
to index cases. The horizontal black line represents the Italian antiviral stockpile.
baseline scenarios. The number of avoided cases for each antiviral course is similar to
that observed for antiviral treatment, namely 1.22, 0.43, 0.28 and 0.18, respectively for
the four transmission scenarios considered (see second row of Fig. 5.12). By assuming age-
specific case fatality rates similar to those estimated for the 1918-19 influenza pandemic
in Copenhagen, the excess mortality decreases by 51.6%, 29%, 22.1%, and 14.7% with
respect to treatment of all cases for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7 R0 = 2 and R0 = 3 respectively
(see first row of Fig. 5.11). The excess mortality decreases even more by assuming age-
specific case fatality rates similar to those estimated for the 1969-70 influenza pandemic
in Italy, namely 56.5%, 36%, 29.7%, and 23.2% (see second row of Fig. 5.11).
Providing prophylaxis only to individuals in some age classes results in the same
patterns observed above for the age-prioritized treatment of index cases (see Fig. 5.10
and Fig. 5.12). Age-prioritized prophylaxis does not result in a significant reduction of
the excess mortality with respect to the treatment of all cases (see Fig. 5.11). In fact,
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when considering prophylaxis to close contacts of cases we are assuming that treatment
is first provided to all index cases.
Prophylaxis provided to younger individuals is the only intervention allowing a relevant
reduction of the cumulative clinical attack rates (they decrease to 7.5%, 17.1%, 24.9%
and 36.3%, respectively for the four transmission scenarios considered) with a significant
reduction of the antiviral stockpile required (sufficient to treat 7, 14, 20 and 27 million
individuals, corresponding to the 11.5%, 25.3%, 35.3% and 47.5% of the population), at
least when R0 is no much larger than 2 (see Fig. 5.10 and 5.12).
Age-prioritized use of antivirals: late detection of index cases
By assuming that index cases and close contacts are treated 48 hours after the onset of
symptoms in the index cases. It is worth noticing that this delay results in a dramatic de-
crease of the intervention efficacy and, in general, a larger number of antivirals stockpiled
is required and a lower decrease of the clinical attack rate is observed. When treatment is
considered for all index cases, the clinical attack rate decreases to 14.9%, 23.9% and 31.1%
for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7 and R0 = 2 respectively and the number of avoided cases divided
by the number of persons treated decreases to 0.51, 0.27 and 0.18. When prophylaxis is
also considered, the clinical attack rate decreases to 9.1%, 17.9% and 25.1% for R0 = 1.4,
R0 = 1.7 and R0 = 2 respectively and the number of avoided cases divided by the number
of persons treated decreases to 0.55, 0.27 and 0.19. Even worst efficacies are observed
when R0 = 3.
Realizations and results variability
Results presented in this section were obtained by averaging over 15 simulations for each
transmission scenario considered (but for the baseline simulations which were based on 100
simulations). This certainly represents a number large enough to guarantee the stability
of the results. Specifically, only the timing of the initial cases is highly variable (however,
this is due to the high stochasticity of the epidemic in its initial phase). On the contrary,
the epidemiological indicators depending on the whole course of the epidemic are very
stable: standard deviations are less than 0.02% of the population for the cumulative
attack rates, less than 6 days for the peak day and less than 0.04% of the population for
the peak daily case incidence.
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5.3.1 Discussion
A recent study conducted in Italy [29] has shown that the use of antivirals, for treatment of
index cases and post-exposure prophylactic treatment of household contacts, is the most
effective single intervention strategy, resulting in a relevant reduction of the cumulative
clinical attack rate, namely of 78%, 50% and 36%, for R0 = 1.4 R0 = 1.7 and R0 = 2.1,
respectively. In addition, their use contributes to delay the epidemic peak and to decrease
the peak daily case incidence. Similar results have been shown for UK and US [47, 54].
Moreover, school and workplace prophylaxis could dramatically increase the impact, in
terms of reduction of the clinical attack rate [47, 29].
However, critically, the antiviral stockpile required is relevant. In Italy [29], an antivi-
ral stockpile large enough to treat 20 to 30 million of individuals (corresponding to the
35% and 53% of the population) is needed for R0 in 1.7 − 2. For R0 = 1.7, the antivi-
ral stockpile required decreases to 17% of the population only with the availability of a
vaccine within 4 months after the first world case and by considering large scale social
distancing measures (e.g., 90% air travel restriction and school closure for 2 months). For
R0 = 2.1, the antiviral stockpile required is about 35% of the population. Similar results
were obtained in US [47], where the antiviral stockpile required ranges from 25% to 60%
of the population, depending on the transmission scenario and the different mitigation
measures considered (school/workplace prophylaxis excluded).
We conducted a systematic simulation study of the age-prioritized use of antivirals for
mitigating and delaying an influenza pandemic. By assuming R0 no much larger than 2,
our results confirm that the antiviral stockpile required for the treatment of cases ranges
from 10% to 25% on the basis of the transmission scenario considered. If R0 = 3, the
stockpile required for the treatment of cases increases to 35% of the population. Treatment
of index cases is effective in mitigating the epidemic (decrease of cumulative attack rate
ranges from 11% to 52% in the four considered transmission scenarios, decrease of peak
daily case incidence ranges from 24% to 72%). By assuming that treatment with antivirals
is associated with a significant reduction in mortality (70%), a large decreases in the excess
mortality is observed in all the transmission scenarios considered (ranging from 42% to
75%).
No suboptimal strategies, based on the treatment of a fraction of cases on an age
basis, were found able to remarkably reduce both the clinical attack rate and the antiviral
stockpile required. Remarkably, however, a significant reduction of the excess mortality
can be achieved by treating only a specific fraction of the population, depending on age-
specific case fatality rates: treatment of adults is more effective if age-specific case fatality
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rates are similar to those estimated for the 1918-19 influenza pandemic in Copenhagen
while treatment of elderly is more effective if age-specific case fatality rates are similar to
those estimated for the 1969-70 influenza pandemic in Italy. Therefore, early estimates of
age-specific cases fatality rates can be crucial for optimizing the use of antivirals during
an influenza pandemic. Moreover, we have shown that treatment of elderly does not lead
to any significant reduction of the cumulative attack rate and that the efficacy of treating
younger population and adults are similar, but with a different cost in terms of antiviral
doses required.
Treatment provided to all cases coupled to prophylaxis for younger individuals is
the only intervention allowing a significant reduction of the cumulative clinical attack
rate with a significant reduction of antiviral courses required, with respect to provide
prophylaxis to the all close contacts of cases. To implement this strategy, the antiviral
stockpile should be large enough to treat about the 12%, 25%, 35% and 47.% of the
population, for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7, R0 = 2 and R0 = 3 respectively. Since the antivirals
stockpiled in Italy are sufficient to treat only about 7 millions individuals, corresponding
to the 12% of the population, Italy seems to be able to mitigate an influenza pandemic only
at the very beginning of the outbreak. However, the implementation of social distancing
measures (e.g. isolation of index cases and school/workplace closure), travel restrictions
could slow down the spread of the epidemic. Consequently, the antiviral stockpile required
could be significantly lower than that predicted by our model and time could be gained
for pandemic vaccine production and distribution, at least under moderate transmission
scenarios.
In our study we did not consider treatment and prophylaxis for specific categories,
such as patients admitted to hospital, health care workers with direct patient contact
and emergency medical service providers, highest risk patients (young children 12-23
months old, elderly ≥65 years old), public safety workers (police, fire, corrections), and
government decision makers. These policies are consistent with medical practice and ethics
to treat those with serious illness and who are most likely to die and those groups which
are critical for an effective public health response to a pandemic (preventing absenteeism
and maintaining societal functions). Specific work should be conducted for modeling these
interventions in order to refine our estimates. However, our strategies of age prioritization
could have important ethical impacts that should be taken into account. Recently, the
WHO has developed specific guidelines to take into account ethical considerations in
developing a public health response to pandemic influenza [131]. As regards age-based
prioritization, it is stated that “the goal of reducing overall disease burden might also
provide a rationale for favouring younger persons, even if the fair innings argument is not
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accepted”. However, “age-based prioritization criteria should be adopted only after wide
public consultation”.
Moreover, the potential impact of resistance of the circulating strain to antiviral drugs
should also be considered [10, 40, 103, 5]. The extent of such may cause substantial
revision to polices regarding the use of such drugs during the next pandemic. In fact,
our results should also consider the possibility of the emergence of an antiviral resistant
strain as observed in the last two influenza seasons for influenza A(H1N1) strain [51]. The
circulation of transmissible oseltamivir-resistant virus may preclude the use of oseltamivir
for post-exposure prophylactic treatment of close contacts. However, certain countries
have differentiated their stockpile acquiring also zanamivir which is particularly relevant
in light of emerging resistance to oseltamivir. This implies that additional antiviral reserve
capacity is required and this is likely to come primarily from zanamivir [51].
Our study also highlights the importance of the early detection of cases. In fact, great
effort should be made in order to establish a surveillance system able to detect and treat
cases as soon as possible since a delay of more than 24 hours could make both antiviral
treatment and prophylaxis very inefficient. This means that, to be successful, prepared-
ness to pandemic should not be only stockpiling of antiviral courses. A great effort should
also be made in organizing antiviral distribution and implementing specificity and sensi-
tivity of existing surveillance systems for seasonal influenza, in order to detect cases as
soon as possible in the occurrence of the emergence of an influenza pandemic. Antiviral
drugs must be given early in the course of infection to reduce symptoms (maximum 48
hours) and before any prospect of knowing the sensitivity of the virus [9, 67]. Viral loads
begin to decrease 24-48 hours after he onset of symptoms and late antiviral therapy is
unhelpful [13]. This critical aspect may have important implications on infrastructure for
care delivery. Since health systems may be overwhelmed during a pandemic, new care
services for providing the usual health care services (such as drug delivery in hospital
or in pharmacies or directly at home) should be considered in order to timely distribute
antivirals to cases and close contacts. Also, monitoring systems able to detect adverse
events should be considered. However, this aspects are directly related to the organization
of the health care system, and should be tailored on the basis of the different resources
available.
A characteristic feature of pandemics is to appear in a series of waves. Results pre-
sented in this work could be considered fairly unrealistic if waves were determined by
virus mutations resulting in the elimination (even partial) of acquired immunity in the
population. In fact, a much larger cumulative attack rate would be expected during a
series of wave in which acquired immunity is lost at the end of each wave. On the contrary,
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no substantial differences, but for the timing of the epidemic spread, would be expected
if waves were determined by factors that do not contribute to increase the effective re-
productive number (e.g. school closure in the Summer period or spontaneous behavioral
changes of the population in response to the epidemic [113]).
5.3.2 Conclusions
Our results strongly suggest that governments stockpile sufficient influenza antiviral drugs
to treat approximately 25% of their populations, by assuming that R0 is not much larger
than 2. In fact, no suboptimal strategies, based on the treatment of a fraction of cases
on an age basis, were found able to reduce remarkably both the clinical attack rate and
the antiviral stockpile required. In countries where the number of antivirals stockpiled
is well below 25% of the population, treatment of elderly should be considered as a
priority if age-specific case fatality rate were similar to that estimated for the 1969-70
influenza pandemic in Italy, where deaths occurred primarily among elder persons. On the
contrary, treatment of adults should be considered as a priority if age-specific case fatality
rate were similar to that estimated for the 1918-19 influenza pandemic in Copenhagen,
where deaths occurred primarily among adult persons. In countries where the number
of antiviral stockpiled exceeds the number required for the treatment of cases, providing
prophylaxis only to younger individuals is an option that could be taken into account
in the preparedness plans. However, these results are influenced by the timing of cases
detection: administration of antivirals 48 hours after the clinical onset of symptoms in
the index cases dramatically affects the efficacy of both treatment and prophylaxis.
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5.4 Dynamics of an influenza pandemic in Europe
The spread of an infectious disease epidemic is driven by the interplay of two factors: the
transmissibility of the virus responsible for the infection and the characteristics of the
host population. When the role of host is played by a human population, predicting the
spread of an epidemic is a tough problem due the complexity of modern human societies.
It is well established that the spatial structure of the population has an impact on the
diffusion of an epidemic: measles waves in England and Wales, spreading from large cities
to small towns, are determined by the spatial hierarchy of the host population structure
[61], and the spatial distribution of farms influences the regional variability of foot-and-
mouth outbreaks in United Kingdom [81]. The heterogeneity of the population itself can
play an important role in the spread of an epidemic [38]. It is also well known that human
mobility patterns affect the spatiotemporal dynamics of an epidemic: the role played by
the airline transportation network has been analyzed in [30], and it has been shown that
the high degree of predictability of the worldwide spread of infectious diseases is caused
by the strong heterogeneity of the transport network [68].
Large-scale individual-based spatially explicit transmission models of infectious dis-
eases [114] have become a relevant tool to evaluate intervention options for containing
[87, 46] or mitigating [85, 47, 54, 29, 64] a new influenza pandemic. Because of their
complexity, these models have been developed only at country level, including also some
European countries [47, 29].
However, Europe has never been analyzed as a whole and thus it is still uncertain how a
new pandemic influenza could spread in Europe. Europe comprises countries characterized
by completely different social and economical backgrounds that result in different levels
of population heterogeneity, in terms of both sociodemograpic structure and mobility.
In particular, it is still unclear how differences in the sociodemographic structure, which
result in different levels of population heterogeneity, and different patterns of human
mobility can affect the spatiotemporal spread of an epidemic. Here we provide quantitative
measures of their effects on the impact and the timing of an epidemic at European level.
5.4.1 Population heterogeneity
By analyzing data on the sociodemographic structure of 37 European countries (see
Fig. 5.13a) provided by the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) and
integrated with data provided by the National Statistical Offices for countries not covered
by Eurostat, we found that the frequencies of household type and size (Fig. 5.13b-c), the
age structure (Fig. 5.13e), the schools size (Fig. 1d), the rates of school attendance and
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Figure 5.13: Sociodemographic structures. (a) The study area includes 37 countries and
accounts for about 515 millions individuals (details are provided in Tab. S1). Colors
from yellow to brown indicate increasing density of population. Black labels refer to
countries belonging to EU27 while red labels refer to countries which do not belong
to EU27. (b) Variability in the frequencies of household type at European level. A1
represents single persons, A1 CH single parents with children, CPL NCH couples without
children, CPL CH couples with children. More than 95% of European households are
structured as one of the four above mentioned types. (c) Variability in the frequencies of
household size. (d) Variability in schools size (primary schools in cyan, secondary schools
in blue). Horizontal lines identify the percentiles 25 and 75, the points represent the
median values. The two boxplots represent the distributions of the average school size in
the different countries. (e) Age structure curves in the different countries. (f) Variability
in the employment and school attendance rates. Only individuals aged more than 15 are
considered. In the model, individuals aged less or equal than 15 are assumed to attend
schools.
employment by age (Fig. 5.13f) are highly variable across Europe. The age structure of
countries like Ireland, which is one the youngest European countries (with 31% of the
population aged less or equal than 20 years), differs drastically from that of countries like
Germany and Italy (where only 22% and 20.5% of the population is aged less or equal
than 20 years, respectively), which are characterized by very low fertility rates [123].
This results in largely different frequencies of household type and size. The fraction of
households with children ranges from 0.3 in Denmark to 0.6 in Sweden and the average
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household size ranges from 2.1 in Denmark to 3 in Cyprus. By restricting our attention to
the households with children, a large variability in the number of children per household
is also observable (see Fig. S1), with countries as Ireland and Cyprus, where households
have several children, opposite to countries like Germany and Bulgaria. We have also
observed a large difference in terms of employment rates in the population aged more
than 15 years (the legal working age in Europe is 15 or 16, with some exceptions): the
fraction of workers ranges from 0.39 in Bulgaria to 0.67 in Lichtenstein. The fraction of
students in the population aged more than 15 years ranges from 0.04 in Denmark to 0.12
in Cyprus. According to the PIRLS 2001 and PISA 2000 and 2003 international surveys,
as elaborated in [44], the average size of primary schools ranges from 200 to 750 and the
average size of secondary schools ranges from 270 to 1000. We used an independent data
set providing information on all the Italian schools to validate the surveys data (see Fig.
S2). Data concerning workplaces in Italy and United Kingdom do not highlight signif-
icant differences in the size of workplaces (see Fig. S3). We used the above described
sociodemographic data to generate a highly realistic synthetic population of individuals,
explicitly grouped in households, schools and workplaces, for simulating the populations
in the different countries of the study area. Since it is reasonable to assume that the epi-
demiological characteristics of the virus do not vary among the European countries, we
should expect that the high variability in the sociodemographic structure of the European
countries results in a high variability in the impact of a new influenza pandemic in the
different European countries. This is the first key issue we want to address. Details on
the analysis of the European sociodemographic structure can be found in [95].
5.4.2 Human mobility
We analyzed air and railway transportation data as provided by Eurostat. We found
that in the 2007 more than 360 millions passengers have taken international trips across
EU27 (see Fig. 5.13a), 323 millions of whom by airplane and 37 millions by train. In the
same year, more than 135 millions passengers have entered EU27 from countries outside
EU27. The great majority of these travels are from and to the western part of Europe
(see Fig. 5.14a-b), namely United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Spain (about the
85% of the travels are from and to these countries). The probability density function of
travel distances is shown in Fig. 5.14c. As shown in [91, 62], international travel flows are
related to economic factors. By considering only the travels across EU27, we found that
the flow from country i to country j can be explained by a gravity model depending on the
GDP (Gross Domestic Product: it is an economic index measuring the national income
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Figure 5.14: Population movement patterns. (a) Network of yearly airplane travelers
across Europe (colors are defined as follows. Green: less than 10,000 travelers, yellow:
10,000 to 100,000 travelers, orange: 100,000 to 1,000,000 travelers, red: 1,000,000 to
10,000,000 travelers, purple: more than 10,000,000 travelers). Each link between two
countries is identified by an arc connecting the two capitals. (b) as (a) but for train
travelers. (c) Probability density function of travel distances by train (green points), by
airplane (blue points) and total (red points). Solid lines represent smooth interpolations
of data. (d) Model A) (described in the main text; parameters: τf = 0.57, τt = 0.99 and
ρ = 0.39): comparison between the observed and the modeled origin-destination matrix.
Points compare generic entries of the two matrix and the solid black line represents a
smooth interpolation. The model tends to overestimate the number of travelers when the
actual yearly number of travelers is less than 1,000; it in good agreement with the data on
the most important links. (e) Model A): resulting probability density function of travel
distances compared with that resulting from the analysis of the observed data (shown in
c) (red points). (f) Internal commuting: probability density function of travel distances
to school/workplace (in the model, red points), compared with that proposed in [58] for
the radius of gyration of mobile phone users (black points). In the model, students are
assumed to attend schools no more than 100Km from home. This results in a change in
the slope of the probability curve (blue circle).
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where gi is a normalized GDP of country i (gi =
Gi
G?
pi where Gi is the GDP per capita of
country i, G? is the average GDP per capita of EU27 and pi is the population of country
i) and dij is the distance between the two countries. τf and τt tune the dependence of
dispersal on donor and recipient sizes and ρ tunes the dependence on the distance, θ is a
proportionality constant. To show this, we generated a synthetic population of travelers
taking travels according to a gravity model whose masses are given by the normalized
GDPs (model A), by the population sizes, as in [126] (model B) and, finally, taking
travels by choosing a random destination (model C). We found that model A explains
the origin-destination matrix (Fig. 5.14d) and the distance distribution (Fig. 5.14e) better
than models B and C (see Fig. S5). This considered, we used model A for simulating long-
distance travels across the study area. As for the internal commuting, i.e. daily trips to
school and workplace, we adopted the following procedure. First, schools and workplaces
of the proper size were spatially-distributed proportionally to the population (see Fig. S2).
Afterward, students and workers were randomly assigned to a school or workplace, in such
a way that the resulting distance to school/work distribution complies with a truncated
power-law distribution (see Fig. 5.14f), as proposed in [58] for the radius of gyration of
mobile phone users, extending the precursor work presented in [18] on the circulation of
bank notes in the United States of America. Fig. S6 shows how well the proposed model
of internal commuting compares with a gravity model previously developed on Italian
commuting data. To what extent the observed mobility patterns and their inhomogeneity
across the European countries affect the spread of a new influenza pandemic in Europe
is the second key issue we want to address. Details on the analysis of human mobility
patterns can be found in [95].
5.4.3 Spatiotemporal spread of a pandemic influenza in Europe
The transmission rates, defined as the product of the contacts rate times the probability
of transmitting the infection, of a new influenza pandemic are unknown. By looking at
past pandemics, we can only make assumptions on its transmissibility potential, which
can be summarized by the reproductive number R0 (essentially, the number of secondary
infections that result from a single infectious individual in a fully susceptible population
[6]). Therefore, according to recent estimates of the reproductive number for last influenza
pandemics [46, 99, 27], plausible transmissibility scenarios on R0 are drawn: the investi-
gated values range from 1.6 to 2.4. Moreover, according to [47], the model is parametrized
so that in the United Kingdom 30% of transmission occurs in households, 37% in schools
5.4. Dynamics of an influenza pandemic in Europe 81
Day of first national case (days)


























































UK DE FR ES NL AT IT DK RS G
R

































Figure 5.15: Spatiotemporal dynamics of a new pandemic influenza (R0 = 2). (a) Prob-
able destination of the first case imported in Europe. (b) Distributions of the day of the
first national case (days since the first world case) in the different countries. (c) Distri-
butions of the peak day (days since the first world case) in the different countries. (d)
Expected number of daily cases per 100,000 individuals in time in Europe (red line) and
95% confidence intervals (shaded area). Green and blue lines (and shaded areas) refer
to the expected number of daily cases per 100,000 individuals in Ireland and Bulgaria
respectively. These two countries are among those where the impact of the epidemic is
expected to be the highest and the lowest respectively. (e) Time sequence (in days) of a
simulated epidemic. A single simulation with first European case in United Kingdom is
shown. Colors from pink to dark red indicate an increasing number of daily cases (dark
red indicates more than 10,000 daily cases).
and workplaces and 33% in the general community. Since the contact rates and, conse-
quently, the reproductive number are determined by the sociodemographic structure of
the population we are somehow setting the probability of transmitting the infection in the
different social contexts. After having parametrized the model in the United Kingdom,
the same transmission rates are assumed in the rest of the study area. In what follows,
when not differently stated, we are assuming R0 = 2 (as discussed, it means R0 = 2 in the
United Kingdom). We assume that the latent period is 1.5days and the infectious period
is 2days (however we provide a sensitivity analysis for values of this epidemiological pa-
rameter in the range 1.5 - 3days). Infected individuals are assumed to have a probability
0.5 of developing clinical symptoms.
We found that the probability of importing the first case is higher in the western
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Figure 5.16: Impact of a new pandemic influenza (R0 = 2). (a) Distributions of the
cumulative attack rate in the different countries. (b) Distributions of the peak daily
attack rate in the different countries. (c) Average cumulative attack rate as a function of
the average household size in the different countries. (d) Distributions of the percentage
of cases due to transmission among household members in the different countries. (e)
Distributions of the percentage of the population infected during long-distance travels
across or outside Europe. (f) Average cumulative attack rate as a function of the fraction
of inactive (neither students nor workers) individuals in the different countries.
countries (the first case is imported in United Kingdom or Germany in almost 50% of
simulations, see Fig. 5.15a). The distributions of the timing of the first case differ largely
from country to country (see Fig. 5.15b): in average, the first case occurs 44 and 79 days
after the first world case in the United Kingdom and Principality of Monaco respectively.
By ignoring the less populous countries, a west-east gradient is clearly observable. The
variability in the peak day in the different countries (see Fig. 5.15c) is less remarkable (in
average it ranges from 106 days in Cyprus to 122 in Romania) since long-distance travels
tend to synchronize the national epidemics and these are much faster in the less populous
countries. In general, we have observed that the high mobility inside the countries (in-
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ternal commuting) and the long-distance travels tend to synchronize, thus fastening, the
epidemic. The average peak day in a country is positively correlated with the longitude
of the country (Spearman test, ρ = 0.55, p = 0.0003), as confirmed by the clear spatial
trend observable in the time sequence of the simulated epidemic shown in Fig. 5.15e. This
finding is supported by the results presented in [43], where a spatial analysis revealed a
significant west-east pattern in the timing of peak influenza activity across Europe for
the eight winters since 1999-2000. The average peak day in a country is negatively cor-
related with the yearly number of passengers entering the country from other countries
in the study area (Spearman test, ρ = −0.59, p = 0.001), supporting the hypothesis that
the observed pattern of epidemic spread is related to patterns of human movement. The
expected pattern of spread in Europe is shown in Fig. 5.15d. The epidemic peaks some
110 days after the first world case and the epidemic lasts about 3 months. We remark
that Fig. 5.15d reports the expected number of new cases in time. Since the epidemics are
not synchronized in time, the actual peak incidence will be much higher than the value
corresponding to the peak day reported in the figure (it will be closer to the upper 95%
confidence limit, see also Fig. 5.16b).
In average, the cumulative attack rate in the different countries ranges from 31.2% in
Bulgaria to 37.8% in Cyprus (see Fig. 5.16a). By looking at the study area as a whole,
the average cumulative attack rate is 33.7%. Among the most popolous countries, the
cumulative attack rate is expected to be 31.7% in Germany, 33.4% in the United Kingdom,
33.5% in Italy, 34.5% in France and 35.5% in Spain. It is worth noticing that the value
obtained for the United Kingdom is very similar to that obtained in [47]. The standard
deviations of the distributions of the national cumulative attack rates are very small,
but for the less populous countries. The average cumulative attack rate in a country
is positively correlated with the average household size (Spearman test, ρ = 0.77, p <
0.0001) (see Fig. 5.16c) and with the fraction of students in the population (Spearman test,
ρ = 0.77, p < 0.0001), and negatively correlated with the fraction of inactive individuals
in the population (Spearman test, ρ = −0.38, p = 0.02) (see Fig. 5.16f). It is worth
noticing that a simple linear regression model whose independent variables are the average
household size, the fraction of students and the fraction of inactive individuals in the
population predicts very well the average cumulative attack rate in the different countries
(coefficient of determination R2 = 0.985, root mean square error RMSE=0.17). The peak
daily attack rate in the different countries is also highly variable. It ranges from 1.5%
in Bulgaria to 2.3% in Cyprus (see Fig. 5.16b). Since the national epidemics are not
synchronized, the average peak daily attack rate of the whole study is similar to the value
observed in Bulgaria, namely 1.5%. In the United Kingdom we obtained a lower peak daily
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attack rate (1.8%) with respect to the 2.1% as reported in [47]. This is due to different
modeling choices for the infective period. We assume an exponential distribution for both
latent and infectious period (as in classical mathematical models of infectious diseases)
and infectiousness is assumed to be constant during the infectious period (2 days). In [47]
individuals transmit more at the very beginning of the infectious period, giving rise to
faster simulated epidemics and to higher peak daily attack rates. These different modeling
choices can affect the evaluation of some containment strategies (e.g. antiviral treatment)
and can lead to differences in the timing of the simulated epidemics but do not affect
the results presented in this work. Fig. S7 shows the dependence of the timing of the
epidemic and of the peak daily incidence on the infectious period: given R0, the shorter the
infectious period is, the faster the epidemic spreads and the higher the peak daily attack
rate is. The cumulative attack rate does not depend on the infectious period. Values of
peak day and peak daily attack rate in the United Kingdom similar to that reported in [47]
were obtained by assuming an infectious period of 1.5days. We found that the peak daily
attack rate in a country is positively correlated with the average household size (Spearman
test, ρ = 0.72, p < 0.0001) and with the fraction of students in the total population
(Spearman test, ρ = 0.79, p < 0.0001), and slightly negatively correlated with the fraction
of inactive individuals in the total population (Spearman test, ρ = −0.31, p = 0.06).
Moreover, it is negatively correlated with the number of inhabitants (Spearman test,
ρ = −0.51, p = 0.001) since the national epidemics tend to be less spatially synchronized
in the larger countries. It is also relevant to analyze where transmission occurs. We
found that the transmission in households in the different countries ranges from 28.6% in
Danemark to 34.8% in Croatia (see Fig. 5.16d) and that the fraction of the population
contracting the infection in foreign countries ranges from 0.02% in Slovakia to 0.57% in
Germany (see Fig. 5.16e). These last results suggest that the efficacy of some targeted
interventions, e.g. post-exposure prophylactic antiviral treatment [47, 29] and travel
restrictions [31], could be largely different from country to country. By examining the
results for values ofR0 in the range 1.6-2.4 we did not find significant qualitative differences
(of course, the timing and the impact of the epidemics are drastically different).
5.4.4 Conclusions
The transmissibility of a new influenza virus is uncertain. At the time of writing, prelim-
inary estimates of R0 for the ongoing A(H1N1) outbreak in Mexico are available [52] but
no estimates are available for Europe (the low number of secondary cases in Europe, due
to active surveillance of cases, is not sufficient to obtain reliable estimates). As predicted
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by our model, however, the number of imported and secondary cases in the initial phase
of the epidemic is much larger in the Western side of Europe [130]. Reliable data on
the proportion of transmission in social contexts, crucial to the disease transmission, as
prisons, leisure places, public transportation systems, hospitals are not available, though
some research works are contributing to fill the gap [105, 133]. Spontaneous behavioral
changes in the population, as a protective response to a (possibly lethal) epidemic, could
affect the spread of the epidemic [113], as well as the imminent school closure in the
Summer period. Despite these limitations, our results clearly show that, once the infec-
tion will be well established in Europe, European countries have to be prepared to face
a fast spread of the epidemic because of the high mobility of the population, resulting in
an early importation of the first cases from abroad and in a high synchronization of the
local epidemics. The impact of the epidemic is different among the European countries.
Specifically, countries as Ireland would have to face more severe epidemic than countries as
Germany and Bulgaria because of their sociodemograpic structure, characterized by large
household groups and by a large fraction of students in the population. Our results are
supported by the findings presented in [105], where the authors analyzed social contacts
and mixing patterns in eight European countries. Specifically, they found that living in a
larger household size was associated with higher number of reported contacts. Moreover,
they found that the dominant feature of the contact matrix data is the strong diagonal
element: individuals in all age groups tend to mix assortatively (i.e., preferentially with
others of similar age) and this pattern is most pronounced in those aged 5-24 years, i.e. the
scholar age. They also found that 58% of all reported contacts occur at home, at work, or
at school. This results supports our assumption on the proportion of transmission in the
different social contexts (in the model, 67% of transmission occurs in households, schools
and workplaces, at least in the United Kingdom). These results should have to be take
into account for planning strategies for mitigating future pandemics and for controlling
the ongoing A(H1N1) influenza outbreak.
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5.5 Controlling hepatitis A in Italy
Hepatitis A virus (HAV) is the cause of viral hepatitis A infection, which results in an
acute form of hepatitis. Patients recover completely and develop full immunity against
future HAV infections [122]. Nevertheless, viral hepatitis A represents an important public
health issue, imposing a remarkable economic burden worldwide [15, 34] and in Italy as
well [90].
HAV is transmitted via the fecal–oral route by person–to–person contact (direct trans-
mission) or by ingestion of contaminated food or water (indirect transmission). Indirect
transmission represents the most important source of infection in countries with high liv-
ing standards [49, 89]. Specifically, raw mussels and shellfish consumption represents the
main source of infection in Italy [94], especially in the most affected regions: Puglia and
Campania [24, 25, 118]. Another significant source of infection is represented by travels
to high endemicity areas [94], where both direct and indirect transmission can occur.
Nowadays, even in the absence of vaccination, hepatitis A is in a decaying phase,
mainly determined by improved hygienic conditions derived from economic development
and higher standards of living [77, 78]. Although this is true also for Italy as a whole, as
documented by both notification [94, 72] and serological data [33], Southern Italy shows a
different pattern. HAV infections are still common in Puglia and Campania, two regions
in Southern Italy, where a very large outbreak was observed in 1996–1997 [90], despite
the improvement of socio–economic conditions.
Thanks to a new generation of mathematical modeling tools, the effectiveness of both
pharmaceutical (e.g., treatment or prophylaxis on a contact tracing basis) and non–
pharmaceutical (e.g., social distancing) individually targeted intervention measures can
be thoroughly investigated. Recently, highly detailed individual–based models have been
developed for evaluating the effectiveness of control measures for diseases such as pan-
demic influenza [54, 46, 47, 87, 85, 29] or fighting back a bioterroristic attack (e.g., by
employing smallpox virus) [42, 86, 115, 65]. As highlighted by Riley [114], the need
arises “to develop a simple model of household demographics, so that these large–scale
models can be extended to the investigation of long–time scale human pathogens”. In
fact, endemic diseases such as tuberculosis, measles, malaria, hepatitis and HIV represent
important public health issues worldwide [106].
In this work we introduce an individual–based model for investigating the dynamics
of viral hepatitis A in the most affected Italian areas, and for evaluating the effectiveness
of intervention options. The model is based on the real sociodemographic composition
of the population and it takes into account the vital dynamics of the population and the
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changes in the network of contacts (e.g., due to the birth and death of individuals, the
generation of new households, the educational career of individuals).
Since hepatitis A is a vaccine–preventable disease, we have evaluated the effective-
ness of different vaccination programmes. Moreover, we have analyzed the effects of
improvements in standards of living and hygiene and of social distancing measures, such
as isolation of symptomatic cases and closure of day care centers and kindergartens.
Results show that a very low vaccination coverage is sufficient to control hepatitis A
in Italy. The above described social distancing measures do not have any positive effect
in decreasing the seroprevalence. Moreover, an undesired effect of the considered social
distancing measures is to decrease the fraction of children and adolescents contracting the
infection while increasing that of adults and elderly people. Improvements in hygienic
conditions can remarkably decrease the seroprevalence. Finally, the elimination of hepati-
tis A appears unfeasible since new cases are continuously imported from high endemicity
areas outside the country.
Intervention measures
Since hepatitis A is a vaccine–preventable disease, we will evaluate the effectiveness of
different vaccination programmes. Moreover, we will evaluate the effectiveness of social
distancing measures. In fact, this is possible mostly thanks to the explicit representation
of the individuals and of the places where transmission can occur. Finally, since hepatitis
A is undergoing a global decline, due to the worldwide improvements in standards of living
and hygiene [77, 78], we will draw different scenarios on possible hygienic improvements.
Vaccination For hepatitis A, the target population consists of children and adolescents.
We consider newborns and 12 years old adolescents as the target population. Vaccination
is modeled by reducing the proportion of susceptible individuals in the target popula-
tion. This proportion depends on vaccination coverage (i.e., the proportion of target
population that is covered in the vaccination campaign) and vaccine effectiveness (i.e.,
the probability of developing immunity after the administration of a vaccine dose). The
latter is kept fixed at 98% according to [12]. Since vaccination coverage depends on the
vaccination programme implemented by public health agencies and on the collaboration
of the population, many scenarios are evaluated.
Social distancing The aim of the considered social distancing measures is to interrupt
the chains of cases observed in day care centers and kindergartens, which are typical
of many childhood diseases [53], and viral hepatitis A as well [26]. This is possible
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thanks to the explicit representation of the individuals and of the places where person–
to–person transmission can occur. Specifically, we investigate the effectiveness of the
following strategies:
d1 symptomatic individuals are assumed to be isolated for two weeks. In this period
they do not transmit the infection neither in their household nor in their school or
workplace, if any;
d2 as d1. Moreover, day care centers and kindergartens attended by symptomatic
individuals are closed for 2 weeks;
d3 as d2. Moreover, the policy is extended to day care centers and kindergartens
attended by other household members of symptomatic individuals.
The aim of strategy d2 is to limit as much as possible the transmission within day care
centers and kindergartens, which are the most important routes of person–to–person HAV
transmission [83]. Isolation of symptomatic cases is not sufficient to interrupt person–to–
person transmission within day care centers and kindergartens, since the probability of
being symptomatic in individuals aged 0–6 is very low (about 4% [122, 49]). In this
respect, the closure of day care centers and kindergartens is required.
The aim of strategy d3 is to limit the transmission within day care centers and kinder-
gartens by suspected infectious individuals, i.e., individuals living in the same household
of a symptomatic individual.
Since isolation of symptomatic individuals will hardly occur immediately after the
onset of symptoms, we assume a one–week delay between the onset of symptoms and the
application of such strategies. We investigate the effectiveness of such strategies when
applied to a fraction of the symptomatic individuals or only to notified cases.
Let us note, however, that symptomatic individuals continue to excrete the virus in
the environment even if social distancing measures are applied.
Modeling hygienic improvements In Italy, the main source of contagion is repre-
sented by the consumption of infected raw mussels and shellfish [94]. HAV infection of
mussels and shellfish can occur both in the marine environment and in fish market stands
where infected water is often employed to wash the shellfish [120]. Thus, we assume that
hygienic improvements would be mainly related to the indirect contacts component. Such
improvements can be reasonably expected to occur in the considered areas.
We model the improvement of hygienic conditions simply as a reduction of the quantity
of infected seafood. In particular, after solving Equation 4.10, we decrease the value of
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Table 5.11: Epidemiological parameters.
Parameter Unit Value Reference
Reproductive number
for Campania region dimensionless 2.9 [1]
for Puglia region dimensionless 3.8 [1]
Latent period weeks 2 [23, 122]
Infectious period weeks 3 [23, 122]
Decay of survival of HAV weeks−1 0.0833 [1, 16, 92]
in the environment
Probability of becoming symptomatic
for individuals aged 0–6 percentage 4 [49, 122]
for individuals aged 7–16 percentage 16 [49, 122]
for individuals older than 16 percentage 80 [49, 122]
Vaccine efficacy percentage 98 [12]
U(τ) by a reduction factor accounting for the improved conditions (e.g., better hygiene
in the fish markets or better awareness in the choice of fishing areas).
Model parametrization
The basic reproductive number R0 is the average number of secondary cases generated
by an infectious individual in a completely susceptible population [6]. In the absence
of any pharmacological interventions, for epidemic outbreaks R0 can be estimated from
notification data during the initial exponential growth phase of the epidemic [28], while for
endemic diseases it can be defined as the inverse of the fraction of susceptible individuals
at the endemic equilibrium [6]. The latter approach was employed for determining the
basic reproductive number of the simulated epidemics. Note that the method can not be
applied when pharmacological interventions (e.g. vaccination) are implemented.
As regards hepatitis A in Italy, R0 was estimated to be 2.9 in Campania and 3.8 in
Puglia1.
The free parameters of the model are the transmission rates associated to the different
sources of infection (i.e. βh, β
ϑ
p , βs(a) and βt(a)), while all the other epidemiological
parameters (e.g., the latent period and the infectious period) are kept fixed according
to the literature (see Table 5.11). We set the transmission rates in such a way that the
fraction of cases generated by each source of infection complies with the risk factors by
age as reported in [94]. In particular, as regards the direct contacts, only transmission
within household, day care, kindergarten and primary school is relevant.
Finally, actual hepatitis A notification data [72] are used to estimate the reporting
1In light of a recent study on the HAV seroprevalence in Italy [8], the estimation of R0 given by [1]
were slightly revised.
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– – – – 2.9 11.7 11.1/12.3 65.8 62.7/68.9 59.2 58.5/60.3 – – –
10 50 † – – 8.3 8.0/8.8 47.2 44.9/49.6 61.0 60.2/62.2 23.9 22.4/25.0 573.5
20 80 † – – 7.0 6.5/7.3 39.9 37.3/41.8 62.5 61.6/63.5 35.1 33.0/36.7 818.9
80 90 † – – 6.0 5.5/6.4 32.7 29.9/34.7 67.6 66.7/68.3 51.0 49.1/53.3 1,121.7
20 80 5 – – 11.1 10.5/11.5 62.3 59.8/64.8 59.8 59.1/60.9 3.5 2.9/4.1 90.5
20 80 10 – – 10.3 9.9/10.7 58.6 56.8/60.5 60.3 59.6/61.4 7.1 5.9/8.4 181.8
20 80 20 – – 9.0 8.8/9.2 51.4 50.5/52.4 61.3 60.6/62.3 13.9 11.4/16.0 343.7
– – – 20 2.1 9.7 8.9/10.4 51.2 48.7/54.7 66.0 65.7/66.8 – – –
– – – 50 1.9 8.7 8.0/9.3 46.2 43.7/49.2 67.5 66.9/68.3 – – –
– – – 80 1.8 8.3 7.7/9.0 44.6 42.1/47.4 67.9 67.4/68.8 – – –
20 80 † 20 – 5.8 5.4/6.1 33.3 30.9/35.0 67.9 67.4/68.8 36.7 34.4/38.3 818.5
20 80 † 50 – 5.5 5.1/5.8 31.7 29.3/33.3 69.0 68.6/69.8 37.0 34.7/38.6 818.7
20 80 † 80 – 5.4 5.0/5.7 31.1 28.8/32.7 69.3 69.0/70.2 37.1 34.8/38.7 818.7
? the duration of the simulation is 50 years.
∗ it represents the age–adjusted percentage of recovered individuals in the population.




The risk of infection by age for the three sources of infection estimated by the model agrees
well with national survey data as reported in [94]. A comparison is shown in Fig. 5.17a.
At the endemic equilibrium, the fraction of recovered individuals2 estimated by the
model is 65.8% in Campania, and 73.8% in Puglia (see Table 5.12 and 5.13). These
estimates comply with the seroprevalence data reported in [8], where an average value of
67.7% is reported for Southern Italy. Fig. 5.17b shows the fraction of recovered individuals
per age cohort, compared with national seroprevalence data [8]. Age at infection of
symptomatic individuals is shown in Fig. 5.17c. Since the age at infection in Puglia is
lower than in Campania and the probability of developing symptoms increases with age,
the fraction of symptomatic cases in the two regions is not significantly different (38.9%
in Campania and 38.3% in Puglia).
Hepatitis A cases are seriously under–reported [11]. The estimated reporting rate is
2Individuals who contracted the infection and recovered; vaccinated individuals are thus excluded.
Basically, it corresponds to the age–adjusted percentage of recovered individuals in the population.
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– – – – 3.8 53.3 50.9/54.0 73.8 71.1/76.1 51.9 50.9/53.9 – – –
10 50 † – – 37.6 35.8/39.6 54.1 52.3/56.2 54.3 53.3/56.3 22.5 21.4/23.6 573.4
20 80 † – – 30.6 29.2/32.5 45.3 43.0/47.2 56.1 55.2/58.0 33.7 32.0/35.2 818.7
80 90 † – – 24.5 22.7/26.2 35.9 33.0/37.9 62.9 61.6/64.2 50.2 48.4/52.6 1,122.1
20 80 5 – – 50.6 48.4/52.6 70.6 68.4/72.3 52.6 51.5/54.4 3.2 2.7/3.8 90.5
20 80 10 – – 47.9 46.0/49.4 67.2 65.7/68.4 53.2 52.3/54.9 6.7 5.5/7.7 181.9
20 80 20 – – 40.7 38.8/42.2 57.0 56.1/58.0 56.0 55.1/57.3 13.4 11.0/15.3 343.7
– – – 20 2.5 50.1 44.8/54.5 60.3 57.1/64.0 62.4 62.1/63.1 – – –
– – – 50 2.2 44.4 39.5/48.6 53.5 51.0/57.1 64.7 64.1/65.6 – – –
– – – 80 2.1 42.2 37.7/46.0 51.1 48.5/54.4 65.5 64.7/66.4 – – –
20 80 † 20 – 26.6 24.8/28.6 37.8 35.1/39.6 64.4 64.0/65.2 35.9 33.8/37.5 818.6
20 80 † 50 – 24.7 23.0/26.5 35.7 33.1/37.5 66.1 65.7/67.0 36.4 34.2/37.9 818.7
20 80 † 80 – 24.1 22.4/25.8 35.0 32.4/36.7 66.7 66.2/67.5 36.5 34.3/38.1 818.7
? the duration of the simulation is 50 years.
∗ it represents the age–adjusted percentage of recovered individuals in the population.
† for the entire duration of the simulation.
about 2% in Campania and 8% in Puglia. These estimates are quite consistent with those
reported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for viral hepatitis A, namely
less than 10% in the US [22]. These values are partially justified by the low perceived
risk of hepatitis A among the population, especially in Campania where only 39% of the
interviewed people would visit a medical doctor in case of icteric sclerae [118].
The estimated average number of notified cases per year per 100,000 inhabitants is 11.7
in Campania and 53.3 in Puglia, which are in good agreement with the values reported
in [72], namely 14.3 in Campania and 52.6 in Puglia.
The model exhibits a “cluster–like pattern” (i.e., a large number of cases in a “short”
period of time) within day care centers and kindergartens (see Fig. 5.17d). As discussed
before, this is a typical pattern of most childhood diseases [53], and hepatitis A as well
[26].
Effectiveness of vaccination programmes
In presence of a vaccination programme of unlimited duration involving both newborns
and 12–years–old adolescents, hepatitis A can be controlled quite well. By performing
a very mild vaccination programme (vaccination coverage of 50% among 12–years–old
adolescents and of 10% among newborns), the fraction of symptomatic individuals reduces
of 26% in Campania and of 23% in Puglia in 50 years. In both regions, the cost of this
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d1 100 2.8 11.7 11.1/12.3 64.3 61.0/67.5 60.8 60.0/62.4
d2 100 2.8 11.7 11.1/12.3 64.1 60.9/67.3 61.0 60.2/62.6
d3 100 2.8 11.7 11.1/12.4 64.1 60.9/67.3 61.1 60.3/62.7
d1 50 2.9 11.7 11.2/12.3 64.9 61.7/68.0 60.2 59.4/61.6
d2 50 2.9 11.7 11.2/12.3 64.7 61.6/67.9 60.3 59.6/61.7
d3 50 2.9 11.8 11.2/12.3 64.8 61.6/67.9 60.4 59.7/61.8
d1 10 2.9 11.7 11.0/12.3 65.6 62.4/68.7 59.4 58.6/60.6
d2 10 2.9 11.7 11.1/12.3 65.6 62.4/68.7 59.4 58.7/60.6
d3 10 2.9 11.7 11.1/12.3 65.6 62.4/68.7 59.5 58.8/60.7
d1 † 2.9 11.7 11.1/12.3 65.8 62.7/68.8 59.2 58.5/60.3
d2 † 2.9 11.7 11.0/12.2 65.8 62.7/68.8 59.2 58.5/60.3
d3 † 2.9 11.7 11.1/12.2 65.7 62.7/68.8 59.2 58.5/60.4
∗ it represents the age–adjusted percentage of recovered individuals in the population.
? the duration of the simulation is 50 years.
† strategy applied to only to notified cases.
vaccination campaign is about 570 vaccine doses per 100,000 individuals per year. Better
results are obtained for higher vaccination coverage. In particular, for a very efficient
vaccination strategy (vaccination coverage of 90% among 12–years–old adolescents and
of 80% among newborns), the fraction of symptomatic individuals declines to 22.1% in
Campania and to 22.6% in Puglia, with a cost of about 1,100 vaccine doses per 100,000
individuals per year. Whatever vaccination programme is applied, hepatitis A can not
be eliminated because some sporadic cases can be caused by travels to high endemicity
areas.
A vaccination coverage of 20% among newborns and of 80% among 12–years–old ado-
lescents mimics the intervention implemented in Puglia which is the only Italian region
that has introduced a vaccination programme started in 1997 [88], though vaccination
is only recommended (and not mandatory): this is the reason of such a low vaccination
coverage. In this setting, a vaccination campaign of limited duration (e.g., 10 years) does
not have a significant effect in mitigating the epidemic. In fact, the fraction of recovered
individuals decreases of only 5% in Campania and 4% in Puglia in 50 years. Fig. 5.18a,
5.18d, 5.18g, 5.19a, 5.19d, 5.19g, Table 5.12 and 5.13 show how better results can be
obtained by extending the vaccination campaign over a longer period.
In both the considered regions, when vaccination is performed for at least 20 years,
the fraction of recovered individuals drastically decreases in almost all age classes (but
for the class of > 59 years old individuals) as an effect of the vaccination (see Fig. 5.18
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d1 100 3.7 54.0 51.5/56.4 72.8 69.9/75.2 53.5 52.4/55.9
d2 100 3.7 54.2 51.6/56.8 72.6 69.9/75.0 53.7 52.6/56.1
d3 100 3.7 54.1 51.7/56.7 72.6 69.8/75.0 53.8 52.6/56.2
d1 50 3.8 53.7 51.1/56.0 73.2 70.4/75.6 52.9 51.8/55.1
d2 50 3.7 53.8 51.2/56.2 73.1 70.3/75.5 53.0 51.9/55.3
d3 50 3.7 53.8 51.3/56.1 73.1 70.3/75.4 53.1 52.0/55.3
d1 10 3.8 53.4 50.8/55.7 73.6 70.9/76.0 52.1 51.0/54.2
d2 10 3.8 53.3 50.9/55.4 73.6 70.9/75.9 52.1 51.1/54.2
d3 10 3.8 53.4 50.9/55.7 73.6 70.8/75.9 52.2 51.1/54.3
d1 † 3.8 53.3 50.8/55.5 73.7 71.0/76.1 52.0 50.9/54.1
d2 † 3.8 53.3 50.7/55.5 73.7 71.0/76.0 52.0 51.0/54.1
d3 † 3.8 53.3 50.8/55.5 73.7 71.0/75.9 52.0 50.9/54.1
∗ it represents the age–adjusted percentage of recovered individuals in the population.
? the duration of the simulation is 50 years.
† strategy applied only to notified cases.
5.18b, 5.18e, 5.18h, 5.19b, 5.19e and 5.19h). This reduction is not observed in the class
of elderly individuals since they lived most of their life before the start of the vaccination
programme. When vaccination is performed for at least 20 years, age at infection increases
with respect to the baseline simulations as a consequence of the higher protection in the
younger (and vaccinated) individuals and of the overall reduction in the number of cases in
the population (see Fig. 5.18c, 5.18f, 5.18i, 5.19c, 5.19f and 5.19i). However, the increased
age at infection is well compensated by the drastic reduction of the overall impact of the
epidemic.
Effectiveness of social distancing measures
Social distancing measures d1, d2 and d3 do not have any positive effect: neither the
fraction of recovered individuals nor the number of notified cases, nor the R0 decline
(see Table 5.14 and 5.15). Specifically, only a slight decrease in the fraction of recovered
individuals (of the order of 1–2%, not statistically significant) can be observed when
considering the more restrictive measures d2 and d3 applied to the 100% of symptomatic
individuals, which is fairly unrealistic. In the more realistic case of strategies applied
only to notified cases, no significant differences are observable with respect to the baseline
scenarios.
Moreover, an undesired observed effect is to decrease the fraction of children and
adolescents who contract the infection while increasing that of adults and elderly people
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Figure 5.17: a Risk factors by age group. Comparison between the National data reported
in [94] (black bars) and the baseline simulations in Campania (dark gray bars) and Puglia
(light gray bars). Children account for individuals aged 0–14, Young for individuals
aged 15–24 and Adults for individuals older than 24 years old. b HAV seroprevalence
by age cohort. Comparison between National data as reported in [8] (black bars) and
baseline simulations in Campania (dark gray bars) and Puglia (light gray bars). c Age at
infection of symptomatic individuals in Campania (black bars) and Puglia (gray bars). d
Number of cases over time in three randomly chosen day care centers in Puglia (R0 = 3.8),
highlighting the classical “clusters–like pattern”. The numbers refer to the fraction of
cases over the number of children enrolled.
(see Fig. 5.20). Since the probability of developing acute symptoms increases with age,
these interventions can be considered counterproductive. This effect is more relevant in
Puglia and it is due to the higher value of R0 which results in a lower age at infection.
Effects of improvements in hygienic conditions
Improvements in hygienic conditions have a wide effect on the hepatitis A dynamics.
Although the decrease in the number of notified cases is not so relevant (see Table 5.12
and 5.13), the fraction of recovered and symptomatic individuals noticeably declines in
50 years, leading to estimated values of R0 of 1.8–2.1 in Campania and 2.1–2.5 in Puglia:
this values are typical of medium–low endemicity areas.

























































































































































































































































































Figure 5.18: Effects of a vaccination programme in Campania. Vaccination coverage
is assumed to be 20% among newborns and 80% among 12 years old adolescents. a
percentage of susceptible individuals over time (light gray area), recovered individuals
(dark gray area), vaccinated individuals (black area) and infected individuals (“small”
white area between susceptible and recovered individuals) for a vaccination programme
lasting 5 years. b HAV seroprevalence by age cohort for a vaccination programme lasting
5 years. c Age at infection of symptomatic individuals (black bars) and asymptomatic
individuals (gray bars) for a vaccination programme lasting 5 years. d, e, f as a, b, c,
but for a vaccination programme lasting 20 years. g, h, i as a, b, c, but for a vaccination
programme lasting 50 years.
Finally, combining a vaccination programme with natural hygienic improvement leads,
not surprisingly, to a very low fraction of recovered individuals values (see Table 5.12 and
5.13).

























































































































































































































































































Figure 5.19: Effects of a vaccination programme in Puglia. Vaccination coverage is as-
sumed to be 20% among newborns and 80% among 12 years old adolescents. a percent-
age of susceptible individuals over time (light gray area), recovered individuals (dark gray
area), vaccinated individuals (black area) and infected individuals (“small” white area be-
tween susceptible and recovered individuals) for a vaccination programme lasting 5 years.
b HAV seroprevalence by age cohort for a vaccination programme lasting 5 years. c Age
at infection of symptomatic individuals (black bars) and asymptomatic individuals (gray
bars) for a vaccination programme lasting 5 years. d, e, f as a, b, c, but for a vaccination
programme lasting 20 years. g, h, i as a, b, c, but for a vaccination programme lasting
50 years.
5.5.2 Conclusions
The development of an algorithm for simulating the temporal evolution of the sociodemo-
graphic structure of the population, where individuals come to life, grow, attend school,
go to work, can generate new households, can procreate and die, allowed us to develop
the first large scale, spatially–explicit individual–based model, applied to the analysis





































































Figure 5.20: a Social distancing measure d3 applied to all symptomatic individuals: vari-
ation of the number of cases (gray bars) and number of symptomatic cases (black bars)
in Campania by age cohorts. b As a but for Puglia region.
of hepatitis A in Italy. The dynamic sociodemographic model proposed in this work
can be easily adapted to the study of other endemic diseases in which person–to–person
transmission can play a relevant role.
The model complies with the available epidemiological data (e.g., the seroprevalence
or the fraction of cases generated in the different sources of infection) and it allows an-
alyzing the effectiveness of different intervention measures. A low vaccination coverage
of unlimited duration is able to reduce hepatitis A, at a limited cost in terms of vaccine
stockpile. However, a vaccination programme of limited duration does not result in a
substantial decrease of the proportion of susceptible individuals in the population. Con-
sequently, HAV can spread in the population and new outbreaks will arise as soon as the
vaccination campaign is interrupted. Therefore, in the light of the results presented in
this section, the mass vaccination adopted in the region of Puglia in 1996–1997 can be
effective only if the vaccination programme is protracted. Unfortunately, serological data
for the pre–vaccination period and for the vaccination period in Puglia are not available
to us. Therefore, it is hard to validate this result empirically.
Expected and desirable improvements in hygienic conditions are sufficient to lead
to a decline of the epidemic, even in the absence of vaccination (as observed in [77,
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78]). The obtained estimates of R0 suggest that the two high endemicity Italian regions
could naturally evolve towards a medium–low endemicity level. The considered social
distancing measures (isolation of symptomatic cases and closure of day care centers and
kindergartens) do not have any positive effect on the containment of hepatitis A. On
the contrary, the effect of these interventions is to decrease the fraction of children and
adolescents who contract the infection while increasing that of adults and elderly people.
Consequently, a side effect is to increase the risk of developing acute symptoms. In
fact, blocking transmission in day care centers and kindergartens may not be an effective
measure for decreasing the overall prevalence of infection in the population if more than
50% of cases are due to ingestion of infected seafood, as in the two considered regions
[94]. This kind of measures could be effective only when coupled to drastic improvements
in hygienic conditions. Elimination of the disease is not possible since new cases are
continuously imported from high endemicity areas outside the country.
The assumption of a constant population (neither immigration nor emigration are con-
sidered in the model and the number of newborns is assumed to be equal to the number
of deaths) represents a critical issue, though this is a reasonable modeling choice. Since
the demographic projections are not completely reliable, the longer the temporal interval
of the simulations, the less accurate the predictions are expected to be. Individual–based
models allow considering highly heterogeneous populations, improving the characteriza-
tion of contacts and representing the age–structure in a natural way. They offer the ad-
vantage of avoiding (arbitrary) assumptions on the transmission rates among age classes.
However, in order to estimate the transmission rates, they require specific data on (i) the
type of contact and (ii) the frequency of contact in the different places where transmission
can occur.
We focused the study on the two most affected Italian regions. Since the risk factors
greatly vary from region to region (e.g., the consumption of raw seafood is not common
in Northern Italy), it would be interesting to develop a nationwide model, to analyze,
for instance, the mechanisms behind the spatio–temporal spread of the epidemic. In
some more detail, it would be interesting to analyze the effects of a vaccination campaign
conducted only in the most affected regions on the temporal evolution of viral hepatitis
A in the rest of the country.
We conclude by remarking the main findings of this work, potentially related to the
implementation of control measures by public health authorities. A low vaccination cov-
erage is sufficient to reduce the impact of hepatitis A, at a limited cost in terms of vaccine
stockpile. However, if the vaccination programme is not protracted in time new outbreaks
can arise as soon as the vaccination campaign is interrupted. Since vaccine is offered on
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a voluntary basis, it is thus crucial to carry out stabilization measures. Improvements in
hygienic conditions are sufficient to lead to a decline of the epidemic. Though they are
difficult to achieve in a short period of time, monitoring of fish market stands and mass
stabilization campaigns could be implemented to raise consumer and industry awareness.
Social distancing measures are discouraged from both clinical and social points of view.
They could be reassessed in the light of high vaccination coverage and drastic improve-
ments in hygienic conditions.
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Chapter 6
Related work
In the last 5 years, a lot of large–scale individual–based models have been proposed in
literature. They are mainly used for evaluating the effectiveness for containing/mitigation
measures in response to an influenza pandemic [85, 46, 87, 47, 54, 64, 29, 35, 96] or to a
bioterroristic smallpox attack [42, 115, 86], but they have been allied also for the testing
the efficacy of control policies for an endemic diseases, as the case of viral hepatitis A
[3]. The scale at which such models work varies a lot among the studies, ranging from
a community level (e.g., see [85]), a city level (e.g., see [42]) or a country level (e.g., see
[47]), but none of them is focused on a continental scale as it is the case of this study.
For the topic, the scale, the considered level of details and the type of used datasets,
the models much comparable to the one proposed here are the ones developed by Ferguson
et al. [47] and by Germann et al. [54], which are both focused on the dynamics of an
influenza pandemic in the US. Recently such models have been already compared in [64].
In [47], individuals are explicitly represented and co–located in households, schools
and workplaces, which have a specific geographic locations. Within such groups an homo-
geneous mixing is assumed, while for all the other kind of contacts, the risk of infection
depends on the geographic distance between individuals, which is weighted by a kernel
function. Also in [54] individuals are explicitly represented and the epidemic can spread
on a sophisticated network. This is obtained by considering the contacts that an indi-
vidual can have within the household, school, workplace, extended family, neighborhood,
local community and by long distance travels. Moreover, the force of infection explicitly
depends on the age of the individual.
The structure of the model described in [47] is quite similar to the one adopted here.
However, since it was focused on a single country, the population considered is, in some
sense, homogeneous and the authors could not take into account differences in the so-
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ciodemographic structure and in the level of human mobility. This holds also for the
model described in [54], while it is one of the main novel feature of the model analyzed
in this thesis. The network of contacts considered in [54], is much sophisticated than the
one adopted here (and the one in [47]), but, as highlighted in [114], this means that the
authors have to made more “arbitrary” assumptions on the transmission rates.
The explicit dependence of the force of infection on the distance between individuals
used in [47] is similar to the one considered in this study. However, we consider also
cross border diffusion and long distance travels. Finally, let us remark that, in both the
previous models and in the one proposed here, the seeding of the infection is based on the
arrival of infected individuals from abroad.
Since our European model (see Sec. 4.2) covers all the European countries, including
United Kingdom, we are able to make a specific comparison on our predictions and the
ones given by Ferguson et al. in [47]. This can be seen as a sort of validation of our
model predictions against the results given in one of the milestones in this area. In order
to perform such numerical comparison, we assume R0 = 2. Remarkably, by assuming an
infectious period of 1.5days in our model, cumulative attack rates as predicted by our
and [47] models are 33.5% and 34% respectively; peak daily attack rate are 2% and 2.1%
respectively; 95% confidence intervals for the peak day are (89,104) days and roughly
(90,105) days respectively; 95% confidence intervals for the timing of initial case are
(30,51) days and roughly (30,55) days respectively (see Fig. 1d in [47] and supplementary
material of [47]). This excellent agreement in the predictions proves the robustness of the
two models, since they are both based on different assumptions on the mobility of the
population (e.g., the law for assigning commuting destinations) and on the epidemiological
parameters (e.g., the distribution of the viral load over time in infectious individuals).
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Predicting the spread of epidemic outbreaks and evaluating the effectiveness of control
strategies represent a priority for public health policy makers worldwide. In this con-
text, mathematical models represent the scientific basis on which decisions can be taken.
Recently, IBM have become the much relevant tool for the evaluation of individually tar-
geted public health measures, which play a central role for controlling epidemic outbreaks.
Probably, the much important applications are focused on the spread of an influenza pan-
demic (e.g., see [46, 54, 64]) or on a deliberate reintroduction of smallpox virus (e.g., see
[42, 115, 86]).
In this thesis project, the developed models have been applied mainly to the investi-
gation of an influenza pandemic. Our investigation have been focused on the theoretical
aspects of the IBM, the description of the sptiotemporal dynamics of an influenza pan-
demic and on the evaluation of the effectiveness of different intervention strategies. In
particular, at Italian scale, the diffusion scenarios drawn by our Italian model (described
in Sec. 4.1) and our evaluation of the effectiveness of control strategies for the ongoing
A/H1N1 influenza pandemic are currently used by the Italian Ministry of Health. More-
over, also at European scale, the predictions of our model (described in Sec. 4.2) are
currently taken into account by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
for preparing their recommendation on the vaccine distribution.
As it has been anticipated in [114], a new frontier for individual–based simulations
would be the application to long–time scale human diseases, such as tuberculosis, measles,
hepatitis or HIV. In this thesis (and in the paper derived from it [3]), it has been shown the
first application of an individual–based model to an endemic diseases: the viral hepatitis
A. Our results show the effectiveness of individually targeted interventions which are not
possible to test with other kind of models (e.g., classical ODE models). This would be
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very useful for public health agencies.
Other plausible applications, not yet discussed in the scientific literature (nor in this
project), could be to the analysis of the dynamics of a possible future severe acute res-
piratory syndrome (SARS) or marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) epidemics. Therefore,
dealing with such kind of diseases could represents natural future applications of the mod-
els proposed in this thesis. Specifically, it would be easy to extend the transmission model
for all diseases where household and school/workplaces contacts are relevant sources of in-
fections. Moreover, the detailed models of the sociodemographic structure and of human
mobility patterns of the Italian and European populations can be used for describing also
other kinds of diffusion processes (e.g., the spread of other diseases, informations, mobile
phone viruses).
A crucial point for a further more intensive employment of IBM is represented by
the development of reliable methods for validating model projections against empirical
epidemiological data. A lot of work was already done for comparing classical model
predictions to empirical data, but as regards IBM, the theory is currently been developed.
A first crucial step in this way has recently been made in [21], but a lot of effort should
be done in this direction.
However, IBM does not represent the only suitable approach for simulating epidemic
outbreaks. Therefore, one major issue thus concerns to which extent the epidemic evo-
lution found by different modeling approaches may differ and depend on the different
approximations and assumptions used. On this context, we are currently providing for
the first time a side by side comparison of the results obtained with an IBM and a struc-
tured metapopulation stochastic model for the evolution of a baseline pandemic event in
Italy. Preliminary results show a good agreement between the two modeling approaches.
This thus define the possibility of hybrid models combining IBM and metapopulation
approaches according to the available data and computational resources.
Bibliography
[1] M. Ajelli, M. Iannelli, P. Manfredi, and M. L. Ciofi degli Atti. Basic mathematical
models for the temporal dynamics of HAV in medium-endemicity Italian areas.
Vaccine, 26(13):1697–1707, 2008.
[2] M. Ajelli and S. Merler. The Impact of the Unstructured Contacts Component in
Influenza Pandemic Modeling. PLoS ONE, 3(1):e1519, 2008.
[3] M. Ajelli and S. Merler. An individual-based model of hepatitis A transmission.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 259(3):478–488, 2009.
[4] M. Akazawa, J. L. Sindelar, and A. D. Paltiel. Economic Costs of Influenza-Related
Work Absenteeism. Value in Health, 6(2):107–115, 2003.
[5] M.E. Alexander, C.S. Bowman, Z. Feng, M. Gardam, S.M. Moghadas, G. Rost,
J. Wu, and P. Yan. Emergence of drug resistance: implications for antiviral control
of pandemic influenza. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences,
274(1619):1675–1684, 2007.
[6] R. M. Anderson and R. M. May. Infectious diseases of humans: dynamics and
control. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Pres, 1992.
[7] V. Andreasen, C. Viboud, and L. Simonsen. Epidemiologic characterization of the
1918 influenza pandemic summer wave in Copenhagen: implications for pandemic
control strategies. Journal of Infectious Diseases, 197(2):270–278, 2008.
[8] F. Ansaldi, B. Bruzzone, M. C. Rota, A. Bella, M. L. Ciofi degli Atti, P. Durando,
R. Gasparini, and G. Icradi. Hepatitis A incidence and hospital-based seroprevalence
in Italy: a nation-wide study. European Journal of Epidemiology, 23:45–53, 2008.
[9] F. Y. Aoki, M. D. Macleod, P. Paggiaro, O. Carewicz, A. El Sawy, C. Wat, M. Grif-
fiths, E. Waalberg, and P. Ward. Early administration of oral oseltamivir in-
105
106 BIBLIOGRAPHY
creases the benefits of influenza treatment. Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy,
51(1):123–129, 2003.
[10] J. Arino, C. Bowman, and S. Moghadas. Antiviral resistance during pandemic
influenza: implications for stockpiling and drug use. BMC Infectious Diseases,
9(1):8, 2009.
[11] G. L. Armstrong and B. P. Bell. Hepatitis A virus infection in the Unites States:
model-based estimates and implications for childhood immunization. Pediatrics,
109:839–845, 2002.
[12] F. Averhoff, C. N. Shapiro, B. P. Bell, I. Hyams, L. Burd, A. Deladisma, E. P.
Simard, D. Nalin, B. Kuter, C. Ward, M. Lundberg, N. Smith, and H. S. Margolis.
Control of Hepatitis A Through Routine Vaccination of Children. Journal of the
American Medical Association, 286(23):2968–2973, 2001.
[13] P. Baccam, C. Beauchemin, C. A. Macken, F. G. Hayden, and A. S. Perelson.
Kinetics of Influenza A Virus Infection in Humans. Journal of Virology, 80(15):7590–
7599, 2006.
[14] D. Balk and G. Yetman. The global distribution of population: evaluating the gains
in resolution refinement. Technical report, Center for Inrternational Earth Science
Information Network, 2004.
[15] J. J. Berge, D. P. Drennan, R. J. Jacobs, A. Jakins, A. S. Meyerhoff, W. Stubblefield,
and M. Weinberg. The cost of hepatitis A infections in American adolescents and
adults in 1997. Hepatology, 31(2):469–473, 2000.
[16] E. Biziagos, J. Passagot, J. M. Crance, and Deloince R. Long-term survival of Hep-
atitis A virus and poliovirus Type 1 in mineral water. Applied and Environmental
Microbiology, 54(11):2705–2710, 1988.
[17] R. Breban, R. Vardavas, and S. Blower. Theory versus Data: How to Calculate R0?
PLoS ONE, 2(3):e282, 2007.
[18] D. Brockmann, L. Hufnagel, and T. Geisel. The scaling laws of human travel.
Nature, 439:462–465, 2006.
[19] J.S. Brownstein, C.J. Wolfe, and K.D. Mandl. Empirical evidence for the effect of
airline travel on inter-regional influenza spread in the United States. PLoS Med,
3(10):e401, 2006.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 107
[20] P. Caley, NG Becker, and DJ Philp. The waiting time for inter-country spread of
pandemic influenza. PLoS ONE, 2(1):e143, 2007.
[21] S. Cauchemez, A. J. Valleron, P. Y. Boelle, A. Flahault, and N. M. Ferguson.
Estimating the impact of school closure on influenza transmission from sentinel
data. Nature, 452(7188):750–754, 2008.
[22] CDC. Disease Burden from Hepatitis A, B, and C in the United States. http://www.
cdc.gov/ncidod/diseases/hepatitis/resource/dz_burden.htm, 2006. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention.
[23] CDC. Health Information for International Travel 2008. Atlanta, US, Department
of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, 2007. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention.
[24] M. Chironna, C. Germinario, D. De Medici, A. Fiore, S. Di Pasquale, M. Quarto,
and S. Barbuti. Detection of hepatitis A virus in mussels from different sources
marketed in Puglia region (South Italy). International Journal of Food Microbiology,
75:11–18, 2002.
[25] M. Chironna, A. Grottola, C. Lanave, E. Villa, S. Barbuti, and M. Quarto. Genetic
analysis of HAV strains recovered from patients with acute hepatitis from Southern
Italy. Journal of Medical Virology, 70(3):343–349, 2003.
[26] S. D. Chitambar, M. S. Chadha, L. R. Yeolekar, and V. A. Arankalle. Hepatitis A
in day care centre. Indian Journal of Pediatrics, 63(6):781–783, 1996.
[27] G. Chowell, C. E. Ammon, N. W. Hengartner, and J. M. Hyman. Transmission
dynamics of the great influenza pandemic of 1918 in Geneva, Switzerland: assessing
the effects of hypothetical interventions. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 241(2):193–
204, 2006.
[28] G. Chowell, N.W. Hengartner, C. Castillo-Chavez, P.W. Fenimore, and J.M. Hy-
man. The basic reproductive number of Ebola and the effects of public health
measures: the cases of Congo and Uganda. J Theor Biol, 229(1):119–126, 2004.
[29] M. L. Ciofi degli Atti, S. Merler, C. Rizzo, M. Ajelli, M. Massari, P. Manfredi,
C. Furlanello, G. Scalia Tomba, and M. Iannelli. Mitigation measures for pandemic
influenza in Italy: an individual based model considering different scenarios. PLoS
ONE, 3(3):e1790, 2008.
108 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[30] V. Colizza, A. Barrat, Barthe´lemy, M., and A. Vespignani. The role of the airline
transportation network in the prediction and predictability of global epidemics.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103(7):2015–2020, 2006.
[31] V. Colizza, A. Barrat, M. Barthe´lemy, A.-J. Valleron, and A. Vespignani. Mod-
eling the worldwide spread of pandemic influenza: baseline case and containment
interventions. PLoS Med, 4(1):e13, 2007.
[32] B.S. Cooper, R.J. Pitman, W.J. Edmunds, and N.J. Gay. Delaying the international
spread of pandemic influenza. PLoS Med, 3(6):e212, 2006.
[33] R. D’Amelio, A. Mele, A. Mariano, L. Roman, R. Biselli, F. Lista, A. Zanetti, and
T. Stroffolini. Hepatitis A, Italy. Infectious Diseases, 11(7), 2005.
[34] A. Das. An economic analysis of different strategies of immunization against hep-
atitis A virus in developed countries. Hepatology, 29(2):548–552, 2003.
[35] V.J. Davey, R.J. Glass, H.J. Min, W.E. Beyeler, and L.M. Glass. Effective, robust
design of community mitigation for pandemic influenza: a systematic examination
of proposed US guidance. PLoS ONE, 3(7):e2606, 2008.
[36] V. Demicheli, D. Rivetti, JJ Deeks, and TO Jefferson. Vaccines for preventing
influenza in healthy adults. Cochrane database of systematic reviews (Online), (3),
2004.
[37] O. Diekmann and J. A. P Heesterbeek. Mathematical epidemiology of infectious
diseases: model building, analysis and interpretation. John Wiley & Son, 2000.
[38] J. Dushoff and S. Levin. The effects of population heterogeneity on disease invasion.
Math Biosci, 128(1-2):25–40, 1995.
[39] ECDC. ECDC Situation Report. Pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009, update 6
August 2009., 2009. http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/files/pdf/Health_topics/
Situation_Report_09080%6_1700hrs.pdf.
[40] M. Eichner, M. Schwehm, H.-P. Duerr, M. Witschi, D. Koch, S. Brockmann, and
B. Vidondo. Antiviral prophylaxis during pandemic influenza may increase drug
resistance. BMC Infectious Diseases, 9(1):4, 2009.
[41] J.M. Epstein, D.M. Goedecke, F. Yu, R.J. Morrison, D. Wagener, and G.V. Boba-
shev. Controlling pandemic flu: the value of international air travel restrictions.
PLoS ONE, 2(5):e401, 2007.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 109
[42] S. Eubank, H. Guclu, A. V. S. Kumar, M. V. Marathe, A. Srinivasan, Z. Toroczkai,
and N. Wang. Modelling disease outbreaks in realistic urban social networks. Nature,
429:180–184, 2004.
[43] European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Annual Epidemiological Re-
port on Communicable Diseases in Europe 2008, 2008.
[44] European Commission. Key Data on Education in Europe 2005, 2005.
[45] N. M. Ferguson. Capturing human behaviour. Nature, 446:733, April 2007.
[46] N. M. Ferguson, D. A. Cummings, S. Cauchemez, C. Fraser, S. Riley, A. Meeyai,
S. Iamsirithaworn, and D. S. Burke. Strategies for containing an emerging influenza
pandemic in Southeast Asia. Nature, 437(7056):209–214, 2005.
[47] N. M. Ferguson, D. A. Cummings, C. Fraser, J. C. Cajka, and P. C. Cooley. Strate-
gies for mitigating an influenza pandemic. Nature, 442(7101):448–452, 2006.
[48] N. M. Ferguson, C. A. Donnelly, and R. M. Anderson. The Foot–and–Mouth Epi-
demic in Great Britain: Pattern of Spread and Impact of Interventions. Science,
292:1155–1160, 2001.
[49] A. E. Fiore. Hepatitis A Transmitted by Food. Clinical Infectious Diseases, 38:705–
715, 2004.
[50] A. Flahault, E. Vergu, L. Coudeville, and R. F. Grais. Strategies for containing a
global influenza pandemic. Vaccine, 24:6751–6755, 2006.
[51] D. M. Fleming, A. J. Elliot, A. Meijer, and W. J. Paget. Influenza virus resistance
to oseltamivir: what are the implications? The European Journal of Public Health,
19(3):238–239, 2009.
[52] C. Fraser, C.A. Donnelly, S. Cauchemez, W.P. Hanage, M.D. Van Kerkhove, T.D.
Hollingsworth, J. Griffin, R.F. Baggaley, H.E. Jenkins, E.J. Lyons, et al. Pandemic
potential of a strain of influenza A (H1N1): early findings. Science, 324(5934):1557,
2009.
[53] K. Galil, B. Lee, T. Strine, C. Carraher, A. AL. Baughman, M. Eaton, J. Montero,
and J. Seward. Outbreak of Varicella at a Day-Care Center despite Vaccination.
The New England Journal of Medicine, 347(24):1909–1915, 2002.
110 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[54] T. C. Germann, K. Kadau, I. M. J. Longini, and C. A. Macken. Mitigation strategies
for pandemic influenza in the United States. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 103(15):5935–5940, 2006.
[55] R.J. Glass, L.M. Glass, W.E. Beyeler, and H.J. Min. Targeted social distancing
design for pandemic influenza. Emerg Infect Dis, 12(11):1671–1681, 2006.
[56] W.P. Glezen. Emerging Infections: Pandemic Influenza. Epidemiologic Reviews,
18(1):64–76, 1996.
[57] W.P. Glezen and L. Simonsen. Commentary: Benefits of influenza vaccine in
US elderly-new studies raise questions. International Journal of Epidemiology,
35(2):352–353, 2006.
[58] M.C. Gonzalez, C.A. Hidalgo, and A.-L. Barabasi. Undersanding individual human
mobility patterns. Nature, 453(5):779–782, 2008.
[59] K. Goodwin, C. Viboud, and L. Simonsen. Antibody response to influenza vacci-
nation in the elderly: a quantitative review. Vaccine, 24(8):1159–1169, 2006.
[60] R.F. Grais, J. Hugh Ellis, and G.E. Glass. Assessing the impact of airline travel on
the geographic spread of pandemic influenza. European Journal of Epidemiology,
18(11):1065–1072, 2003.
[61] B. T. Grenfell, O. N. Bjornstad, and J. Kappey. Travelling waves and spatial
hierarchies in measles epidemics. Nature, 414(6865):716–723, 2001.
[62] T. Grosche, F. Rothlaufa, and A. Heinzla. Gravity models for airline passenger
volume estimation. J Air Transp Manag, 13(4):175–183, 2007.
[63] I. M. Hall, R. Gani, H. E. Hughes, and S. Leach. Real-time epidemic forecasting
for pandemic influenza. Epidemiol Infect, 135(3):372–385, 2007.
[64] M. E. Halloran, N. M. Ferguson, S. Eubank, I. M. Longini Jr, D. A. T. Cummings,
B. Lewis, S. Xu, C. Fraser, A. Vullikanti, T. C. Germann, D. Wagener, R. Beckman,
K. Kadau, C. Barrett, C. A. Macken, D. S. Burke, and P. Cooley. Modeling targeted
layered containment of an influenza pandemic in the United States. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, 105(12):4639, 2008.
[65] M. E. Halloran, I. M. Jr Longini, A. Nizam, and Y. Yang. Containing Bioterrorist
Smallpox. Science, 298:1428–1432, 2002.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 111
[66] W. Hanshaoworakul, J.M. Simmerman, U. Narueponjirakul, W. Sanasuttipun,
V. Shinde, S. Kaewchana, D. Areechokechai, J. Levy, and K Ungchusak. Severe
Human Influenza Infections in Thailand: Oseltamivir Treatment and Risk Factors
for Fatal Outcome. PLoS ONE, 4(6):e6051, 2009.
[67] F. G. Hayden. Developing New Antiviral Agents for Influenza Treatment: What
Does the Future Hold? Clinical Infectious Diseases, 48(S1):S3–S13, 2009.
[68] L. Hufnagel, D. Brockmann, and T. Geisel. Forecast and control of epidemics in a
globalized world. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 101:15124–15129, 2004.
[69] M. Iannelli and P. Manfredi. Demographic Change and Immigration in Age-
structured Epidemic Models. Mathematical Population Studies, 14(3):169–191,
2007.
[70] Influenza team (ECDC). Pandemic preparedness in the European Union - multi-
sectoral planning needed. Eurovurveillance, 12(8):3143, 2007.
[71] ISTAT. Life tables. http://demo.istat.it/unitav/index.html?lingua=eng,
1974–2004. Italian Institute of Statistics.
[72] ISTAT. Annuario statistico Italiano, 1980–2006. Italian Institute of Statistics. (In
Italian).
[73] ISTAT. VIII Censimento generale dell’industria e dei servizi. http://dwcis.istat.
it/cis/index.htm, 2001. Italian Institute of Statistics. (In Italian).
[74] ISTAT. Strutture familiari e opinioni su famiglia e figli. http://www.istat.it/
dati/catalogo/20060621_03/, 2003. Italian Institute of Statistics. (In Italian).
[75] ISTAT. Resident population. http://demo.istat.it/pop2007/index_e.html,
2007. Italian Institute of Statistics.
[76] ISTAT. Matrimoni, separazioni e divorzi. http://www.istat.it/altridati/
matrimoni/, 2008. Italian Institute of Statistics. (In Italian).
[77] K. H. Jacobsen and J. S. Koopman. Declining hepatitis A seroprevalence: a global
review and analysis. Epidemiology and Infection, 132:1005–1022, 2004.
[78] K. H. Jacobsen and J. S. Koopman. The effects of socioeconomic development
on worldwide hepatitis A virus seroprevalence patterns. International Journal of
Epidemiology, 34:600–609, 2005.
112 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[79] T. Jefferson, S. Smith, V. Demicheli, A. Harnden, A. Rivetti, and C. Di Pietrantonj.
Assessment of the efficacy and effectiveness of influenza vaccines in healthy children:
systematic review. The Lancet, 365(9461):773–780, 2005.
[80] N. Johnson and J. Mueller. Updating the accounts: global mortality of the 1918-
1920” Spanish” influenza pandemic. Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 76(1):105–
115, 2002.
[81] M.J. Keeling, M. E. J. Woolhouse, D. J. Shaw, L. Matthews, M. Chase-Topping,
D. T. Haydon, S. J. Cornell, J. Kappey, J. Wilesmith, and B. T. Grenfell. Dynamics
of the 2001 uk foot and mouth epidemic: stochastic dispersal in a heterogeneous
landscape. Science, 294:813–817, 2001.
[82] W. O. Kermack and A. G. McKendrick. A contribution to the mathematical the-
ory of epidemics. Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and
Engeneering Sciences, 115:700–721, 1927.
[83] Y. Lerman, G. Chodik, H. Aloni, J. Ribak, and S. Ashkenazi. Occupations at
Increased Risk of Hepatitis A: A 2-Year Nationwide Historical Prospective Study.
American Journal of Epidemiology, 150(3):312–320, 1999.
[84] M. Lipsitch and C. Viboud. Influenza seasonality: Lifting the fog. Proc Natl Acad
Sci USA, 106(10):3645, 2009.
[85] I. M. Jr Longini, M. E. Halloran, A. Nizam, and Y. Yang. Containing Pandemic
Influenza with Antiviral Agents. American Journal of Epidemiology, 159(7):623–
633, 2004.
[86] I. M. Jr Longini, M. E. Halloran, A. Nizam, Y. Yang, S. Xu, D. Burke, D. Cummings,
and J. Epstein. Containing a Large Bioterrorist Smallpox Attack: A Computer
Simulation. International Journal of Infectious Diseases, 11(2):98–108, 2006.
[87] I. M. Jr Longini, A. Nizam, S. Xu, K. Ungchusak, W. Hanshaoworakul, D. A.
Cummings, and M. E. Halloran. Containing pandemic influenza at the source.
Science, 309(5737):1083–1087, 2005.
[88] P. L. Lopalco, P. Malfait, F. Menniti-Ippolito, R. Prato, C. Germinario, M. Chi-
ronna, M. Quarto, and S. Salmaso. Determinants of acquiring hepatitis A virus
disease in a large Italian region in endemic and epidemic periods. Journal of Viral
Hepatitis, 12(3):315–321, 2005.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 113
[89] P. L. Lopalco, P. Malfait, S. Salmaso, C. Germinario, G. Salamina, M. Quarto,
S. Barbuti, R. Cipriani, A. Mundo, and G. Pesole. A persisting outbreak of hepatitis
A in Puglia, Italy, 1996: epidemiological follow-up. Euro Surveillance, 2(4):31–32,
1997.
[90] C. Lucioni, V Cipriani, S. Mazzi, and Panunzio M. Cost of an Outbreak of Hepatitis
A in Puglia, Italy. Pharmaco Economics, 13(2):257–266, 1998.
[91] H. Matsumoto. International urban systems and air passenger and cargo flows:
some calculations. J Air Transp Manag, 10(4):239–247, 2004.
[92] J. N. Mbithi, V. S. Springthorpe, and S. A. Sattar. Effect of relative humidity and
air temperature on survival of Hepatitis A virus on environmental surfaces. Applied
and Environmental Microbiology, 57(5):1394–1399, 1991.
[93] A. McGeer, K. A. Green, A. Plevneshi, A. Shigayeva, N. Siddiqi, J. Raboud, and
D. E. Low. Antiviral therapy and outcomes of influenza requiring hospitalization in
Ontario, Canada. Clinical Infectious Diseases, 45(12):1568–1575, 2007.
[94] A. Mele, M.E. Tosti, E. Spada, A. Mariano, E. Bianco, and SEIEVA Collaborative
Group. Epidemiology of acute viral hepatitis: twenty years of surveillance through
SEIEVA in Italy and a review of the literature. Technical Report ISTISAN, 12(6):1–
39, 2006.
[95] S. Merler and M. Ajelli. The role of population heterogeneity and human mobility
in the spread of pandemic influenza. Proc Royal Soc B, 2009. In press.
[96] S. Merler, M. Ajelli, and C. Rizzo. Age-prioritized use of antivirals during an
influenza pandemic. BMC Infectious Diseases, 9:117, 2009.
[97] S. Merler, P. Poletti, M. Ajelli, B. Caprile, and P. Manfredi. Coinfection can trigger
multiple pandemic waves. J Theor Biol, 254(2):499–507, 2008.
[98] S. Merler, C. Rizzo, M. Ajelli, M. Massari, G. Scalia Tomba, C. Furlanello, and
M.L. Ciofi degli Atti. Modelling preventive measures during an influenza pandemic
in Italy: a real time simulation strategy. In Options for the Control of Influenza
VI: Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Options for the Control of
Influenza, pages 169–172, 2007.
[99] C.E. Mills, J.M. Robins, and M. Lipsitch. Transmissibility of 1918 pandemic in-
fluenza. Nature, 432(7019):904–906, 2004.
114 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[100] Ministero della Salute. Influenza Vaccination Coverage, 2005. http://www.
ministerosalute.it/promozione/malattie/malattie.jsp.
[101] MIUR. La scuola in cifre. http://www.miur.it/ustat/documenti/pub2005/,
2005. Italian Ministry of University and Research. (In Italian).
[102] MIUR. L’universita` in cifre. http://www.miur.it/ustat/documenti/pub2005/,
2005. Italian Ministry of University and Research. (In Italian).
[103] S.M. Moghadas, C.S. Bowman, G. Rost, and J. Wu. Population-wide emergence of
antiviral resistance during pandemic influenza. PLoS ONE, 3(3):e1839, 2008.
[104] A.S. Monto. Vaccines and antiviral drugs in pandemic preparedness. Emerging
infectious diseases, 12(1):55, 2006.
[105] J. Mossong, N. Hens, M. Jit, P. Beutels, K. Auranen, R. Mikolajczyk, M. Massari,
S. Salmaso, G.S. Tomba, J. Wallinga, J. Heijne, M. Sadkowska-Todys, M. Rosin-
ska11, and J.W. Edmunds. Social Contacts and Mixing Patterns Relevant to the
Spread of Infectious Diseases. PLoS Med, 5(3):e74, 2008.
[106] C. J. L. Murray and A. D. Lopez. Mortality by cause for eight regions of the world:
Global Burden of Disease Study. The Lancet, 349:1269–1276, 1997.
[107] C.J.L. Murray, A.D. Lopez, B. Chin, D. Feehan, and K.H. Hill. Estimation of
potential global pandemic influenza mortality on the basis of vital registry data
from the 1918–20 pandemic: a quantitative analysis. Lancet, 368(9554):2211–2218,
2007.
[108] K. M. Neuzil, C. Hohlbein, and Y. Zhu. Illness Among Schoolchildren During
Influenza Season. Effect on School Absenteeism, Parental Absenteeism From Work,
and Secondary Illness in Families. Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med., 156:986–991, 2002.
[109] J. S. Nguyen-Van-Tam and A. W. Hampson. The epidemiology and clinical impact
of pandemic influenza. Vaccine, 21:1762–1768, 2003.
[110] Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). XIV Censimento generale della popolazione
e delle abitazioni. Availibale on-line at http://dawinci.istat.it/MD/, 2001.
[111] A. D. M. E. Osterhaus. Pre- or post-pandemic influenza vaccine? Vaccine,
25(27):4983–84, 2007.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 115
[112] M. T. Osterholm. Preparing for the Next Pandemic. The New England Journal of
Medicine, 352(18):1839–42, 2004.
[113] P. Poletti, B. Caprile, M. Ajelli, A. Pugliese, and S. Merler. Spontaneous behavioural
changes in response to epidemics. J Theor Biol, 260(1):31–40, 2009.
[114] S. Riley. Large–Scale Spatial–Transmission Models of Infectious Disease. Science,
316(5829):1298–1301, 2007.
[115] S. Riley and N. M. Ferguson. Smallpox transmission and control: Spatial dynamics
in Great Britain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103(33):12637–
12642, 2006.
[116] S. Riley, C. Fraser, C. A. Donnelly, A. C. Ghani, L. J. Abu-Raddad, A. J. Hedley,
G. M. Leung, L.-M. Ho, T.-H. Lam, T. Q. Thach, P. Chau, K.-P. Chan, S.-V. Lo,
P.-Y. Leung, T. Tsang, W. Ho, K.-H. Lee, E. M. C. Lau, N. M. Ferguson, and R. M.
Anderson. Transmission Dynamics of the Etiological Agent of SARS in Hong Kong:
Impact of Public Health Interventions. Science, 300:1961–1966, 2003.
[117] C. Rizzo, A. Bella, C. Viboud, L. Simonsen, M. A. Miller, M. C. Rota, S. Salmaso,
and M. L. Ciofi degli Atti. Trends for influenza-related deaths during pandemic and
epidemic seasons, Italy, 1969-2001. Emerg Infect Dis, 13(5):694–699, 2007.
[118] G. Salamina and P. D’Argenio. Shellfish consumption and awareness of risk of
acquiring hepatitis A among Neapolitan families - Italy 1997. Euro Surveillance,
3(10), 1998.
[119] J. Shaman and M. Kohn. Absolute humidity modulates influenza survival, trans-
mission, and seasonality. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 106(9):3243–3248, 2009.
[120] H. Shuval. Estimating the global burden of thalassogenic diseases: human infectious
diseases caused by wastewater pollution of the marine environment. Journal of
Water and Health, 1:53–64, 2003.
[121] A. C. Singer, B. M. Howard, A. C. Johnson, C. J. Knowles, S. Jackman, C. Accinelli,
A. Barra Caracciolo, I. Bernard, S. Bird, T. Boucard, A. Boxall, J. V. Brian, E. Cart-
mell, C. Chubb, J. Churchley, S. Costigan, M. Crane, M. J. Dempsey, B. Dorrington,
B. Ellor, J. Fick, J. Holmes, T. Hutchinson, F. Karcher, S. L. Kelleher, P. Marsden,
G. Noone, M. A. Nunn, J. Oxford, T. Rachwal, N. Roberts, M. Roberts, M. L.
Sacca, M. Sanders, J. O. Straub, A. Terry, D. Thomas, S. Toovey, R. Townsend,
116 BIBLIOGRAPHY
N. Voulvoulis, and C. Watts. Meeting Report: Risk Assessment of Tamiflu Use Un-
der Pandemic Conditions. Environmental Health Perspectives, 116(11):1563–1567,
2008.
[122] J. T. Stapleton and S. M. Lemon. Infectious Diseases, chapter Hepatitis A and
hepatitis E, pages 790–797. Philadelphia, US, Lippincott Co, 1994.
[123] United Nations. World Population Prospects - The 2006 Revision, 2007.
[124] L. Uscher-Pines, S.B. Omer, D.J. Barnett, T.A. Burke, and R.D. Balicer. Priority
setting for pandemic influenza: an analysis of national preparedness plans. PLoS
Med, 3(10):e436, 2006.
[125] T.M. Uyeki. Influenza diagnosis and treatment in children: a review of studies on
clinically useful tests and antiviral treatment for influenza. The Pediatric Infectious
Disease Journal, 22(2):164–177, 2003.
[126] C. Viboud, O. N. Bjornstad, D. L. Smith, L. Simonsen, M. A. Miller, and B. T.
Grenfell. Synchrony, waves, and spatial hierarchies in the spread of influenza. Sci-
ence, 312(5772):447–451, 2006.
[127] C. Viboud, M. A. Miller, B. T. Grenfell, O. N. Bjornstad, and L. Simonsen. Air
travel and the spread of influenza: important caveats. PLoS Medicine, 3(11):e503,
2006.
[128] R. J. Webby and R. G. Webster. Are We Ready for Pandemic Influenza? Science,
302(5650):1519–1522, 2003.
[129] WHO. WHO global influenza preparedness plan, 2005. http://www.who.int/csr/
resources/publications/influenza/WHO_CDS_CSR_GIP%_2005_5/en/.
[130] WHO. Influenza A(H1N1) - update 50, 2009. http://www.who.int/csr/don/
2009\_06\_17/en/index.html.
[131] World Health Organization. Ethical considerations in developing a public health
response to pandemic influenza. WHO, Geneva, 2007.
[132] J. T. Wu, S. Riley, C. Fraser, and G. M. Leung. Reducing the impact of the
next influenza pandemic using household-based public health interventions. PLoS
Medicine, 3:e361, 2006.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 117
[133] E. Zagheni, F.C. Billari, P. Manfredi, A. Melegaro, J. Mossong, and W.J. Edmunds.
Using Time-Use Data to Parameterize Models for the Spread of Close-Contact In-
fectious Diseases. Am J Epidemiol, 168(9):1082–1090, 2008.
